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Abstract 
 
 
Corruption, a word with an illicit identity that represents a major public problem 
for citizens. In fact, this apparent unquestionable common sense statement does 
permeate recent political discourses or even cutting-edge academic research. 
But, indeed, what may be wrong with this well-accepted assertion? And why is it 
characterized as a possible mistaken assumption? Both questions can be 
summed up in one direct answer: corruption is much more than illegalities, it is 
also a ‘beyond the law’ concern with social implications. Little attention has been 
given to evaluate corruption as an exclusive combination of pure licit behaviors. 
This alternative approach has always assumed a marginal or even 
complementary status in the comprehension of the phenomenon. This thesis 
affirms that illegalities offer a relevant, but incomplete contribution. For this 
reason, they must be set aside in order to unveil how legalities affect citizens’ 
perceptions about corruption as a whole. 
 
Undoubtedly, it is easier to establish objective parameters to limit the 
measurement of corruption to a mere evaluation of prosecutions, 
condemnations, or even perceptions about the commitment of illegal actions. 
However, corrupt behaviors proved to be resilient essentially because of their 
capacity to resemble both socially and normatively accepted as necessary for 
the ordinary democratic political operation. A renewed methodological approach 
is here proposed to demonstrate why legality in corruption matters. Thus, legal 
corruption must be put in evidence in order to verify how corruption appears as 
a pervasive, adaptable, dangerous for politics, and widely accepted major 
problem, especially in the public sector. Such methodology does not aim to 
incorporate ‘beyond the law’ elements in a broader corruption measurement, as 
usually attempted. On the contrary, it will isolate what is considered purely lawful, 
although corrupt, to deeply explore its specific effects on citizens’ perceptions. 
 
In essence, this thesis aims to show that legalities are more important to define 
the relevance of corruption than illicitness. It also wants to identify what should 
count as sufficient to determine such legal corruption. In this context, 
socioeconomic factors proved to be fundamental, especially ‘Internet Usage’ and 
‘Wastefulness of Government Spending’. 
 
Finally, it is possible to conclude that legality in corruption can be unveiled by 
simply asking citizens if they consider corruption a relevant problem in the public 
sector of advanced democracies or quasi-democracies, instead of asking directly 
about specific dimensions of corruption. It is also possible to perceive if 
corruption is a relevant public problem without directly asking citizens about 
corruption, but about general socially accepted misconducts with regards to legal 
corruption, such as the necessity of establishing personal contacts to get things 
done; the capacity of distorting rules, norms, and statutes in order to make 
private interests resemble licit and politically acceptable; and the governments’ 
ability to do what tradespeople want without hindering citizens’ wills. 
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Resumo 
 
Corrupção, uma palavra com identidade ilícita que representa um grande 
problema para os cidadãos. De facto, esta afirmação – aparentemente 
inquestionável e baseada no senso comum – permeia discursos políticos 
recentes ou até mesmo pesquisas académicas de ponta. Mas, em verdade, o 
que pode estar errado com esta afirmação tradicionalmente aceite? E por que 
caracterizá-la como equivocada? Ambas as questões podem ser resumidas em 
uma única e objetiva resposta: corrupção não se refere tão somente a 
ilegalidades, mas também a interesses ‘para além da lei’ que possuem 
implicações sociais. Pouca atenção tem sido dada à avaliação da corrupção sob 
uma perspetiva meramente lícita. Esta abordagem alternativa sempre foi 
marginal ou mesmo complementar. Esta tese afirma que a caracterização da 
corrupção como algo ilegal oferece uma contribuição relevante, mas incompleta 
para o entendimento do fenómeno. Por esta razão, deve ser posta de lado, a fim 
de se desvendar como apenas as legalidades afetam as perceções dos 
cidadãos sobre a corrupção como um todo. 
 
Sem dúvida, é mais fácil estabelecer parâmetros objetivos para limitar a medição 
da corrupção a uma mera avaliação de processos, de execuções penais ou 
mesmo de perceções sobre o cometimento de atos ilegais. Entretanto, o 
comportamento corrupto se mostra resiliente essencialmente devido à sua 
capacidade de parecer socialmente e normativamente aceite como necessário 
ao normal funcionamento político democrático. Uma renovada abordagem 
metodológica é aqui proposta para demonstrar a importância do papel da 
legalidade perante a corrupção. Logo, a corrupção legal deve ser colocada em 
evidência para que seja possível verificar como a corrupção (em sentido mais 
amplo) aparece como um invasivo, adaptável, politicamente perigoso e 
amplamente aceite problema, especialmente no setor público. Tal metodologia 
não pretende incorporar elementos ‘para além da lei’ em uma mensuração mais 
alargada da corrupção, como é usualmente feito. Pelo contrário, ela isolará o 
que é considerado puramente legal, embora corrupto, para explorar mais 
detalhadamente seus efeitos específicos sobre as perceções dos cidadãos. 
 
Em essência, esta tese pretende mostrar que as legalidades são mais 
importantes para definir a relevância da corrupção do que as ilegalidades. 
Também busca identificar o que deve contar como suficiente para determinar 
essa tal corrupção legal. Neste contexto, fatores socioeconómicos provaram ser 
fundamentais, especialmente aqueles relacionados ao ‘Uso da Internet’ e ao 
‘Desperdício dos Gastos do Governo". 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finalmente, é possível concluir que a legalidade na corrupção pode ser 
compreendida simplesmente ao se perguntar aos cidadãos sobre a relevância 
da corrupção como um problema no sector público de democracias avançadas 
ou quasi-democracias, ao invés de se perguntar diretamente sobre dimensões 
específicas da corrupção. De igual modo, é possível perceber se a corrupção é 
um problema público relevante sem se pedir diretamente aos cidadãos para que 
respondam sobre corrupção, mas sim sobre condutas abusivas, socialmente 
aceites e relacionadas a características lícitas da corrupção, tais como a 
necessidade de se estabelecer contactos pessoais para fazer as coisas 
acontecerem nos serviços públicos; a capacidade de distorcer as regras, normas 
e estatutos a fim de fazer os interesses privados parecerem lícitos e 
politicamente aceitáveis; e a habilidade dos governos para fazer exatamente 
aquilo que industriais e comerciantes desejam sem obstruir os interesses dos 
cidadãos. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Corruption, a word with an illicit identity that represents a major public problem for citizens. 
This apparent unquestionable common sense statement has been permeating recent political 
discourses or even cutting-edge academic research. But, indeed, what may be wrong with this 
well-accepted assertion? And why is it characterized as a possible mistaken assumption? Both 
questions can be summed up in one direct answer: corruption is much more than illegalities, 
it is also a ‘beyond the law’ concern with social implications. 
Everyone has an idea about what corruption is. Common sense always refers to it as 
something illegal and directly connected with an illicit conduct. A preliminary approach may 
simply classify the corrupt act just as a “behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a 
public role because of private-regarding […] pecuniary or status gains; or [as a] violat[ion of] 
rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (Nye, 1967, p. 419), 
but it is not that simple. Mark Philp, a reputed British political philosopher, once noticed 
that a legal act can still be corrupt (Philp, 1997, p. 441). This important statement highlights 
that it is possible to find corruption in an atmosphere surrounded by apparent legality and 
that a corrupt act can be not only supported by norms, but also accepted by citizens as 
necessary for politics to run properly, i.e., a behavior may be lawful, socially underpinned, 
politically mandatory, and still corruptive. In sum, the combination of these three not well-
categorized factors – legality, social tolerance, and political usage – is exactly what constitutes 
the basis for ‘legal corruption’1 itself and represents the starting point of this study. 
Obviously, it will not be easy to describe the intrinsic legality of a corrupt act. Nowadays, 
legal corruption has been seen as a yet imprecise concept. Many efforts were done to savvy 
this puzzling phenomenon and, as a consequence of its immaterial meaning, research 
                                                          
1 Legal corruption and its complexities will be precisely defined and explained in chapter 2, especially in section 
2.2. 
2 
basically focused on perceptions to find measures and explanations (Castro, 2008; Dincer & 
Johnston, 2015; Kaufmann & Vicente, 2005, 2011; Light, 2013). This thesis will follow a 
perceptional approach too, but with a novelty: legal corruption will be not operationalized 
through opinions of businessmen, academics or specific groups in society (such as 
journalists, public servants, or employees of non-governmental organizations). Information 
will come from general public, i.e., citizens’ perceptions will be used to make the concept 
more tangible and representative. 
Of course, perceptions are always a little problematic manner to evaluate and explain social 
phenomena. Corruption does not give rise to positions for or against because nobody is in 
favor of corruption (de Sousa, 2008, p. 11). However, even if survey responses do not reflect 
exactly the reality, they are a valid and feasible way to access people’s opinion and a yet 
possible form to make comparisons among countries. Furthermore, this thesis does not aim 
to capture real levels of corruption, but the importance of perceptions in the process of 
influencing politics instead. In essence, changing the way corruption is perceived today (by 
considering moral and ethical standards that go beyond the limits of juridical norms) will 
make possible to reduce the commitment of corrupt acts tomorrow. 
Considering that corruption persists as an endemic scourge, this thesis tries to explain that 
its maintenance as a primary public problem does not directly refer to the fact that it has 
illicit causations, but to the fact that it is pervasive, self-sustainable (see Mishra, 2006, p. 350), 
and determined by moral terms. Legal, social, and political approved corrupt acts may be the 
reason for the continuity of evidenced corruptions in ambiences full of anti-corruption 
agencies and public transparency instruments. As once pointed by Di Pietra & Melis (2015, 
pp. 3–4), “when corruption occurs across legal, cultural, and organizational boundaries, it 
becomes a complex and rich phenomenon to explore”. ‘Beyond the law’ corrupt dimensions 
must be then unveiled. 
1.1. Research question and objectives 
After this brief contextualization, it is possible now to present objectively the basic 
characteristics of the proposed thesis. First of all, corruption will work as a main topic and 
will serve as a guidance for the entire research. Next, a precise research question arises 
directly from this corrupt problématique: ‘Can legal corruption explain the reason why 
corruption itself is perceived as an important public problem among countries?’ 
Consequently, to answer this question, it will be necessary to better understand what legal 
3 
corruption is. A solid literature review will describe such central concept and a group of 
variables2 that directly refers to a combination of three specific kinds of corruption – cultural, 
political, and metasystemic (see de Sousa, 2011, pp. 39–43) – will be used to operationalize 
it. After understanding the measurement process and its implications, another question 
(complimentary, but not unimportant) should be answered: ‘What determines legal 
corruption?’ It will be then built an elucidative interpretation to decode the influence of 
specific socioeconomic elements (conditions of public transparency, accountability, 
efficiency, efficacy; and macroeconomic robustness) on legal corruption. 
In sum, comprehending theoretically what legal corruption is, learning how to measure it, 
observing how it exerts influence on the perception of the relevance of corruption, and 
explaining how it is determined in advanced democracies and emerging industrialized 
countries, will broaden our knowledge about a phenomenon that still represents a disputable 
concept (Dincer & Johnston, 2015; Kaufmann & Vicente, 2011; Lessig, 2013a, 2013b; 
Newhouse, 2014; Thompson, 2013) with serious political implications. Moreover, by doing 
so, a new way of perceiving the corrupt act itself is about to emerge, i.e., corruption has been 
widely studied, explained and demonstrated via its implicit illegal dimension, but not much 
effort has been done to deeply understand its intrinsically licit characteristics. 
Understanding corruption as something supported by both law and sociopolitical acceptance 
means changing how to fight against it and orient public policies. It is also relevant to note 
that a comparative cross-country analysis will serve as an important tool to categorize legal 
corruption and to describe ‘beyond the law’ corrupt tendencies and patterns throughout the 
evaluated nations. 
Another important task is to present the goals of this research. First, it aims to (i) explain in 
which circumstances legal corruption can work as a key point to better understand the 
relevance of corruption and (ii) define what should count as necessary to determine such 
‘beyond the norm’ corruption in capital-oriented countries. Next (as a secondary goal), it is 
also desired to (iii) develop a citizens’ perception-based measurement for legal corruption. 
1.2. Essential auxiliary concepts 
Definitions of corruption, such as legal corruption and its illegal counterpart, will be precisely 
described in chapter 2 and discussed throughout the thesis. However, some other necessary 
                                                          
2 These variables will be described in Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.1.3. 
4 
concepts will permeate the entire research process – including the foregoing definitions of 
corruption. I will call them ‘Essential Auxiliary Concepts’. The apparent contradiction 
between these two qualitative terminologies (essential and auxiliary) is intentional and 
explicable: these elements will serve to substantiate almost all discussions and allegations 
henceforth.  
The first ‘Essential Auxiliary Concept’ is the ‘Relevance’ of corruption as a major public 
problem. ‘Relevance’ was quoted, because it should be seen as the center of the proposed 
definition. Corruption will be further explored in subsequent chapters, but the term 
‘Relevance’ (usually marginalized in theories of corruption) needs to be described before 
discussions begin. In this sense, the relevance of corruption here is equivalent to a set of 
latent, persistent, and adaptable corrupt behaviors which is repeated through time and 
sufficient to cause disturbances to the current public order. The second ‘Essential Auxiliary 
Concept’ is the one related to ‘Advanced Democracies’3, i.e., well-established electoral 
democracies (members or candidates) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). The third (and last) ‘Essential Auxiliary Concept’ refers to ‘Emerging 
Industrialized Countries’. A macro-combination of two classes of countries: (i) the emerging 
economies – “localities which create opportunities for businesses […] [w]ith context typically 
characterized by, among other features, inefficient markets, active government involvement, 
extensive business networking, and high uncertainty, [that] challenge the efficacy of business 
models and theories” (Xu & Meyer, 2013, p. 1322) – and (ii) the newly industrialized nations4 
– “[t]raditionally less developed countries which have made profound structural changes in 
their economies under conditions of a fast growth rate” (Bożyk, 2006, p. 164)5. 
1.3. Basic structure of the thesis and the organization of chapters 
Based on the guidelines presented in this introductory section, chapter 2 will focus on 
reviewing literature. In this context, the theoretical evolution of corruption will be discussed 
and both classical and contemporary perspectives will be described in detail. The objective 
is to understand how corruption has been historically studied since remote epochs and how 
                                                          
3 Dalton, Scarrow, & Cain (2004) discussed about possible interconnections between advanced industrialized 
democracies and politics. Their interpretation of advanced democracy is also based on OECD membership or 
partnership. 
4 For more information, see the book Globalization and the Transformation of Foreign Economic Policy (Bożyk, 2006), 
especially in its section 7.3. 
5 Russia was considered because of its interpenetrating relations with both set of countries. It has historical 
connections especially with European OECD countries, it is one of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
and South Africa), and it has a huge and diversified industrial park. These conditions advocate for country’s 
inclusion in the study. 
5 
it has become a recurrent subject, especially in capital-oriented democracies and quasi-
democracies. Cutting-edge discussions about the resilience of corruption and its ‘beyond the 
law’ implications will be critically analyzed. After that, legal corruption will be defined and 
explored in conceptual terms. Discussions about bribery, extortion, and embezzlement will 
be held to determine precise boundaries for a definition of legal corruption. Besides that, 
mainstream definitions will be also displayed and will serve to understand what corruption 
has to do with legality itself. Finally, legal corruption will be presented in political terms, i.e., 
as a degeneration of politics. 
In chapter 3, the methodology will be dissected. The building blocks of the research will be 
described carefully. In this context, perception-based, cross-national, and quantitative 
elements will be investigated. Next, the objectives of the thesis will be properly 
operationalized. Describing all hypotheses and their implications will facilitate the evaluation 
of the results in the following chapters. Finally, multivariate econometric models to explain 
both the relevance of corruption and legal corruption will be developed. 
Chapter 4 will offer a ‘beyond the law’ explanation for the relevance of corruption. Necessary 
discussions will enhance the comprehension of the phenomenon. The first one will be about 
the relevance of corruption as a public problem. Is it really true? Is corruption in fact a very 
serious perceived public problem? Three distinct categories of countries will be defined (one 
in which corruption is seen as totally endemic and problematic in public terms, other in 
which the limits between legality and illegality have been contested, and another one in which 
corruption is socially controlled, but not inexistent). Additionally, some pertinent potential 
exceptions will be discussed and integrated into the proposed explanatory linear models. 
Lastly, good measures to explain the relevance of corruption will be presented: a rival illegal 
explanation will be contested, control sociocultural interactions will be analyzed, and a 
‘beyond the law’ interpretation of the relevance of corruption will be demonstrated and 
validated. 
Chapter 5 will focus on determining what counts to explain legal corruption in this specific 
set of capital-oriented countries. Extrinsic determinants of legal corruption (such as public 
transparency, accountability, efficiency, efficacy, and macroeconomic robustness) will be 
described and considered as possible concurrent explanations for a perceived legality in 
corruption. As a way to create a singular answer for this problématique, a model – in which 
only relevant determinants previously tested were inserted – will be used to build a simple – 
albeit powerful – explanation for the perception of legal corruption. 
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Finally, chapter 6 will present the main findings and conclusions. More than assuming the 
necessity of exploring ‘beyond the law’ dimensions of the problem, this thesis concludes that 
creating conditions to reduce levels of perceived legality in corruption may become a crucial 
tool in the process of fighting against corruption. In essence, changing citizens’ perceptions 
about corruption today will help us to mitigate the occurrence of real corrupt acts in the 
future. That is why corruption should not continue to be seen as a political necessity. Better 
citizens, better social decisions, better democracies, and consequently lower levels of 
corruption. 
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Chapter 2  
Reviewing literature to understand legal corruption 
Lambsdorff, Taube, and Schramm (2005, p. 1) once stated that “[w]e need more theoretical 
inspiration that is able to better direct our energies in the fight against corruption”. I would 
say that we need not only more inspiration to combat it, but also a better understanding of 
what corruption really means. We must go beyond orthodox precepts that lead corruption 
to a simplistic characterization in which illegalities (e.g. bribery, extortion, and 
embezzlement) act as perfect boundaries for the phenomenon. Corruption is more than what 
is sanctioned as illegal not only because societies experience difficulties in making norms 
ultimately represent what citizens really consider corrupt, but also because there is a 
widespread perception of degeneration in politics that makes people believe in corruption as 
necessary for the ordinary political operation. 
A corrupt culture has been thus undermining politics. Corruption scandals have never been 
so contested in advanced democracies and emerging industrialized countries (see for e.g., 
Bågenholm, 2013; Chaia & Teixeira, 2001; Lopez & Suryomenggolo, 2014) and their effects 
have never been so adaptable and persistent (Herzfeld & Weiss, 2003; Jain, 2001; Mishra, 
2006). In such situation, citizens perceive that corruption is no longer about individual 
wrongdoing, but processes and systems; it is no more about state resources, but the public 
interest in current public affairs; and it is no more about occasional incidence, but embedded 
practices. In sum, corruption has not been considered a relevant public problem because of 
its illegal conditions; it has been considered relevant because of its capacity to become 
resilient, licit, and inevitable for politics. 
In fact, corruption has a lot to do with politics. As a trans-systemic phenomenon, “it inheres 
in all systems […] [and] affects all classes of society; all state organizations […]; and all times, 
ancient, medieval, and modern” (Alatas, 1990, p. 11). Consequently, it is impossible to assess 
legality in corruption without understanding what corruption is in a comprehensive 
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perspective, i.e., any ‘beyond the law’ conceptualization is highly influenced by historical 
precedents that conducted studies in the field to this new paradigm. In sum, a robust 
literature review is needed to clarify in which circumstances citizens consider corruption as 
a major public problem essentially because of its lawful political implications. 
In this sense, this chapter will first overview the theoretical evolution of corruption (section 
2.1). An historical literature review will serve to show that both classical and contemporary 
perspectives of the phenomenon largely contributed to understand why corruption is seen 
as a broader public issue in which legalities must be took into account. Next, it will focus on 
building up a precise definition for legal corruption (section 2.2) that excludes illegalities and 
highlights what is lawful. Additionally, the three most usual ways to define corruption will be 
presented in order to elucidate that the commitment of a legal corrupt act is mainly associated 
with a major public interest degeneration, i.e., the collusion between market interests and 
democratic institutions is able to distort not only laws, but also natural conditions for politics 
to run properly. Finally, this chapter will present a comprehensive summary of the 
discussions held (section 2.3). 
2.1. The theoretical evolution of corruption 
Science is a combination of evolution, integrity and self-organization (Alieva & Zayats, 2015, 
p. 102). These three factors enable empirical research to solve problems and to raise new 
dilemmas in a continuous dialectical process6. The concept of corruption is also driven by 
this triad of elements. “This constant evolution is characteristic of corruption studies [and] 
[i]t would not be too surprising if, in the next 20 years, new forms of corruption will receive 
greater weight in the literature” (Farrales, 2005, p. 13). In this sense, legal corruption only 
appears as a contemporary conceptual quest because of a series of evolutionary factors that 
redirected the field of study to this new paradigm. Actually, revisiting the literature about 
corruption is necessary to better understand the fundamentals of a ‘beyond the law’ 
corruption. 
There is no better way to comprehend evolution in theories about corruption than 
understanding the literal meaning of evolution in social sciences and its relationship with two 
other complementary concepts: integrity and self-organization. First, evolution in social 
sciences, and also in the field of corruption, represents an objective reality driven by 
‘ideational’ and ‘material’ forces (Tang, 2010, pp. 33–35), i.e., notions of corruption should 
                                                          
6 For details about dialectics and its implications, see Marx (1892). 
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capture ideas (the ideational force) to put them in practice (the material force). This “organic 
synthesis” (Tang, 2010, p. 34) of forces is something desirable, but difficult to happen. In 
fact, legal corruption is a tentative way to reconcile ‘ideational’ and ‘material’ approaches by 
simply recognizing that a perceived deterioration of political conditions (the ideational force) 
leads to the commitment of lawful corrupt acts (the material force). 
Second, integrity, here seen as a systemic condition in which all the parts support the overall 
function of the whole (B. Smith, 2007, p. 290), can be seen as another important element for 
paradigmatic evolution. Finding specific answers for corruption will also contribute to 
connect major social theories and “unite separate, ‘piecewise’ scientific knowledge” (Alieva 
& Zayats, 2015, p. 100) to create solutions for multidisciplinary problems. Comprehending 
that corruption is more than mere illegalities reinforces the idea of integrity in this field of 
study. Whereas people still believe in a material explanation for corruption (e.g. bribery, 
extortion, and embezzlement), they do know that corruption needs a broader answer that 
encompasses even ethical standards and democratic values. Corruption appears as a relevant 
public problem not only because of its association with what is illegal, but also because of its 
capacity to legally shape the political operation of advanced democracies or industrialized 
quasi-democracies. 
Third, corruption studies seems to be self-organized, which means that they “appear to arise 
spontaneously from the local interactions of actors” (Holland, 1995, 1998; see Wagner & 
Leydesdorff, 2005, p. 1610). Many institutions and specialists have influenced the way science 
sees corruption, but there is not a single explanatory power that had fully systematized 
corruption. Because of this, “the emergence of order cannot be attributed to either top down 
or bottom up rules” (Cilliers, 1998; Kauffman, 1995). The concept of corruption is then 
shaped by a complex structure that encompasses the perceptions of institutions, specialists 
and citizens about the phenomenon in different periods and cultures. The evolution of the 
concept of corruption does not represent a rational and logical continuum and a step-by-step 
construction.  
In sum, “historical influences are important to the extent that history shapes the cultural 
norms that dictate corrupt acts” (Goel & Nelson, 2010, p. 434). It is necessary to be familiar 
with the history of the great definitional debates (Farrales, 2005, p. 40) in order to understand 
that recent conceptualizations are influenced by a non-linear construction of an evolutionary 
conceptual process that encompasses both classical (subsection 2.1.1) and contemporary 
(subsection 2.1.2) perspectives of corruption. Historical precedents have shaped institutions 
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over the years (Goel & Nelson, 2010, p. 439) and, for this reason, it is relevant to perceive 
that corruption is an ‘historical construction still under construction’. 
2.1.1. Classical perspectives of corruption 
Corruption is not a new phenomenon (Klitgaard, 1988, p. 7), but (i) “was it a prominent 
subject in ancient philosophical discussions?” and (ii) “how can classical perspectives help us 
to understand new forms of corruption? Classical definitions can be found even in Platonic 
and Aristotelian discourses. For the Greek tradition, “corruption expresse[s] the 
degeneration of right regimes, those who rule for the ‘good of the whole,’ into perverted 
ones, those who rule for ‘the good of themselves’ (e.g., tyranny, oligarchy, demagogy)” (Mény 
& de Sousa, 2001, p. 2827). As a result, for them, “politics is not a polity where everyone 
pursues the public interest but one where the pursuit of private interests is not allowed to 
transgress certain minimal public-interest limits” (Mulgan, 2012, p. 27). Aristotle once 
summed up this idea in his chef-d'œuvre Politics saying that 
“The true forms of government, therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, 
or the many, govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which 
rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the one or of the few, or of the 
many, are perversions” (Aristotle, 1999[335-323 BC], book III, part VII). 
In this sense, acting corruptly becomes a regime perversion, i.e., if corruption happens, 
democracy fails. They cannot coexist because, for Greek philosophers, they are incompatible 
phenomena. Consequently, in accordance with Aristotle’s words, “ideal, non-corrupt states 
are governed by ideally virtuous rulers who are wholly focused on the common interest and 
would never consider pursuing their own interests at the expense of the good of the 
community” (Mulgan, 2012, p. 31). Thus, corruption only represented an institutional decay 
explained in terms of behaviors, practices, and laws that debased from the ‘common good,’ 
(Mény & de Sousa, 2001, p. 2827). 
Indeed, πθορα (fthora), the Greek word for corruption, still “retains more of its literal meaning 
and implies actual decay or disintegration” (Mulgan, 2012, p. 29). For the Greek tradition, 
“[t]o label any person or practice as ‘corrupt’ is to stigmatize them as beyond the moral pale” 
(Mulgan, 2012, p. 25). Of course, this “conception of corruption […] grounded in existing 
law is open to charges of circularity […] because it offers no independent standard of what 
should count as corrupt” (Mulgan, 2012, p. 33). Pure democracy – the point with absence of 
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corruption – becomes a hypothetical ideal to be achieved because “[everybody is] corrupt 
and, consequently, what is the point of condemning corruption?” (Mulgan, 2012, p. 31). 
In fact, legal corruption appears as a possible answer for this question, because it observes 
that citizens may also consider corruption necessary for politics to run well in a democratic 
sense. In other words, corruption has not been condemned because of its capacity to 
degenerate right regimes into perverted ones, but because of its capacity to degenerate 
politics in order to make the validation of group-based interests resemble democratic. Public 
interests become secondary and limited by the necessity of safeguarding market interests 
first. In contrast to the precepts of classical tradition, citizens are encouraged to believe that 
it is inevitable for democracies – or at least for industrialized quasi-democracies – to run 
corruptly, and, for this reason, they tend to legitimize corruption. Some behaviors may be 
considered ethically corrupt, while relevant for the process of doing politics in a democratic 
manner. Citizens are unhappy with a pervasive corruption; however, they accept that it is 
necessary to act corruptly in order to reach democratic collective decisions. 
Corruption continued to be theoretically studied, but empirically underdeveloped. Medieval 
approaches correlated it with catholic moral standards. In this period, “a life not led in accord 
with [Christian] principles was seen as being necessarily corrupt” (Barcham, 2012, p. 68). In 
the Renaissance, Machiavelli (1469-1527) emphasized that “to be a corrupt citizen was to 
place one’s own ambitions, or the ends of faction, above the common good, because to act 
in this way was invariably fatal to liberty and hence greatness” (see Barcham, 2012, p. 65; 
Machiavelli, 1989, 1, 2.2; Skinner, 1990, p. 138). Thus, a Machiavellian corruption 
“represented any form of deterioration in the quality of government” (Hill, 2012, p. 98). Else, 
Ferguson (1723-1816) “agreed that corruption could affect people, not only individually but 
also en masse, denoting pervasive attitudinal and behavioral trends in a given polity” (Hill, 
2012; Shumer, 1979, p. 9). Montesquieu (1689-1755), Ferguson and even Rousseau (1712-
1778) conceived corruption in moral terms, then it appeared to be only a problem of virtue 
(Hill, 2012, p. 98). Additionally, Smith (1723-1790) considered it as a deviation from a natural 
– liberal – state (Hill, 2012, p. 110) and soften its boundaries in order to produce a 
commercial justification of interests (Hill, 2012, p. 102). 
Then now it is time to answer the two preliminary questions that were presented in the 
beginning of this subsection. First, it was possible to note that corruption was not a 
prominent discussion in classical times. It does not mean that it was not discussed, but it was 
not definitely the reason of the major historical debates. Classical definitions of corruption 
seemed to “sacrifice clarity to brevity” (Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002, p. 3) and limit the 
12 
discussions to a superficial approximation of the phenomenon (Mény & de Sousa, 2001, p. 
2827). They only evidenced that corruption has a strong relation with a moral decay that is 
socially condemned and undermines democratic values, but they almost neglected the fact 
that corruption has also a licit dimension in which politics is put into practice. 
Second, classical approaches helped us to understand corruption as a multidisciplinary 
phenomenon (Di Pietra & Melis, 2015) that correlates with both democratic values and 
politics. Only by assuming the maintenance of this association, it will be possible to analyze 
new approaches that see corruption not only as something wrong or illicit, but also as 
something licit and socially accepted by citizens. Legality in corruption is mainly associated 
with a degeneration, as pointed by the classics, but with a degeneration of natural conditions 
of politics to run properly instead. 
2.1.2. Contemporary empirical perspectives of corruption 
As it was possible to see, corruption is not a new trend at all. For many centuries, corruption 
was regarded just as a mere control variable for other major concepts, e.g., democracy, public 
administration, ethics, or even politics. Mid-twentieth century surely represented a turning 
point for corruption comprehension (Farrales, 2005, p. 6) because it was considered for the 
very first time as a specific research field in which parameters and implications must be 
unveiled. The vagueness observed on corruption studies until the half of the last century was 
progressively replaced by the usage of robust scientific research methods. In fact, corruption 
changed its status and appeared no longer as a marginal phenomenon, but as a central 
concept to be precisely assessed, explained, and measured. 
Four relevant historical periods will be defined here. They will serve as a way to understand 
recent theoretical dilemmas and to promote a solid comprehension about the phenomenon. 
Surely, corruption definitions from mid-twentieth century (subsection 2.1.2.1) still influence 
studies in the field. Conceptual developments during the 1970s and 1980s (subsection 
2.1.2.2) also offered relevant contributions and potentiated the application of statistical tools 
to assess corruption. 1990s and 2000s (subsection 2.1.2.3) came to reveal an endemic 
perspective and to systematize corruption. Certainly, all these three remarkable periods did 
matter to justify the relevance of a renewed contemporary research in the field (subsection 
2.1.2.4) that observes the resilience of corruption as public problem and tries to attach it in 
a lawful perspective. 
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2.1.2.1. 1950s and 1960s: a functional revisionist meaning for corruption 
Joseph Nye once stated that “[c]orruption, some say, is endemic in all governments, [but] it 
has received remarkably little attention from students of government” (Nye, 1967, p. 417). 
At that time, he was correct. In fact, he and other relevant scholars (see Bayley, 1966; 
Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964) started to shed some light on this by simply noting that 
corruption interfered in the process of democratization and development (Farrales, 2005, p. 
6), especially in less developed countries (Scott, 1972, p. 9). 
This group of researchers, mostly recognized as functionalists, tried to contest the classical 
moralist approach in which “corruption conveys the idea of wrecking or destroying 
institutions” (Bowles, 2000, p. 462). As pointed by Mény and de Sousa (2001, p. 2828), for 
them, corruption was seen as ‘another form of political influence’ that could also be used to 
enhance economic development and political integration. 
This ‘revisionism’ of corruption also represented a critic period for the consolidation of the 
field and marked the beginning of a systematic analysis of the phenomenon. Indeed, the 
revisionists avoided moralism by treating corruption not as pure moral decay with pervasive 
implications, but as a common event with negative and positive implications (see Bayley, 
1966; Nye, 1967) Functionalist-revisionists presented a disquieting finding: corruption may 
also ‘grease the wheels’7 (Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964; Leys, 1965) and produce favorable 
results. Historic moralism was then shaken by a robust evidence of benefits for practicing 
corrupt acts in specific circumstances. 
Common sense illegal kinds of corruption – e.g., bribery, extortion, embezzlement –  were 
said to represent a valid form of achieving development, but, “[t]oday, it would be difficult 
to advocate the benefits of conventional forms of corruption” […] [because] the belief that 
[it] […] promoted economic development, political participation, and administrative efficacy 
proved historically wrong” (Mény & de Sousa, 2001, p. 2828). Nevertheless, this approach 
helped scholars to perceive that corruption must not be seen as a marginal social behavior, 
because of its capacity to influence politics and to generate economic development in specific 
circumstances. 
Seeing legality in corruption, as proposed in this thesis, is a way of recognizing, in accordance 
with the functionalists, that corruption is in fact a political influence. However, corruption 
                                                          
7 See also Dreher & Gassebner (2011) and Méon & Sekkat  (2005) for more information about ‘greasing the 
wheels’ theories. 
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may degenerate institutions without being perceived as something illegal and make sovereign 
states work for specific groups in society, groups that represent massive commercial or 
industrial interests. Apart from a functional perspective, a lawful corruption must not be seen 
as a form of ‘greasing the wheels’ for any kind of social development. Citizens accept a licit 
corruption because they see it as needed to run politics, and not because they believe it will 
enhance economic development or social cohesion. 
2.1.2.2. 1970s and 1980s: a market approach to challenge functionalism 
After establishing the basis for corruptive studies, functionalism was gradually challenged by 
a more rational perspective. In the 1970s and 1980s, scholars started to reorient research to 
a more economical paradigm. In this sense, it is possible to mention the relevant 
contributions of Susan Rose-Ackerman (1975, 1978), Anne Krueger (1974), and Olivier 
Cadot (1987) to the evolutionary process. It is also important to say that much effort was 
done to conceptualize criminal behaviors in a rational manner. Becker’s works (Becker & 
Stigler, 1974; Becker, 1968, 1983), mainly during this period, were relevant to offer 
comprehension to the fact that illicit corrupt acts had also micro-level implications that did 
not legitimize development – as pointed by functionalists. In essence, corruption represented 
an individual choice and “depended on two major determinants: the existing structures of 
opportunity and the costs and incentives involved” (Mény & de Sousa, 2001, p. 2828). 
This rational approach tended to underestimate personal standards by transforming 
individual choice in a mere cost-benefit calculation (Mény & de Sousa, 2001, p. 2828). Surely, 
any attempt to explain corruption in terms of exclusive rational choices would limit also its 
interpretation and exclude any influence of cultural, moral, behavioral, or political 
implications that matters to a lawful observation of the phenomenon. 
Besides that, associating crime, punishment and bribery with corruption, 1970s and 1980s 
scholars offered an outstanding contribution to the process of conceptualization: it must be 
“studied in the context of the institutional structures in which [it] exist[s]” (Farrales, 2005, p. 
7). Rational choices uniquely understood that it was only possible to fully recognize 
corruption by deepening knowledge about the ambience in which it happened. It was done 
a great job during this period, especially in the 1980s, to improve the discussion about the 
limits and formats of corruption. Handbooks and tentative articles (see for example 
Becquart-Leclercq, 1984; Heidenheimer, Johnston, & LeVine, 1989) appeared to sum up a 
vast bibliography in a more pragmatic way. 
15 
This époque served to define the main objectives of the research in corruption. The paradigms 
presented at that period were crucial to motivate the commitment of an ‘explosion’ of studies 
about corruption during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. 
2.1.2.3. 1990s and early 21st century: corruption as a systemic public problem 
Preliminary works in the field showed that corruption needed a more multidimensional 
analysis. Both functionalist and rational approaches seemed to limit corruption by avoiding 
its classical essence: corruption is not a choice between ‘less moralism for committing illicit 
acts to justify development’ and ‘an individual cost-benefit calculation’. Contrariwise, it is a 
combination of these two factors plus a wide range of behaviors in which both social moral 
condemnation and the decadence of natural conditions of politics play an important role 
(Mény & de Sousa, 2001, p. 2828; Philp, 1997, pp. 445–446). Moreover, defining corruption 
also represents an historical challenge because it is a result of “a confluence of several 
significant events and ongoing trends” (Farrales, 2005, p. 8). 
During the 1990s – and also early twenty-first century – researchers were exposed to a 
panoply of concepts of corruption with economical, sociological, political, and/or ethical 
implications. However, “[w]hat changed in the early 1990s was the public’s readiness to 
tolerate political corruption” (Heywood, 1997, p. 419) because 
“It no longer appeared to be an exception, but a norm: threatening democratic 
foundations, causing institutional crisis, destabilizing the global economy, helping 
‘organized crime’ to breed from clandestinity to illicit government, fomenting 
public deception about political life, and undermining the idea of public good” 
(Mény & de Sousa, 2001, p. 2829). 
Consequently, corruption started to be seen not only as a social phenomenon, but as an 
endemic and relevant public problem with systemic implications to the legitimacy of political 
systems (Della Porta & Mény, 1995). 
By noting that, it became more interesting to develop solutions or even comparative analyses. 
Studies about corruption seemed to proliferate in a way never seen before. This period 
certainly provided some of the greatest contributions to the literature. The gradual interest 
in understanding corruption in a systemic way encouraged scholars to search and explain 
corruption in a multidisciplinary manner (see Andvig, 1991; Cartier-Bresson, 1992; 
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Heywood, 1997; Philp, 1997; Tanzi, 1998). Moreover, a continuous application of statistical 
methods potentiated the appearance of robust findings about the phenomenon (Hellman, 
Jones, Kaufmann, & Schankerman, 2000, p. see; Paldam, 2002; Treisman, 2000). 
Universities, anti-corruption agencies, and supranational institutions started a progressive 
process of measuring corruption in a comparative perspective. Many organizations started 
to develop indexes in which corruptive actions played a significant role and datasets were 
created or improved. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International 
(TI) was first launched in 1995 to “put the issue of corruption on the international policy 
agenda” (Transparency International, 2015a). It represented the first systematic attempt to 
measure corruption and tried to “capture the informed views of analysts, businesspeople and 
experts in countries around the world” (Transparency International, 2015a). The Global 
Corruption Barometer (GCB), also developed by TI, had its first appearance in 2003 and was 
created to present citizens’ perceptions about everyday corruption worldwide (Transparency 
International, 2015b). Many other projects appeared, but none of them with the significant 
social impact and specificities of TI’s initiatives. In this sense, the World Economic Forum 
(WEF) and the World Bank (WB) also contributed to the development of the field by 
considering corruption as a fundamental pillar of both competitiveness (see Lall, 2001) and 
governance (see Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010), respectively. 
A normative approach (see Della Porta & Vannucci, 2005; Jos, 1993) also gained relevance. 
By progressively sanctioning the commitment of illegalities, societies believed that corruption 
could be avoided and its incidence dramatically reduced. However, corruption proved to be 
more resilient and persistent than expected (Blackburn, Bose, & Emranul Haque, 2006; 
Damania, Fredriksson, & Mani, 2004; Mishra, 2006; Swaleheen, 2012). Constitutions, penal 
codes, laws, and decrees were not able to overwhelm all forms of corruption because they 
do not change automatically to become adapted for new forms of corruption and because 
norms can be also manipulated in order to make what is corrupt sounds licit and fundamental 
to the process of doing politics. 
2.1.2.4. Last decade: a ‘beyond the law’ persistent corruption 
The perception of corruption as a social ‘cancer’8 seemed to undermine and limit the concept 
to a simple inquisition against illegalities. As a result, citizens’ perceptions and also anti-
                                                          
8 In 1996, the ninth President of the WB declared that “we need to deal with the cancer of corruption” 
(Wolfensohn, 2005). 
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corruption strategies appeared to be challenged by a dramatic reconfiguration of the idea of 
corruption. Illegal corruption was condemned and progressively inserted into a normative 
framework, whereas legal corruption – what goes beyond the law and condemnation – 
remained unregulated. “There are many factors that can account for [the] institutional 
failure” (de Sousa, 2010b) of combating corruption and certainly one of them begins to be 
more and more prominent: corruption is not only systemic and illicit, but resilient, adaptable, 
persistent and sometimes licitly supported by moral standards, elite dissimulation or even by 
citizens. 
As a result, mainstream anticorruption reforms “based on a theoretical mischaracterization 
of the problem of systemic corruption” (Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013, p. 449) did not 
result. Any attempt to comprehend corruption as a principal-agent problem fails because it 
rather resembles a collective action problem (Persson et al., 2013, p. 449). It is necessary to 
recognize that “[corruption] appears to be a coordination problem, where the equilibrium 
that emerges depends on shared expectations about others’ behavior” (Persson et al., 2013, 
p. 463). 
The more corruption was illegally condemned, the more citizens felt that corruption 
remained unexplained and uncontrolled. If illicit behaviors were punished, how could 
corruption remain a relevant public problem, especially in advanced democracies and 
emerging industrialized countries? The answer is that corruption is not what elites or 
institutions define as illegal and punishable, but what they sell to citizens as legal and 
acceptable – by controlling the norms - and also what citizens signalize as socially acceptable 
to elites and institutions. Corrupt acts may be supported by both elites (norms approved by 
institutions) and citizens (social tolerance of corruption or information asymmetry caused by 
the difficulty to punish licit corruption), i.e., citizens disapprove the commitment of illegal 
acts, while tacitly accept some corrupt behaviors (e.g., traffic of influence, manipulation of 
norms and institutional objectives, state capture, etc.) as necessary for politics to run well. 
In fact, resilience in corruption seems to be much more related to what people democratically 
valid as corrupt and lawful than to what they consider illegal, and, for this reason, scholars 
have been gradually reorienting research in the field in order to understand why corruption 
still represents a public problem, even though institutions have never been so prepared to 
punish illegalities. During the last seventy years, corruption has been mainly characterized as 
something illegal. However, a group of researches tries now to observe in which 
circumstances corruption can be associated with lawful actions. Institutional distortion or 
even the manipulation of laws are used to justify an evidenced persistence of a systemic 
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corruption (Jain, 2001, p. 72). Relevant works produced to analyze corruption in the United 
States by Thompson (1995, 2013), and Lessig (2011, 2013a), in Italy by Della Porta and 
Vannucci (Della Porta & Vannucci, 2007, 2012; Della Porta, 2001), or even worldwide by 
Kaufmann and Vicente (2005, 2011), evidenced that the relations between public and private 
actors must be considered, that the institutions in which corruption appears are relevant, and 
that corruption is more than bribing, extorting or cheating. 
Considering what this new group of theoreticians observed, this thesis want to show that 
corruption may represent a relevant collective action problem not only for extremely corrupt 
societies facing illegal corrupt impasses (see Persson et al., 2013, pp. 463–466), but also for 
advanced democracies and emerging industrialized economies that deal with the persistence 
of a systemic ‘beyond the law’ corruption. In sum, the resilience of a licit kind of corruption 
may produce more damage to societies than its illegal counterpart, because it has the power 
to pervert natural conditions of politics. 
2.2. The hard task of defining legal corruption 
However, what is this ‘legal corruption’? To answer this question, first, it will be necessary 
to observe the differences between what is assumed as corruptly illegal and what is perceived 
as corruptly legal (subsection 2.2.1). After that, mainstream definitions of corruption will be 
presented in order to elucidate that the commitment of a legal corrupt act is mainly associated 
with a major public interest deterioration (subsection 2.2.2). Following this, legal corruption 
will be precisely defined (subsection 2.2.3). Different dimensions of legal corruption will be 
explored to evidence how a persistent degeneration of natural conditions of politics can 
affect the way citizens perceive the relevance of corruption as a public problem in societies 
with high levels of commercial development or industrialization. 
2.2.1. Much more than bribery, extortion, or embezzlement 
It is impossible to understand corruption in a legal approach, without observing its illegal 
foundations. For this purpose, bribery, extortion, and embezzlement – the most usual illicit 
approximations for corruption – will be dissected in the next lines of this subsection. Daniel 
Lowenstein once stated that 
“[T]he crime of bribery is the black core of a series of concentric circles 
representing the degrees of impropriety in official behavior. In this conception, a 
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series of gray circles surround the bribery core, growing progressively lighter as 
they become more distant from the center, until they blend into the surrounding 
white area that represents perfectly proper and innocent conduct” (Lowenstein, 
1985, p. 786). 
In this sense, bribery represents the quintessential darkest form of corruption (de Sousa, 
2011, pp. 100–101; Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002, pp. 139–140; Scally, 2009, p. 7) and any 
material definition of it will impact corruption itself. Indeed, by limiting the boundaries of 
what is illegal, this thesis establishes the preliminary basis to discuss about legal corruption 
definitions that present more than a simple bribe-pact approach and consider even ethical 
behaviors or political standards. 
Actually, the concept of corruption has always been historically associated with bribery 
(Bayley, 1966, p. 720; see Tanzi, 1998, pp. 559–560). This fundamental assumption seems to 
restate the largely disseminated idea that corruptive acts and bribes act as similar phenomena. 
Just like corruption, bribery has been noticed since remote times (Noonan Jr., 1984). In 
ancient times, it worked just as an approximated synonym for reciprocity and its 
condemnation represented the irresponsibility of not fulfilling social covenants (Noonan Jr., 
1984, pp. 1–30). In this context, paying a bribe could be an efficient way to achieve success 
in social exchanges. 
British tradition saw it as a condemnable action with moral implications. The first English 
extortion statute asserted that "no Sheriff, or other officer of the King, shall take any reward 
to do his office, but shall be paid by the King"9, while the first English bribery statute stated 
that “judges may not take any robe, fee, pension, gift, nor reward of any but the King, except 
reward of meat and drink, which shall be no great value”10. These two excerpts reflected also 
an important detail with great impact in the discussions: bribery and extortion are not perfect 
synonyms. 
The distinction between bribery and extortion is not straightforward (Lindgren, 1993, p. 
1739; Rose-Ackerman, 2010, p. 222). Paraphrasing Ayres (1997, p. 1235), it is possible to say 
that when a pure bribe is being negotiated, the threatened expects, in the absence of 
agreement, to receive a fair trial; and when a pure extortion is being negotiated, the threatened 
expects, in the absence of agreement, to receive an unfair trial. Bribery is thus a more severe 
offshoot of extortion that indicates an illicit benefit given or received to influence official 
                                                          
9 Chapter XXVI, 3 Edw. 1 (Statute of Westminster I), 1275, fully available in Mortimer (1764, pp. 528–530). 
10 Chapter III, 8 Ric. 2, 1384, fully available in Pickering (1762, pp. 272–275). 
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action (Lindgren, 1993, pp. 1696, 1739), whereas extortion11 is more general and refers to 
“the seeking or receipt of a corrupt payment by a public official (or a pretended public 
official) because of his office or his ability to influence official action” (Lindgren, 1993, p. 
1696). 
Additionally, embezzlement, defined “as theft of assets by a person in a position of trust or 
responsibility over those assets” (Cai & Li, 2011, p. 1), is also a prominent illegal expression 
of corruption. It is unquestionable that this sort of behavior is grave and socially harmful. 
When discovered, embezzlement is rapidly condemned by citizens, except when associated 
with political populism and dissimulation (Acemoglu, Egorov, & Sonin, 2013; Gidron & 
Bonikowski, 2013). Only “a rhetoric that aggressively defends the interests of the common 
man against the privileged elite” (Acemoglu et al., 2013, p. 771) is able to legitimize such a 
disorder.  
Contemporary researchers in the field agree that bribery, extortion and embezzlement are 
not corruption itself and represent only a specific dimension of it (Basu, 2011, p. 4; Bowles, 
2000, p. 460; Torsello & Venard, 2016, p. 35). Special attention was given to the phenomenon 
of bribery. They try to separate it in two distinct major classes: (i) the collusive one and (ii) 
the ‘harassment bribery’ (see Basu, 2011, pp. 4–6; Dufwenberg & Spagnolo, 2011, pp. 2–4; 
Verma & Sengupta, 2015, p. 1). The first represents a condition “where an individual or 
group pays a bribe to illegally get access to a product or service” (Verma & Sengupta, 2015, 
p. 1) and the second describes a situation where persons have to pay a bribe to get what they 
are legally entitled to (Basu, 2011, p. 4). In effect, this last classification expands the traditional 
approach by arguing that in some conditions even the payment of a bribe may be considered 
licit and, for this reason, legal and supported by public opinion. 
Finally, all these usual illegalities (bribery, extortion, and embezzlement) seem only to 
configure specific and severe kinds of corruption with direct implications in moral standards 
and citizens’ perceptions, but limited explanations for the relevance of corruption. In 
essence, corruption must be seen as a situation in which individuals or groups act in concert 
to further their own interests at the expense of a third party or unilaterally to further their 
own interests at the expense of others12. Illegal forms of corruption resemble essentially the 
                                                          
11 This definition refers to a specific kind of extortion, the ‘extortion under color of office’. For more 
information about a coercive extortion, see Lindgren (1993). 
12 These assertions were made by Bowles (2000, p. 460). For him, corruption works only as a situation in which 
individuals or groups act in concert to further their own interests at the expense of a third party. Illegalities, 
such as fraud, embezzlement, extortion, or bribery are not included in this conceptualization, what constitutes 
a limitation for the understanding of corruption. 
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second case and are thus grave corruption. In the first case, corruption becomes a lawful 
phenomenon in which elites are allowed to distort norms to promote commercial or 
industrial interests and citizens are authorized to act corruptly to be part of the political 
process. 
Thus, the relevance of corruption appears to be produced by a resilient legal corruption, a 
corruption that undermines basic political conditions by making citizens believe corruption 
is necessary for democracies or quasi-democracies to function. After all, an inquisition against 
illegal forms of corruption has been put into practice by national public institutions, anti-
corruption agencies, and international organizations; whereas legal forms of corruption 
remain poorly regulated. Of course, it is easier to sanction what is illegally done. A set of 
norms may simply fail in accessing legality, because a ‘beyond the law’ corruption rather 
resembles an ethical deterioration with harmful implications to the public interest as a whole. 
Laws are important to capture perceptions of corruption, but they are a derivation of a 
degeneration of politics. 
2.2.2. What do mainstream definitions of corruption have to do with legality? 
Corruption has been identified as a relevant public problem mainly because of its persistence 
as a systemic deterioration of the public interest as whole. Consequently, it is now necessary 
to understand how the various theoretical streams and their respective definitions of 
corruption correlate with a paradigmatic corrupt legality. 
The starting point of this discussion is a ‘common sense definition’ presented, with minor 
differences, by a sort of international institutions. The WB defines corruption as “the abuse 
of public office for private gain” (World Bank, 1997, p. 8), and TI defines it as “the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International, 2016). In sum, all these 
definitions seem to present the corrupt phenomenon only as an illegal act. There is no room 
for legality in this sort of definitions. Actually, this usual connection between corruption and 
illicit actions still permeates an expressive part of the studies carried out in the field (see Frías-
Aceituno, Rodríguez-Domínguez, & García-Sánchez, 2014; Gorodnichenko & Sabirianova 
Peter, 2007; Ramirez, 2014; Ryvkin & Serra, 2012; Van Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001; Yang, 
2005). Although important, these studies add little to the discussion of a more nebulous 
corruption. 
Mainstream usually approaches corruption and develops its concepts in three different ways: 
(i) in a public-office-centered (POC); (ii) in a public-interest-centered (PIC); and (iii) in a 
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market-centered (MC) perspective. All of them seem to work as a complex interactional set 
in which many scholars have been trying to create a well built or even a widely accepted 
definition. Because of its complexity, this thesis does not aim to produce a ‘universal remedy’ 
concept for corruption as a whole. Contrariwise, it only wants to observe corruption from 
another point of view, which associates legality mainly with a public interest modus operandi. 
Although restrictive, the most stable and popular definition of corruption (Ko & Weng, 
2011, p. 363; Mény & de Sousa, 2001, p. 2824) refers to a famous excerpt extracted from a 
Joseph Nye’s seminal paper, in which 
“Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role 
because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or 
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-
regarding influence. This includes such behavior as bribery […]; nepotism […]; 
and misappropriation […]. This definition does not include much behavior that 
might nonetheless be regarded as offensive to moral standards. It also excludes 
any consideration of whether the behavior is in the public interest […]”13 (Nye, 
1967, p. 419). 
POC definitions basically follow such conceptualization and restrict corruption to what is 
broadly accepted as illegal and condemnable (Mény & de Sousa, 2001, p. 2824). As it was 
possible to observe, this usual approach aligns with a common sense perspective that 
presents corruption in illegal terms. Indeed, international institutions, national governments 
and, in some circumstances, even anti-corruption agencies have been influenced by a 
restrictive belief in the application of laws as sufficient to curb corruption. Being corrupt has 
become then a consequence of what is prescribed as illegal and not a consequence of what 
is amoral or relevant to the public interest as a whole. In turn, “[t]here always is some 
discrepancy between the situation as it is depicted in the ‘official law’ and in the psychosocial 
mentality of members of the society”, i.e., legislations are not said to be a perfect 
representation in time for corruption, because they change at a slower pace than corruption 
itself (Mény & de Sousa, 2001, p. 2824). Norms are necessary to sanction illegalities in 
corruption, but restrictive to the process of seeing corruption as a resilient problem in which 
legalities play an important role. 
                                                          
13 This definition encompasses and expands what Banfield previously described as corruption. See Banfield 
(1961, p. 315). 
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PIC, as another important stream, can be expressed in terms of what Friedrich once wrote: 
“[Corruption is] a disintegration of the belief system upon which a particular political system 
rests” (Friedrich, 2002, p. 17) and must “include all kinds of practices which are believed to 
be dysfunctional and hence morally corrupt” (Friedrich, 2002, p. 16).  This group of 
researchers understands moral issues as a relevant way to define public interests and 
emphasizes that corruption is broader and more based on perceptions/expectations and 
conceptions of democratic regimes (see Heywood, 1997). Contrary to POC definitions, the 
ultimate goal of fostering the public interest turns into a necessary condition to identify 
corrupt actions. Legality, in fact, appears to be more related to what PIC followers prescribe 
as corruption. As pointed by Thompson, corruption may also be “provided in a continuing 
relationship or regular practice, especially when the recipient itself is an institution, habits 
and routines are established, expectations generated, and a culture of influence developed” 
(Thompson, 2013, p. 11). In other words, a legal approach to corruption potentially damages 
the system by simply hurting the core conditions in which the democratic process establishes 
its bases: politics. Norms are not sufficient to address legality in corruption, because a corrupt 
act distort not only laws, but also the political operation to put them into practice. Thus, 
citizens have been associating democratic values with the necessity to behave legally corrupt, 
in order to be simultaneously capable of interfering in politics and accepted as a part of the 
society. More important than punishing corruption, as proposed by POC theorists, is to 
assess perceptions, because corruption is not a simple normative condemnation, it is what is 
believed to degenerate the social interest in order to serve the private. In sum, a persistent 
legality in corruption rather resembles a public interest problem. 
Meanwhile, the MC approach can be elucidated as a disputable way to comprehend 
corruption (Cartier-Bresson, 1995). In Rose-Ackerman’s words, market corruption can be 
summed up as “all payments (legal or illegal) to agents that are not passed on to superiors, 
but includes also a series of legal activities with similar public policy consequences, such as, 
campaign contributions and lobbying” (Rose-Ackerman, 1978). In fact, even with a vast 
literature that correlates economic tools and corruption (see also Andvig, 1991; Cadot, 1987; 
Leff, 1964; Lui, 1986; Palmer, 2008; Persson et al., 2013; Rose-Ackerman, 1975; Scott, 1972; 
Tilman, 1970; Van Klaveren, 1989), market definitions seem to represent only an application 
of public choice methods to analyze corruption (Philp, 1997, pp. 443–444), and for this 
reason, must be seen only as a powerful tool to recognize and assess both illegality and legality 
in corruption. 
24 
While POC approaches reinforce both simplicity and objectivity in corruption, they lack a 
broader interpretation in which licit behaviors may also be took into account. MC definitions, 
as observed resemble more a tool to evaluate corruption and can be used in any possible 
context - legal or illegal. PIC approaches attack both illegalities and legalities, because they 
tend to see corruption in a broader perspective. For this reason, a ‘beyond the law’ corruption 
is assumed to be associated with such stream. Bribery, extortion, embezzlement, and any 
other illegal form of corruption should continue to be tackled; however, a legal corruption 
can only be addressed in a PIC perspective. In short, legal corruption is about perceiving a 
(non-)regulation14 of what should count as corrupt, but necessary for politics. 
2.2.3. Legal corruption: a political degeneration 
As observed in the previous subsection, stable definitions of corruption linked to a POC 
approach usually limit the scope of corruption by presenting norms and illicitness as perfect 
boundaries (Ko & Weng, 2011, pp. 361–363). However, this usual approach 
“Confront[s] a two-fold problem: (i) laws are not necessarily consistent in 
interpretation or application across different countries, i.e., what is illegal in one 
country may not be in another […] [,and] (ii) the recourse to legal norms […] 
forgoes any possibility of capturing a more nebulous aspect of the phenomenon” 
(Heywood, 1997, pp. 422–423). 
Even considering a PIC perspective, very few studies have focused on purely assessing a legal 
perspective of corruption (see Kaufmann & Vicente, 2005, 2011; Lessig, 2011, 2013a, 2013b; 
Newhouse, 2014; Thompson, 1995, 2013). Researchers have offered a marginal status to the 
investigation of a licit corruption (see Kaufmann & Vicente, 2011, p. 197) and little attention 
was given to the fact that social or even elite-based perceptions about what must be 
considered corrupt may distort and damage without being morally wrong or punishable by 
law (Philp, 1997, p. 441). By emphasizing illegal implications or considering licit corrupt 
actions only as a complementary source of comprehension, theoreticians neglected that 
corruption must be also interpreted exclusively in terms of what is recognized as tacitly licit. 
Consequently, understanding what drives a ‘beyond the law’ corruption involves the 
acceptance of a certain degeneration of the naturally sound condition of politics (Philp, 1997, 
                                                          
14 See Nelken & Levi (1996) for a detailed analysis of the connection between the causes and (non-)regulation 
of political corruption. 
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pp. 445–446), here seen as “the activity or process by which groups reach and enforce 
binding decisions” (Hague & Harrop, 2013, p. 2). 
It is only possible to process legality in corruption by exposing perceptions of intangible 
elements in which both a corruptive behavior and a mischaracterization of democratic values 
may be associated with. In this sense, legal corruption represents a tridimensional 
phenomenon that encompasses a lawful combination of influence peddling, institutional 
corruption, and state capture. Each dimension defines a way to verify how politics influences 
social moral conduct and also how it diverts public objectives by not fulfilling satisfactory 
levels of political access, representation, and independence. 
Legal corruption tries to see the harmful effects of corruption as a democratic fiduciary 
relation (Newhouse, 2014) between citizens and governors. Corruption is symbolically 
condemned, just like a pure illegal action, but ordinarily used in day-by-day interactions 
(Becquart-Leclercq, 1984, pp. 28–31; de Sousa, 2011, p. 98), i.e., it has been relativized for 
the sake of democratic consolidation (de Sousa, 2011, p. 58). People are unsatisfied with a 
corrupt democracy at the macro-level, but tolerate corruption at the individual level. Thus, 
this way of perceiving corruption in politics contradictorily represents both a legitimate 
recognition of citizens’ personal interests at a micro-scale and a rampant dissatisfaction with 
the operation of the democratic political process at a macro-scale. 
An increasing political decadence seems to progressively undermine citizens’ satisfaction 
with democracy in recent times (Abdelzadeh, Özdemir, & Van Zalk, 2015; Christensen, 2015; 
Weßels, 2015). Indeed, the collusion between market interests and democratic institutions 
distorts not only laws, but also natural conditions for politics to run properly. High levels of 
commercial development or industrialization encourage corrupt behaviors and, for this 
purpose, they represent valid conditions for the dissemination of a tacit corruption. 
Kaufmann & Vicente (2011) defines legal corruption as a broad instrument for corruption 
with no particular components. In this context, they only say that “when a legal framework 
accompanies corruption […], we refer to the existence of legal corruption; when corruption 
arises without this legal framework, we refer to illegal corruption” (Kaufmann & Vicente, 
2011, p. 199). This conceptualization ignores the fact that norms may be inefficient 
boundaries to establish the limits between legality and illegality. Therefore, this thesis refines 
the concept by offering another explanation for the frontiers of illicitness: social perceptions 
about the natural conditions of politics. In this sense, legal corruption represents a decadence 
of what politics is expected to be in a lawful context, i.e., it is a systemic and persistent 
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degeneration of the natural conditions of politics which undermines democratic values and 
ethical standards by distorting public perceptions about political access, representation, and 
independence in order to make citizens accept amoral behaviors as necessary for the 
operation of societies and to validate market-based interests15. 
The focus is neither on the commitment of illicit actions nor on the execution of monetary 
transactions, but on the perceptions of what distorts politics to produce licit corruption 
instead. In other words, legal corruption does not want to evidence that corruption has an 
illicit social condemnation as mainstream studies do. Contrariwise, it wants to show 
exclusively that a ‘beyond the law’ corruption is basically a result of what is perceived as a 
degeneration of the political process and must be studied in order to assess corruptive 
implications in the organization and quality of advanced democracies and quasi-democracies. 
Undoubtedly, corruption stablishes a path-dependent relation not only with democratic 
values (Philp, 2001), but also with naturally sound conditions of politics (Philp, 1997), and, 
for this purpose, political access (input), representation (throughput), and independence 
(output) must be considered in order to fully understand legal corruption. Indeed, 
“corruption [seems to be] […] challenging the very nature of politics and undermining the 
attempt to establish and exercise authority in the ordering of conflict and the allocation of 
resources” (Philp & Dávid-Barrett, 2015, p. 387). Behaving in such way affects the legitimacy 
of democratic institutions (Philp, 2001), because citizens start to accept certain corrupt 
behaviors – if authorized by norms –  and, by doing so, they also accept that it is impossible 
to achieve collective decisions without creating particularistic advantages for certain social 
groups. In sum, any legal corruption dimension is able to limit the political operation in a 
specific way: influence peddling limits the democratic access; institutional corruption distorts 
representation; and state capture hurts public independence, a central element for 
democracies. Let us observe with particular attention these relations. 
As a political input, access, or “the whole raison d’être of the political system […] [,] express[es] 
[…] the will of the people by ensuring equal[ity] and participation” (Philp, 2001, p. 364) in 
politics. Complementarily, influence peddling refers to the spurious relation between public 
and private interests that undermines public officer’s power over a decision in favor of a 
                                                          
15 Thompson (2013) also discusses about a more nebulous and adaptable corruption that distorts democratic 
values and “undermines legitimate procedures of the institution[s]” (Thompson, 2013, p. 9). However, the 
definition of legal corruption presented in this thesis incorporates a dimension that transcends his institution-
oriented perspective: it considers citizens’ perceptions about ‘beyond the law’ implications of corruption, what 
represents a way to prove that citizens are not ignoring the harmful effects of legality in corruption and a way 
to make the concept more general and not exclusively restricted to institutional distortions. 
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private future advantage (see Majumdar & Yoo, 2012; Slingerland, 2011). If political 
accessibility encompasses equality and participation, undue influence represents a risk and, 
for this purpose, must be assessed. 
Influence peddling, and even its widespread pervasive dysfunctions – ‘revolving doors’16, or 
lobbying17 –, certainly undermines political access by diverting and favoring certain groups 
of interest. In this perspective, legal corruption must encompass a perceived deterioration of 
accessibility because it mitigates equality and participation in order to promote market 
interests in a lawful ambiance. Then, observing perceptions of limited political access 
becomes a valid way to characterize licit non-monetary interactions and also a form to reveal 
if citizens support or not a more nebulous corruption to run politics. 
Modern states need to ensure that political access happens. And, for this reason, access needs 
to be converted into representation, “a principal-agent relationship, in which the principals 
[…] elect agents to stand for and act on their interests and opinions” (Urbinati & Warren, 
2008, p. 389). Indeed, representation establishes “a space within which the sovereignty of 
the people is identified with state power” (Urbinati & Warren, 2008, p. 389) and becomes a 
necessary political throughput to disseminate democratic values or to protect citizens’ 
interests. 
However, what happens if representation itself is distorted? Another prominent risk for 
being legally corrupt appears: institutional corruption. In this regard, representatives may not 
represent a broader social interest, but particularistic interests instead. “[I]f representatives 
are democratic, they are responsive to those they would represent, with respect to particular 
goods” (Urbinati & Warren, 2008, p. 396) and, for this reason, they may be interested in 
providing decisional access to specific social groups in order to guarantee also their legitimacy 
towards their constituency. 
Representatives speak properly for their constituency, while they continue to be 
intermediaries between the citizens and the state. Societies eventually assume that “the best 
judgment of elites [can] replace the judgment of the people” (Urbinati & Warren, 2008, p. 
400) and, by assuming it, they allow representation to produce political distortions. Thus, 
representatives become democratically allowed to promote the interests of specific groups 
in society. 
                                                          
16 For recent developments about ‘revolving doors’, see Brezis & Cariolle (2015) and Draca (2014). 
17 For contemporary discussions about lobbying, political influence, and institutions, see Tresch & Fischer 
(2015) and Weiler & Brändli (2015). Especially, for a precise analysis between lobbying and corruption see also 
(Campos & Giovannoni (2007). 
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In this context, institutional corruption, a recent preoccupation for theorists18, represents a 
relevant tool to verify if institutions really deliver what they promise to citizens. It can be 
precisely defined as 
“A systemic and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently ethical, that 
undermines the institution’s effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose or 
weakening its ability to achieve its purpose, including, to the extent relevant to its 
purpose, weakening either the public’s trust in that institution or the institution’s 
inherent trustworthiness” (Lessig, 2013a, p. 2). 
Thus, it is impossible to produce an institutional diversion of purposes without recognizing 
representation as a striking source of degeneration of ethical standards in politics. Di Pietra 
& Melis (2015, p. 7) recently stated that “[o]rganizational practices do not develop in a 
vacuum […] [and] [c]ontingencies and complementarities do not exist in isolation”. 
Representatives do fill this gap and become able to produce intentional distortions to validate 
exclusive preferences of whom elected them. Anyway, group-based or even market interests 
may overlap social interests. 
A normative approach assumes “that, over time, corporations will assimilate ethical and legal 
standards into their operating practices in ways that reduce the occurrence of corruption” 
(Di Pietra & Melis, 2015, pp. 7–8), but legal corruption, as here proposed, works exactly in 
the opposite direction. It assumes that a distorted representation will progressively 
undermine institutional effectiveness and change the boundaries of what must be seen as 
illicit, i.e., corruptors are not progressively assimilating moral standards or avoiding the 
commitment of illegalities, they are solely adopting strategies to exert power over public 
organizations in order to divert institutional rules and purposes, and make their corruption 
sounds licit, accepted and politically necessary. 
Undeniably, citizens want a non-corruptive political process, but “the higher the levels of 
perceived corruption in a society, the more citizens see it as justified” (Dong, Dulleck, & 
Torgler, 2012, p. 610). Legal corruption must not be seen as a condition for putting politics 
in practice because it just represents a constraint or at least a procedural misrepresentation 
of the process. Public institutions are not a bargain among groups of interest to gain power 
                                                          
18 See Lessig (2010, 2011, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c), Light (2013), Newhouse (2014), Philp & Dávid-Barrett (2015), 
Pierce (2013), Remolina (2014), Robertson (2013), Taylor (2014), and Thompson (1995, 2013) for more 
information about institutional corruption and its implications. 
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and specific representation, but a complex negotiation among them to consolidate a 
consistent social validation. Being legally corrupt put all this cause. 
As an political output, independence, “an intermediary system between state and society” 
(Habermas, 2006, p. 412), becomes relevant. However, as a degeneration, pure public interest 
becomes secondary for states. It becomes more important for representatives to format 
democracy in order to serve commercial or industrial interests than serving citizens’ wills. 
Public entities thus become crucial for capitalists to secure their own best interests. 
Constitutions, codes, laws, institutional structures, statutes, and regulations are diverted to 
make general public interest conveniently reflects market-interests. People then believe that 
what is good for a few relevant private corporations is invariably good for society as whole. 
Institutions may appear to work properly, while they are, in fact, driven by entrepreneurial 
forces, i.e., states may be captured by private interests without developing any illegal 
compromise or counterpart.  
Mainstream state capture refers to the efforts of firms to shape the formation of the basic 
rules of the game – laws, policies, and regulations – through illicit or non-transparent means 
(Fries, Lysenko, & Polanec, 2003; Hellman, Jones, & Kaufmann, 2003; Hellman & 
Kaufmann, 2001). Licit behaviors are usually neglected in traditional models of state capture 
because they tend to undermine its potential effectiveness (Bagashka, 2013; Fries et al., 2003; 
Tudoroiu, 2015). However, as evidenced, private influence on public affairs can also distort 
norms by simply using licit measures. In fact, state capture must not be understood only as 
an illegal phenomenon, but also as a kind of lawful capture instead. 
State capture encompasses three main characteristics: (i) “firms (or other private agents) must 
be able to influence policy decisions by providing some private benefits to politicians; (ii) 
such influence must be concentrated in a relatively small number of firms” (Hellman & 
Schankerman, 2000, p. 553), and (iii) it must primarily benefit organized private elite interests 
(Bagashka, 2013, p. 167). Thus, a situation in which all these parameters are met becomes 
the most permissive expression of legal corruption and leads to a complete deconstruction 
of natural conditions of politics. In this situation, citizens begin to believe that societies are 
only a derivation of entrepreneurial wills and that it is plausible to be corrupt in order to 
defend particularistic interests, if authorized by law. 
Summing up, legal corruption seems to deconstruct basic political conditions of access, 
representation, and independence. Figure 1 presents a schematic overview of how each 
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proposed dimension of this phenomenon – influence peddling, institutional corruption, and 
state capture – affects the process of running politics. 
 
Figure 1: Legal Corruption as a degeneration of natural conditions of politics 
Each legal corruption dimension is able to distort and influence a specific political condition 
and, by doing so, they become relevant to understand how citizens perceive a non-
transactional licit corruption. Else, by observing the path-dependency of political conditions, 
it is possible to understand that legal corruption can damage the process at any moment. 
Influence peddling can affect access and degenerate input requirements and, by doing so, it 
can also damage the whole process. Institutional corruption can produce direct throughput 
damages and indirect output damages. And finally, state capture – the most pervasive form 
of legal corruption – can directly influence output requirements. An important observation 
must be done: a soft form of legal corruption – influence peddling – is able to create the 
dissemination of a fragmented corruption during the entire process, while a heavy form of 
legal corruption – state capture – causes direct damage to the results of the process by 
endorsing a grand corruption instead. In sum, each dimension has its own characteristics: 
influence peddling disseminates a diffuse petty corruption; institutional corruption is 
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moderately diffuse and associated with a systemic19 corruption; and state capture is 
concentrated, extremely pervasive and related to a metasystemic20 corruption. 
Distorting politics in order to produce immaterial gains is essential to evidence legal 
corruption in advanced democracies or even in emerging industrialized societies. Corruption 
remains a relevant public problem not because it determines a condemnable illicit behavior. 
It remains relevant because it produces a diffuse disillusion with the operation of political 
conditions and a sensation that democratic values must be revisited. Laws do not serve as a 
solution to characterize corruption anymore. Legal corruption reflects not what is said to be 
normatively wrong, but what is perceived by citizens as a sort of ‘beyond the norms’ 
degeneration of politics in a macro-scale. In sum, if licit behaviors are important to define 
corruption, then it is necessary to isolate legality in order to investigate its effects over the 
relevance of corruption per se and its broader influences over society. 
2.3. Summing up the discussions 
In this chapter, it was possible to observe how corruption became a relevant topic and how 
it was historically associated with illicitness. Both classical and twenty-first century 
mainstream conceptualizations mainly emphasized that corruption represents something 
deviant, but linked to any sort of illicitness. 
However, licit behaviors may also trigger corruption. An illegal perspective has been driving 
field research since remote epochs. Little attention has been given to evaluate corruption as 
an exclusive combination of pure licit behaviors. This alternative approach has always 
assumed a marginal or even complementary status in the comprehension of the 
phenomenon. This thesis affirms that illegalities offered a relevant, but incomplete 
contribution. For this reason, they must be set aside in order to unveil how legalities affect 
citizens’ perceptions about corruption as a whole. 
Citizens seem to validate an ordinary corruption, while they symbolically renounce it 
(Becquart-Leclercq, 1984, pp. 28–31; de Sousa, 2011, p. 98). But how is it possible? By 
assuming that a ‘beyond the law’ corruption, here presented as ‘legal corruption’, appears as 
                                                          
19 This term refers to a sophisticated political corruption which involves a series of mediators and peripheral 
actors (see de Sousa, 2011, pp. 41–42). This kind of corruption serves as a tool to develop strategies to divert 
organizational objectives and to produce specific group-based benefits. It is also relevant to mention that the 
term, as here used, considers only a licit perspective and, for this reason, does not encompass the complexity 
of its illegal implications as originally proposed by the author. 
20 It refers to a grand kind of corruption with highly sophisticated mechanisms, reduced number of specialized 
actors, and certain levels of permeability between markets and politics (de Sousa, 2011, pp. 42–43). 
Consequently, it represents a natural consequence of a state capture process. 
32 
a degeneration of basic political conditions of access, representation and independence. Such 
corruption represents only an outside interference that makes citizens accept corrupt 
practices as necessary for the operation of societies. Thus, exploring its dimensions – 
influence peddling, institutional corruption, and state capture – becomes relevant. Table 1 
presents a schematic overview of main characteristics regarding legal corruption and its 
proposed dimensions. 
Table 1: Characterizing legal corruption 
Characteristics 
Dimensions 
Influence Peddling Institutional Corruption State Capture 
Basic 
Definitions 
The spurious relation 
between public and 
private interests that 
undermines public 
officer’s power over a 
decision in favor of a 
private future 
advantage (a) 
A systemic and strategic 
influence which is legal, or 
even currently ethical, that 
undermines the institution’s 
effectiveness by diverting it 
from its purpose or 
weakening its ability to 
achieve its purpose, including, 
to the extent relevant to its 
purpose, weakening either the 
public’s trust in that 
institution or the institution’s 
inherent trustworthiness (b) 
It refers to the efforts of 
firms to shape the 
formation of the basic 
rules of the game – laws, 
policies, and regulations 
– through non-
transparent means (c) 
Political 
effects 
Limiting political 
access by producing 
fragmented and diffuse 
petty corruption 
Limiting political 
representation by producing 
moderately diffuse and 
systemic corruption 
Limiting political 
independence by 
producing grand and 
metasystemic corruption 
Essential 
proprieties 
Diffuse and 
fragmented 
Moderately diffuse Concentrated 
Situations in 
which it takes 
place 
 Offering or promising 
a job for an 
entrepreneur that may 
legally coordinate tasks 
in order to favor 
certain commercial or 
industrial groups; 
 Licitly speeding up 
specific processes in 
order to favor certain 
commercial or 
industrial groups. 
 Distorting constitutions, 
codes, laws, regulations, 
statutes, and decrees to favor 
certain commercial or 
industrial groups; 
 Distorting organizational 
objectives, in order to benefit 
specific groups in society. 
 Making certain private 
industrial or commercial 
interests resemble 
politically democratic 
and necessary to 
promote the public 
interest as a whole. 
Sources: (a) This definition is based on Majumdar & Yoo (2012) and Slingerland (2011); (b) this is a well-
accepted definition proposed by Lessig (2013a, p. 2); (c) this is a modified legal adaptation of the definitions 
presented by Fries, Lysenko, & Polanec (2003); Hellman, Jones, & Kaufmann (2003) and Hellman & 
Kaufmann (2001). 
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Politics has been transfigured in order to make group-based or even market-based interests 
sound licit and essential. Apparently, no harm is observed, but citizens do know that 
something amoral is happening, something really nebulous. Indeed, advanced democracies 
and emerging industrialized countries make room for such degeneration because they 
certainly have what matters the most for corruptors: commercial or industrial opportunities. 
In conclusion, citizens perceive corruption as a relevant public problem not because it is 
illegal, but because they know that natural conditions of politics have been distorted and that 
these distortions, although socially accepted, may produce long-term damages. 
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Chapter 3  
In search of a methodology 
As once pointed by Lancaster & Montinola (1997, p. 203), “[t]ruly robust explanations of 
political corruption demand that research into the phenomenon progresses beyond purely 
abstract (theoretical) analyses […] and embraces cross-national investigations that are […] 
rich in empirical verification”. Traditionally, the relationship between corruption and 
democratic political conditions has been mainly explained in illegal terms (see Sung, 2004; 
Treisman, 2000). Corrupt behaviors have been reduced to what is against the laws, no matter 
if ethical or not. Mainstream methodology in the field reflects such limited approach: 
corruption has been widely operationalized as something strictly and simplistically illegal. 
Undoubtedly, it is easier to establish objective parameters to limit the measurement of 
corruption to a mere evaluation of prosecutions, condemnations, or even perceptions about 
the commitment of illegal actions21. However, corrupt behaviors proved to be resilient 
essentially because of their capacity to resemble both socially and normatively accepted as 
necessary for the ordinary democratic political operation. Illegalities are important to 
understand what should count as corrupt, but they do not seem to explain why citizens are 
so concerned with the persistence of corruption and its relevance for the functioning of 
public institutions. 
                                                          
21 Many scholars and public agencies have adopted a tentative illegal judicial approach to evaluate corruption: 
see for e.g., the methodology used by Alencar & Gico Jr. (2011) for the Brazilian case, the Reports to Congress on 
the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section  of the United States Department of Justice (The United 
States Department of Justice, 2012, 2013) or even the Portuguese project called A Corrupção participada em 
Portugal 2004-2008: Resultados globais de uma pesquisa em curso (de Sousa, 2010a). However, it has been mainly 
evidenced that judicial systems and their respective codes, laws, and norms are inefficient to tackle a more 
nebulous corruption based on socially accepted behaviors (Dincer & Johnston, 2015), i.e., “[o]ne could instead 
study rates of prosecution or conviction for misuse of office, but these are as likely to reflect the zeal, 
competence, and integrity of the police and judiciary, or the political priority placed on fighting corruption, as 
they are to capture the true scale of the phenomenon” (Treisman, 2007, p. 213). Additionally, others have 
focused on using perceptions of illegal actions to evaluate corruption (Gorodnichenko & Sabirianova Peter, 
2007; Ryvkin & Serra, 2012). Nevertheless, such approach is also ineffective to capture a more nebulous 
corruption based on social acceptance. 
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A renewed methodological approach is here proposed to demonstrate why legality in 
corruption matters. Thus, legal corruption must be put in evidence in order to verify how 
corruption appears as a pervasive, adaptable, dangerous for politics, and widely accepted 
major problem, especially in the public sector. Such methodology does not aim to 
incorporate ‘beyond the law’ elements in a broader corruption measurement, as usually 
attempted. On the contrary, it isolates what is considered purely lawful, although corrupt, to 
deeply explore its specific effects on citizens’ perceptions of the relevance of corruption. 
Indeed, it is exactly “[t]his discrepancy between legal/formal and social/cultural standards 
defining corrupt behavior in a given society at a particular time […] [that] makes the study 
of corruption so challenging” (see de Sousa & Moriconi, 2015, p. 159; de Sousa, 2002). 
Objectively, this chapter will present a quantitative cross-national method based on 
perceptions to evidence (i) how a given level of legality in corruption influences the way in 
which advanced democracies and emerging industrialized countries characterize corruption 
as a relevant public problem to be dealt with and (ii) what determines the incidence of legal 
corruption. In order to do so, it will first focus on describing the universe of analysis and 
outlining the three main elements of the proposed methodology: the usage of (i) citizens’ 
perceptions, (ii) cross-country data, and a (iii) quantitative approach (section 3.1). After that, 
the objectives of this thesis will be made tangible, because hypotheses will be described and 
concepts will be both quantified and operationalized (section 3.2). Then, an econometric 
model to assess legality in corruption will be designed (section 3.3). And finally, a schematic 
overview will be presented to make the implementation of the proposed methodology much 
more accessible and clear throughout the next chapters (section 3.4). 
3.1. A perception-based, cross-sectional, quantitative universe of 
analysis 
Designing a methodology to assess legality in corruption is not an easy task. Many approaches 
have been used to systematize and evaluate a comprehensive occurrence of corruption in 
which illegalities play a relevant role. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches have been 
helping scholars to unveil many characteristics of corruption. However, attempts to analyze 
a ‘beyond the law’ corruption seem to be usually restricted to a more descriptive perspective 
(see for e.g., Lessig, 2013b; Light, 2013). Even when eminently comparative and quantitative, 
legal corruption methodologies generally focus on evaluating both entrepreneurial and 
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specialized perceptions of the phenomenon (Castro, 2008; Dincer & Johnston, 2015; 
Kaufmann & Vicente, 2005, 2011), giving less importance to citizens’ opinions. 
In fact, a model in which legalities assume a critical role confronts two specific problems: (i) 
the difficulty to understand what must be considered lawfully corrupt; and (ii) the difficulty 
to find measures for what is prescribed as corrupt, albeit legal. This thesis present the 
following answers to these two problems: any socially accepted degeneration of naturally 
sound conditions of politics will be considered legally corrupt; and citizens’ perceptions 
appear to be the most feasible way22 to identify legality in corruption, respectively. 
In this sense, a new path to evaluate the relevance of corruption, based essentially on ‘beyond 
the law’ aspects, needs to be methodologically described. This section will start this process 
by showing the fundamentals of the proposed method, i.e., by presenting the universe of 
analysis and its three essential elements: (i) citizens’ perceptions (subsection 3.1.1), (ii) cross-
country data (subsection 3.1.2.), and (iii) quantitative treatment of information (subsection 
3.1.3). Only after understanding such triad, it will be possible to detail and derive hypotheses, 
operationalize variables, and systematize an econometric modelling. As once said by 
Treisman (2007, p. 213), “the challenge of the next wave of research [is] to refine and gather 
more experience-based measures of corruption and to examine the patterns they reveal”. 
This subsection will then serve as a way to establish the methodological baseline to discuss 
about the relevance of corruption and its ‘beyond the law’ determinants. Citizens’ 
perceptions, comparisons and statistical analyses will be the essential parameters to any 
further discussion held in the next chapters. 
3.1.1. It is all about perceptions 
Considering the information on public opinion provided by TI in its GCB23 for the year 
2013, a multidimensional model to explain legality in corruption was then built. Although 
limited, citizens’ perceptions were used to approach both the relevance of corruption and its 
interrelated perspectives of legality and illegality. By following this path, a major limitation to 
be overcome become worth mentioning: it is said that perceptions do not reflect citizens’ 
real experience of corruption (Abramo, 2008; Donchev & Ujhelyi, 2008; Olken, 2009; Rose 
                                                          
22 See subsection 3.1.1 for details. 
23 The Global Corruption Barometer is organized by Transparency International and has been surveying “the 
experiences of everyday people confronting corruption around the world” (Transparency International, 2015b) 
since 2003. For more information and access to GCB datasets, consult 
http://www.transparency.org/research/gcb/overview. 
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& Mishler, 2010). Albeit true, this assertion does not affect the proposed methodology, 
because this thesis aims to provide reasonable solutions for purely perception-based 
phenomena, i.e., it does not want to explain people’s experience of corruption and how it 
can be significantly different from perceptions, but it only wants to understand what matters 
to make people believe that corruption is something relevant in advanced democracies and 
emerging industrialized countries. Legal corruption represents a perceptional concept per se 
and encompasses a triad of dimensions (influence peddling, institutional corruption, and 
state capture) which refers to behaviors, attitudes, and ethics – concepts that are also based 
on perceptions. Legality in corruption is a perception-based construct in essence and if 
citizens perceive corruption as a relevant public matter, it is necessary to understand what 
determines such impression, rather than discussing if it expresses or not real social levels of 
corruption. 
Furthermore, general public opinion was used because both entrepreneurial and specialized 
(e.g., journalists, politicians, civil servants, employees of non-governmental organizations) 
perceptions confront a serious implication: they may represent institutional distortions and 
specific interests (see Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2010), what constitutes legal corruption 
itself. Thus, citizens’ perceptions, which encompasses a more diversified and representative 
sample of analysis, appear to be the less harmful way to observe ‘beyond the law’24 attributes 
of corruption. 
3.1.2. Making comparisons to unveil legality in corruption 
Thirty-nine capital-oriented economies – 28 advanced democracies25 and other 11 emerging 
industrialized countries26 – that appeared in the 2013’GCB were used to explore legality in 
corruption. Considering this specific set of nations, such citizen-based barometer surveyed a 
universe of 40,605 people between September 2012 and March 2013 (Transparency 
                                                          
24 Experimental approaches have been also used to unveil specific licit corrupt behaviors, such as the Brazilian 
Jeitinho, a partial possible expression of legality in corruption that refers to “individuals’ strategy to solve 
problems using resources, sometimes illegal, in favor of their own benefit” (Rodrigues, Milfont, Ferreira, Porto, 
& Fischer, 2011). These experimental studies have not been used in a cross-national perspective, albeit they 
offer fruitful elements to do so, e.g., priming techniques (see Fajardo & Leão, 2014; Rodrigues et al., 2011). 
25 Twenty-six OECD members (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of 
America) and two potential OECD members (Latvia and Lithuania) were considered in this group of countries. 
26 Two OECD members (Mexico and Turkey), one potential OECD member (Colombia) and other eight 
emerging industrialized economies (Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Russian Federation, South 
Africa, and Thailand) were considered in this group of countries. 
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International, 2013b, pp. 27–30). Additionally, un-weighted average GCB results were then 
employed to build up a nationally representative27 comparative evaluation. 
Such a selective country grouping represented an attempt to congregate most-similar cases28 
and to make legal corruption even more clear and approachable. It would be difficult to 
observe ‘beyond the law’ aspects of corruption and to secure reliable measurements for the 
proposed research variables29 based on citizens’ perceptions without evidencing minimum 
democratic-oriented political standards. It was necessary to guarantee that any sort of 
political degeneration had been mainly caused by the manipulation of norms to serve 
commercial or industrial interests in an apparently democratic ambiance. 
Else, cluster analyses were conducted in order to identify patterns and tendencies among 
specific groups of countries. Such strategy represented the bridge between a necessary 
descriptive-qualitative evaluation of the relevance of corruption (and its lawfully corrupt 
implications) and a more robust quantitative-interpretative test of the ‘beyond the law’ 
characteristics of corruption in advanced democracies and emerging industrialized countries. 
3.1.3. A quantitative quest for tendencies and patterns 
A quantitative investigation with quantitative data was then held. This approach aims to 
produce results that help “enhancing the ability to investigate group differences without 
being unduly influenced by dramatic instances of a phenomenon” (Westerman, 2006, p. 267) 
and provide objective and global measurements of data used (Upjohn, Attwood, Lerotholi, 
Pfeiffer, & Verheyen, 2013, p. 319). As pointed by Lancaster & Montinola (1997, pp. 186–
187), 
“[…] [S]tudies of political corruption should ultimately incorporate the most 
central goal of all comparative analyses – the assessment of rival explanations. The 
advancement of logical explanations, grounded in systematic empirical testing of 
theoretically-derived hypotheses, facilitates healthy debate about the primacy of 
one explanation over another. Systematic explanation, in turn, should include at 
least three related tasks. These are the provision of causal explanations of 
                                                          
27 Chilean and Mexican samples were only urban-based, instead of nationwide-based. 
28 In its purest form, the most-similar selection method refers to a situation in which all cases are similar in all 
respects except the variable(s) of interest (Gerring, 2008, p. 668). 
29 2013’GCB data was employed to measure three critical variables in this study: (i) the relevance of corruption 
as a public problem; (ii) legal corruption; and (iii) illegal corruption. Subsection 3.2.1.3 of this chapter details 
their respective operationalization. 
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covariation among cases, the use of theoretically-derived models to help illuminate 
causal relations, and the utilization of models, frameworks and concepts that 
incorporate differences in context. Inclusion of these tasks would provide 
methodological rigor to studies of political corruption and maintain focus on the 
importance of explanation in studying such political phenomena” (Lancaster & 
Montinola, 1997, pp. 186–187). 
In this sense, this thesis wants to find causal nexuses. More than valid correlations, it is then 
necessary to evidence systemic multivariate interactions in an ambiance where plausible rival 
explanations should be invalidated and the causes must precede the effects (see Cook & 
Campbell, 1976). Ackoff (1962, p. 178) once mentioned that symbolic representations could 
also be used to study certain phenomena. Legal corruption is a concept that meets such 
requirements, because its perception is said to happen before citizens perceive corruption 
itself as a widespread public problem and because it links the perception of the relevance of 
corruption with other preliminary perceptions about transparency, accountability, efficiency, 
and efficacy or with real macroeconomic elements. 
Furthermore, a factorial analysis was used to create a composite measurement for legal 
corruption. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methods served to format linear regressions that 
explored significant relations between legality in corruption and the relevance of corruption, 
and between legal corruption and other socioeconomic perceptions or conditions. Else, 
hypotheses were considered valid only when p-values reached persistent high levels (at least 
5%) of statistical significance throughout the proposed econometric models and when high 
levels of systemic explanatory power were evidenced (a restrictive condition that enhances 
the conclusions drawn). Finally, clusters were defined to analyze and interpret results among 
socially diversified sets of nations. Indeed, grouping nations is a powerful way to summarize 
intercultural similarities and differences (Gupta, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002, p. 11). 
3.2. Making the objectives become tangible 
The descriptive literature review presented in chapter 2 emphasized that ‘beyond the law’ 
implications of corruption have been usually underestimated or at least scientifically 
marginalized. Methodological frameworks in the field hardly ever assessed licit aspects of 
corruption alone. This kind of ‘socially accepted’ corruption has been widely declared crucial 
and striking, albeit secondary for the establishment of objective corruption measurements. 
Illegalities have been used indiscriminately in surveys worldwide as a potential explanatory 
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dimension of corruption. However, is an illegal perception of corruption really fundamental 
to justify its systematic and persistent relevance?  
This thesis believes that legal corruption offers a potential good explanation for this question. 
Political influence has been reconfiguring what should be treated as corruptive, whereas 
corruption has continued to be tackled as something that is against the social norms. 
However, citizens – especially in advanced democracies and emerging industrialized 
countries – indicate that corruption is in fact an important public issue not only because of 
its illegal aspects. Scholars agree that tackling a tacit corruption is fundamental to the process, 
but they almost reduce researches, surveys, and public pools to an inquisition against 
illegalities, such as extortion, embezzlement, and especially bribery. 
This section aims to make legal corruption tangible. The challenge here was to develop a 
comprehensive methodological scenario in which corruption was assessed not by its illegal 
consequences, but by its socially accepted implications. An apparent citizen-sanctioned 
corruption has been eroding political conditions and it is thus necessary to perceive if it has 
been responsible for making societies observe corruption as a generalized public problem 
(step 1) and also what has been influencing such ‘beyond the law’ corruption (step 2). 
In the first step, the relevance of corruption as a public problem was put in evidence (section 
3.2.1). The main hypothesis of this thesis was tested and efforts were done to make it 
operational. Additionally, complementary hypotheses that contested possible rival 
explanations or minimized unwanted statistical disturbances were modeled. In the second 
step, legal corruption was dissected, explained in a political manner, and another set of 
hypotheses was tested in order to understand what have been determining a socially 
approved corrupt behavior (section 3.2.2). 
3.2.1. Step 1: Does legality in corruption explain the relevance of corruption? 
It is all about searching for modus ponendo ponens, i.e., it is all about finding causalities30. Is legal 
corruption necessary to explain the perceived relevance of corruption in advanced 
democracies and emerging industrialized countries? Do illegalities matter to understand such 
relevance? Are both political stability and education crucial to determine certain levels of 
                                                          
30 All the hypotheses here presented are restrictive, i.e., they are not only interested in confirming if variables 
correlate with one another, but in validating causal relations instead. Hypotheses were confirmed only in 
conditions where correlations happened, statistical significance appeared, and econometric explanatory power 
occurred. 
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relevance of corruption? Step 1 represents a way to unveil these relations. In this sense, 
hypotheses must be presented (subsection 3.2.1.1) and variables must be operationalized 
(subsection 3.2.1.2). Only by doing this, it will be possible to properly understand how 
‘beyond the law’ factors influence people’s perceived deterioration of the political process 
and, consequently, their opinions about the importance of corruption. 
3.2.1.1. Main hypothesis 
The quintessential objective of this thesis is to observe if a ‘beyond the law’ dimension of 
the corrupt act is able to explain the reason why citizens consider corruption a relevant public 
problem. As a way to make such statement even more evident, the main research hypothesis 
is then presented. 
Main Hypothesis (Main-H1): 
The higher the perception of legal corruption in a country, the higher the relevance of corruption as a public 
problem in this country. 
Undoubtedly, corruption is said to be a relevant issue. However, studies mainly focused on 
capturing and explaining corruption itself, i.e., research has been trying to assess and measure 
the phenomenon, but little effort was done to measure its relevance. This is exactly what is 
proposed here: a way to quantify how impacting corruption is for citizens, in order to verify 
what determines such perception. 
Persson et al. (2013) investigated the patterns of a systemic corruption, albeit only in 
countries plagued by rampant corruption, and found its relation with a collective problem. 
This thesis wants to go further. It wants to observe how citizens’ perceptions affects the way 
in which capital-oriented societies evaluate their systemic corruption, i.e., it wants to show 
that the perception of the relevance of corruption as a problem rather resembles not only a 
collective action dilemma, but a ‘beyond the law’ persistent collective action dilemma. 
Diamond (2007, p. 119) once observed that “[reducing [endemic corruption] to less 
destructive levels – and keeping it there – requires revolutionary change in institutions”. 
However, an institution is “a norm that has been institutionalized” (Lane & Ersson, 2000) 
and legal corruption31 is in fact a norm with controversial institutions: albeit necessary, 
                                                          
31 Subsection 2.2.3 of chapter 2 described legal corruption and its dimensions in detail.  
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socially unwanted. It is then necessary to unveil how citizens correlate such dichotomy with 
the relevance of corruption to draw relevant conclusions about the recent resilience of 
corruption evidenced. 
Indeed, legal corruption was used as a baseline to describe this relevance in both advanced 
democracies and emerging industrialized countries. In an unorthodox perspective, illegalities 
were put in a secondary plan and legalities were isolated to explore corrupt patterns.  
Main-H1 certainly deserves a detailed exploration. Direct and simple causalities – as the 
proposed one – may be deconstructed if not properly controlled. For this purpose, three 
complementary hypotheses were built to expunge unwanted systematic effects that could 
distort or invalidate the proposed relation between legality and the relevance of corruption. 
Illegal corruption, political stability, and educational level served all to enhance the 
explanatory power of the results observed when testing Main-H1. 
3.2.1.2. Rival and control hypotheses 
First, a plausible rival alternative hypothesis was tested to observe if the relevance of 
corruption as a public problem was also influenced by a generalized perception of the 
commitment of illegalities. It would be impossible to verify if legal corruption is determinant 
to explain an evidenced social preoccupation with corruption, without observing its illegal32 
counterpart potential associations with the public relevance of corruption. 
Plausible Rival Alternative Hypothesis (Rival-H1a): 
The higher the perception of illegal corruption in a country, the higher the relevance of corruption as a public 
problem in this country. 
The other two complementary hypotheses were built to control expected effects of Main-
H1. In this sense, both political stability (Control Hypothesis A: PolStab-H1b) and the 
educational level (Control Hypothesis B: Educ-H1c) were tested and utilized as valid tools to 
make the proposed association between legal corruption and the relevance of corruption 
even more clear and justifiable. 
                                                          
32 Revisit subsection 2.2.1 of chapter 2 for more information about illegalities in corruption. 
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Control Hypothesis A (PolStab-H1b):  
The higher the political stability in a country, the lower the relevance of corruption as a public problem in this 
country. 
Previous research found contradictory relations between political stability and corruption. 
Treisman (2000) found no statistical evidence to confirm that a higher level of instability 
promotes more corruption, while recent studies concluded exactly the opposite (Fjelde & 
Hegre, 2014; Nur-tegin & Czap, 2012; Schumacher, 2013). Albeit relevant, all these findings 
were strongly based on illegal characteristics of the corrupt act. This thesis aims to use 
political stability as a tool to unveil ‘beyond the law’ corrupt implications. In this sense, 
political stability became relevant to expunge unwanted noises produced by exogenous 
conditions that may affect capitalist-based electoral democracies, i.e., controlling the 
conditions of stability in a country made possible to better understand how legal corruption 
affects the way in which citizens perceive the relevance of corruption in their respective 
countries. 
Control Hypothesis B (Educ-H1c): 
The more years of schooling, the lower the relevance of corruption as a public problem in a country. 
Education has been widely studied in a corrupt perspective, especially in the last decade (see 
Cheung & Chan, 2008; Dridi, 2014; Eicher, García-Peñalosa, & van Ypersele, 2009; Pitsoe, 
2013). The main goal here is to find if high levels of literacy help to explain the relation 
between the relevance of corruption as a public problem and legal corruption, a yet 
unexplored subject. By the way, years of schooling were used as a measure for literacy. Again, 
a control variable intended to reduce disturbances in the model and clarify the relationship 
between legal corruption and the relevance of corruption. 
3.2.1.3. Operationalizing ‘Step 1’ variables 
After properly presenting the main hypotheses, this subsection provides relevant information 
about the operationalization process of the variables used in this first step. By simply 
describing the resources employed to format each variable, it first shows how the relevance 
of corruption was measured (the dependent variable). Next, it adequately describes the 
quantification of legal corruption (the main explanatory variable). Finally, it shows how both 
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political stability (control variable A) and educational levels (control variable B) were 
operationalized. 
(a) Dependent variable: The relevance of corruption as a public problem 
As a major concept, previously defined33, the relevance of corruption as a public problem 
must be precisely operationalized. Following a perceptional approach, citizens’ responses to 
the question 2 (“To what extent do you think that corruption is a problem in the public 
sector in this country?”) of the 2013’GCB were used to quantify this dependent variable. The 
aggregate score, which ranged from 1 (the lowest parameter) to 5 (the highest parameter), 
was selected to represent this crucial variable. 
(b) Main explanatory variable: legal corruption 
2013’GCB answers were also used to establish a perceptional operationalization of legal 
corruption. Again, aggregate scores ranging from 1 (the lowest) to 5 (the highest) were 
selected to determine levels of perceived legality in corruption. Three specific questions of 
this survey were combined to build a composite index that represented each legal corruption 
dimension34: questions 3, (“In your dealings with the public sector, how important are 
personal contacts to get things done?”), 4 (“To what extent is this country's government run 
by a few big entities acting in their own best interests?”), and 6 (“To what extent do you see 
the following categories in this country affected by corruption?: Political Parties, 
Parliament/Legislature, Judiciary, and Public officials/Civil servants”) described influence 
peddling, institutional corruption, and state capture, respectively. 
A principal component analysis was used to merge all legal corruption dimensions into one. 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure confirmed sample adequacy (KMO = 0.680) for 
the proposed one-scale reduction, Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant at a 1% level, 
and communalities were higher than 0.600. Kaiser eigenvalue criterion was obeyed and 
explained 75.99% of the variance. The Cronbach's alpha coefficients of all components were 
above 0.835, indicating the reliability of the methodology. In summary, influence peddling, 
institutional corruption, and state capture were mixed to define a composite 
multidimensional legal corruption index and to simplify and enhance the proposed 
evaluation of both the relevance of corruption and legal corruption. 
                                                          
33 See subsection 1.2 of chapter 1. 
34 These dimensions were described in subsection 2.2.3 of chapter 2. 
46 
(c) Other independent variables: illegal corruption, political stability, and educational level 
Additionally, illegal Corruption, political stability, and educational level were also properly 
operationalized. Illegal corruption certainly represents a multifaceted concept which 
encompasses a large set of improper actions (for e.g., bribery, extortion, embezzlement). 
2013’GCB results were also used to build a measure for illegal corruption. In its question 12 
(“Have you ever been asked to pay a bribe?”), such survey offered the possibility, albeit 
limited, to observe how citizens perceive a direct incidence of illegalities in their lives. 
Objectively, this strategy was adopted due the extreme scarcity of citizen-oriented cross-
country perception data about corruption. Thus, perceptions of bribery were intentionally 
employed to characterize illegal corruption because of its cross-cultural acceptance as an 
unquestionable illicit representation of the corrupt act (Miller, 2006, p. 372; Noonan Jr., 1984, 
pp. 702–703; Scally, 2009, pp. 5–9). Original data was rescaled in order to enhance the 
explanatory power. Again scores ranged from 1 (the lowest perceived level of illegality in 
corruption) to 5 (the highest perceived level of illegality in corruption). 
Political Stability, a critical control variable, became quantifiable by using the ‘Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism’ dimension of the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI)35 for the year 2013. It served to capture perceptions of the likelihood of 
political instability and/or politically motivated violence (Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 4) that 
may influence citizens’ perceptions of the relevance of corruption and their impressions of 
the necessity to accept certain corrupt behaviors as necessary, albeit approved by law. It 
ranged from -2.5 (less stable observation) to +2.5 (more stable observation)36. 
Years of schooling served to operationalize the educational level among countries. 
Consolidated data provided by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its 
Human Development Report 2014 made this control variable tangible. The average number 
of years of education received by people (≥25 years old)37 – calculated in 2012 for the entire 
set of countries here analyzed – was then adopted as an adequate measurement. 
                                                          
35 WGI was developed by Kaufmann & Kraay and first launched in 1996. This project represents their efforts 
to build a composite index that provides observed levels of governance worldwide. “Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence/Terrorism” is one of its intrinsic dimensions and merges over 30 different datasets into 
one specific quantifiable value. Such project begun in 1996 and its products have been largely used by 
researchers in order to understand corruption and a panoply of other social phenomena. For more information, 
access www.govindicators.org. 
36 See Kaufmann et al. (2010) for more details about the WGI’s methodology and analytical issues. 
37 Such data is available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/mean-years-schooling-adults-years. 
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3.2.2. Step 2: Legal corruption dissected 
After establishing a set of hypotheses regarding the relevance of corruption, it is now time 
to determine what really affects legal corruption. Even in countries that sit at the apex of the 
anti-corruption indexes, ‘beyond the law’ elements of corruption still exert influence on 
citizens’ perceptions. For this purpose, three distinct categories of hypotheses38 were created. 
Each category tried to unveil possible rival causes for legal corruption. The first one refers 
to determinants of transparency and accountability (subsection 3.2.2.1), the second one is 
about conditions of public efficiency and efficacy (subsection 3.2.2.2), and the third one 
refers to macroeconomic factors (subsection 3.2.2.3). 
3.2.2.1. Hypotheses about transparency and accountability 
This set of hypotheses tried to check if transparency and accountability really matter to the 
process of determining perceptions of legality in corruption. ‘Transparency of Government 
Policymaking’, ‘Strength of Auditing’, ‘Freedom of the Press’, and ‘Internet Usage’ were used 
capture both indirect and direct39 levels of public transparency. In this context, 4 hypotheses 
were formulated and can be described now. 
T&A Hypothesis A (Transp-H2a): 
The higher the level of transparency of government policymaking, the lower the perception of legal corruption 
in a country. 
Finally, the hypothesis to be tested here is about the relation between transparency and legal 
corruption. Lindstedt & Naurin (2010, p. 301) found “that making political institutions more 
transparent is an effective method for combating corruption”, but it should be accompanied 
by “measures for strengthening citizens’ capacity to act upon the available information” 
(Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010, p. 301) if we want to catalyze corruption combat. In this context, 
a legal approach will verify if transparency works as a way to reduce social information 
                                                          
38 ‘Step 2’ hypotheses followed the same rule: the acceptance was subject to the existence of causal relations 
among observed variables. Linear correlations were not considered sufficient to determine whether to accept 
or reject a hypothesis. 
39 Only ‘Internet Usage’ is able to promote direct transparency, because it is not an exogenous action. On the 
contrary, it represents citizens’ direct capacity of accessing public information available. 
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asymmetry or as way to produce diffused support to ratify the legal components of 
corruption. 
T&A Hypothesis B (Audit-H2b): 
The higher the strength of auditing, the lower the perception of legal corruption in a country. 
Lindstedt & Naurin (2010) once emphasized that “transparency is not enough”. It is 
necessary to add some other pertinent elements to the discussions. Accountability is certainly 
one of these elements. Considering ‘beyond the law’ conditions, Kaufmann & Vicente (2011, 
p. 216) found that “higher accountability is the essential determinant of lower levels of legal 
corruption in more equal and richer societies”. Such statement needs to be better explored 
and detailed. An inverse relation between the strength of auditing (and reporting standards) 
and legal corruption is then expected to occur. 
T&A Hypothesis C (Press-H2c): 
The freer the press, the lower the perception of legal corruption in a country. 
Brunetti & Weder (2003), Chowdhury (2004), Freille, Haque & Kneller (2007) suggested that 
the direction of causation runs from higher press freedom to lower corruption. Kalenborn 
& Lessmann (2013) showed that press freedom works as a control variable for the 
implications of corruption on democratic elections, while Cunha (2015) said that the media 
helped to develop a democratic image of ‘collapse’ in which corruption played an important 
role. By considering all this traditional linkage between freedom of the press and corruption, 
this thesis aims to observe if a free press enhances the perception of legal corruption in 
advanced democracies and emerging industrialized countries. 
T&A Hypothesis D (Internet-H2d): 
The greater the internet usage, the lower the perception of legal corruption in a country. 
Vinod (1999, p. 592) once stated that “problems [regarding corruption] can be 
simultaneously attacked by using Internet-based innovative techniques”. This is exactly what 
this thesis aims to do with legal corruption. Making public processes transparent by using 
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Internet represents a possibility to evaluate if direct transparency really matters to the process 
of determining levels of perceived legality in corruption. 
3.2.2.2. Hypotheses about efficiency and efficacy 
Public efficiency and efficacy are interpenetrating events that deserves attention. ‘Regulatory 
Quality’, ‘Efficiency of the Legal Framework in Challenging Regulations’, ‘Wastefulness of 
Government Spending’, and ‘Burden of Government Regulation’ tested if the quality of the 
public institutions contributed to the explanation of legal corruption. 
E&E Hypothesis A (RegQuality-H2e): 
The better the regulatory quality, the lower the perception of legal corruption in a country. 
As once observed by Lambsdorff (2006, p. 6), “bad regulation and corruption are quite often 
two sides of the same coin”. Scholars have already detected both the linkage and the causality 
between these variables: higher levels of regulatory quality determine lower levels of illegal 
corruption. However, it is necessary to test if legal corruption follows the same tendency. 
E&E Hypothesis B (LegFrame-H2f): 
The higher the efficiency of the legal framework in challenging regulations, the lower the perception of legal 
corruption in a country. 
The efficiency of the legal framework in challenging regulations affects the proper 
functioning of the market and, consequently promotes lower of levels of illegal corruption. 
In sum, “the greater reliance on the market for economic decisions and the increased need 
to be competitive have created an environment in which the pursuit of efficiency has 
acquired greater importance and distortions attributed to corruption attract more attention” 
(Tanzi, 1998, p. 561). It is then crucial to perceive in which circumstances such efficiency 
negatively correlates with perceived levels of legality in corruption. By doing so, it will be 
possible to verify if the inefficiency of the legal framework is sufficient to explain a 
widespread and tolerant perception of the usage of ‘beyond the law’ corrupt strategies. 
Societies needs to be efficient, but it is vital to understand if such efficiency is in fact 
determining lower levels of legal corruption. 
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E&E Hypothesis C (Waste-H2g): 
The higher the wastefulness of government spending, the higher the perception of legal corruption in a country. 
Mainstream research sees corruption as an element of public investment distortion and 
usually sees it intrinsically connected with illicit acts (see de la Croix & Delavallade, 2009; 
Mauro, 1998; Rajkumar & Swaroop, 2008). Total public waste was used as a way to 
understand what determines levels of perceived legality in corruption. This kind of 
inefficiency may have been driving not only the commitment of illicit corrupt behaviors. It 
may be also causing an increasing perception of socially (and politically) accepted corrupt 
behaviors in capital-oriented democracies and quasi-democracies. 
E&E Hypothesis D (Burden-H2h): 
The higher the burden of government regulation, the higher the perception of legal corruption in a country. 
Although several empirical studies found a positive correlation between regulatory 
intervention and corruption, literature has been diverging about the impact of state regulatory 
involvement on corruption (see Duvanova, 2014, p. 298) and some found evidence in an 
opposite direction (Berg, Jiang, & Lin, 2012). Moreover, no studies until now tried to 
associate this relevant variable with the licit aspects of a corrup act. Leff (1964), Huntington 
(1968), and Méon & Weill (2010), also concludes that “inefficient and burdensome state 
regulations necessitate corruption as an informal mechanism for improving economic 
efficiency” (Duvanova, 2014, p. 298), what represents a disputable finding for the field of 
study and supports a tentative correlation between the burden of government regulation and 
legal corruption. 
3.2.2.3. Hypotheses about macroeconomic conditions 
‘Taxation’, ‘Government Debt’, ‘GDP per capita’, and ‘Unemployment’ were adopted to test 
the influence of macroeconomic factors on the perception of legal corruption. Economic 
effects have been used to determine legal corruption (Dincer & Johnston, 2015; Kaufmann 
& Vicente, 2011). This thesis wants to explore if citizens’ perceptions about the commitment 
of ‘beyond the law’ corrupt behaviors are also explained by this kind of implications. 
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Macroeconomic Hypothesis A (Tax-H2i): 
The higher the taxation, the higher the perception of legal corruption in a country. 
Timmons & Garfias (2015, p. 13) proved that in Brazilian municipalities “tax revenue rises 
with clean audit reports and falls as revealed corruption increases”. In this sense, this thesis 
wants to go a step further. It aims to observe if the perception of legality in corruption is also 
influenced by taxation. 
Macroeconomic Hypothesis B (Debt-H2j): 
The bigger the government debt, the higher the perception of legal corruption in a country. 
Corruption has been also linked to public debt. Ivlevs & Hinks (2014) found that bribery is 
associated with crisis factors in thirty post-socialist economies of Central and Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia. González-Fernández & González-Velasco (2014) also found that 
corruption shows a direct and significant relationship with public debt in Spain. Additionally, 
Elgin & Uras (2013, p. 633) proved that financial stress is related with corruption. Besides 
that, none of these studies captured if sovereign debts are able to determine a ‘beyond the 
law’ dimension of the corrupt act. 
Macroeconomic Hypothesis C (GDP-H2k): 
The higher the GDP per capita, the lower the perception of legal corruption in a country. 
It is not a new fact that corruption and economic factors are correlated (Cartier-Bresson, 
1992; Dreher, Kotsogiannis, & McCorriston, 2007; Méndez & Sepúlveda, 2006; Mo, 2001; 
O’Hara, 2014; Saha & Gounder, 2013; Seldadyo & Haan, 2006). In fact, this thesis wants to 
verify if economic well-developed countries present a lower incidence of legal corruption. 
Macroeconomic Hypothesis D (Unemployment-H2l): 
The higher the unemployment, the higher the perception of legal corruption in a country. 
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Saha & Gounder (2013, p. 73) discovered that “higher […] unemployment levels increase 
corruption”. However, it is again necessary to isolate ‘beyond the law’ corrupt behaviors in 
order to test if such statement remains valid. 
3.2.2.4. Operationalizing ‘Step 2’ variables 
‘Transparency of government policymaking’ considered the responses to the item 1.12 
(Transparency of government policymaking) of the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) 
2013-2014 and its values ranged from 1 to 7 (more transparency). The ‘Strength of Auditing’ 
used the answers to the item 1.18 (Strength of auditing and reporting standards) of the 2013-
2014’GCR. Again, values ranged from 1 to 7 (stronger auditing). ‘Freedom of the Press’ used 
data from the Freedom of the Press Index of Freedom House (FH) for the year 2013. Values 
ranged from 0 to 100 (less freedom). ‘Internet Usage’ was determined by the percentage of 
individuals using the Internet in 2012 (such information was provided by the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) and presented in the World Telecommunication/ICT 
Indicators for the year 2013.  
‘Regulatory Quality’ was described by a dimension called “Regulatory Quality” in the WGI. 
Values ranged from -2.5 to 2.5 (better regulatory quality) and referred to the year 2012. 
‘Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations’ considered responses to the item 
1.11 (Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations) of the 2013-2014’GCR and 
values ranged from 1 to 7 (more efficiency). ‘Wastefulness of government spending’ used 
data from the item 1.08 (Wastefulness of government spending) of the 2013-2014’GCR and 
values ranged from 1 to 7 (less wastefulness). ‘Burden of government regulation’ considered 
the answers to the item 1.09 (Burden of government regulation) of the 2013-2014’GCR and 
values ranged from 1 to 7 (less burdensome) again. 
‘Taxation’ was determined by the total tax rate, % profits for the year 2012 defined by the 
WEF in its 2013-2014’GCR and produced by the WB/International Finance Corporation, 
Doing Business (2013), Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises. 
‘Government Debt’ considered the Gross General Government Debt as a percentage of 
GDP for the year 2012, published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its World 
Economic Outlook Database (April 2013 edition). ‘GDP per capita’ used the Gross 
Domestic Product per capita in current US dollars for the year 2012, also published by the 
IMF in its World Economic Outlook Database (April 2013 edition). ‘Unemployment’ was 
measured as a percentage of total labor force for the year 2012, published by the WB. 
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Finally, ‘Legal Corruption’ was previously operationalized in subsection 3.2.1.3, item “b”. 
Step 2 just used the same definition for this specific variable. The only difference is in the 
fact that it was used here as a dependent variable and not as an explanatory variable. 
3.3. Designing an econometric model to assess legality in corruption 
Box (1976, p. 792) once pointed that “[specialists] know that in nature there never was a 
normal distribution […] [or] a straight line, yet with normal and linear assumptions, known 
to be false, [they] can often derive results which match […] those found in the real world”.  
Statistical resources are important to support and explain social phenomena, but they must 
not be seen as the explanation itself, i.e., “science is a means whereby learning is achieved, 
not by mere theoretical speculation […], nor by the undirected accumulation of practical 
facts […], but rather by a motived iteration between theory and practice” (Box, 1976, p. 791). 
In fact, researchers have been using statistics to better comprehend corruption and its 
intrinsic characteristics (see for e.g., Kalenborn & Lessmann, 2013; Kaymak & Bektas, 2015; 
Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000; Treisman, 2000; Van Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001). Legality in 
corruption has also been assessed in quantitative terms. Kaufman & Vicente (2005, 2011) 
and Dincer & Johnston (2015) previously used OLS methods to evaluate legal corruption. 
This thesis also followed this approach. Linear regressions were then employed to explain 
both the relevance of corruption (see chapter 4) and the determinants of legal corruption 
(see chapter 5). 
A linear approach was chosen because of its great capacity to summarize findings in an 
objective manner. Kaufman & Vicente (2011, p. 211) observed that such strategy offers a 
more easily interpretable comprehension of the proposed conclusions. Even in an ambiance 
where typical regression assumptions may be difficult to achieve, it is still preferable to 
present a model in which parameters are tangible and interpretable. In other words, less is 
more and simple is better (Cohen, 1990, pp. 1304–1307). Complex models may produce 
more accurate results, albeit less useful. 
It is important to mention that the proposed econometric modeling did not aim to be 
predictive, but only descriptive, what certainly relaxes normality preconditions of the OLS 
model (Kleinbaum, Kupper, Muller, & Nizam, 1998, p. 117). 
Lumley, Diehr, Emerson, & Chen noticed (2002, p. 166) that sufficiently large samples are 
often under 100, so it is possible to say that all 40,605 2013’GCB interviews performed in 
the 39 nations evaluated in this study are certainly a representative sample of advanced 
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democracies and emerging industrialized countries. Such a condition reinforced the interest 
in conducting a more general econometric investigation based on linear regressions, due to 
its useful default tools for analyzing differences and trends in many types of data, not just 
those with normal distributions (Lumley et al., 2002, p. 166). 
3.3.1. A model to explain the relevance of corruption 
Cross-sectional OLS regressions were produced to verify what determines the relevance of 
corruption as a public issue. The first attempt was to present the most straightforward and 
accepted explanation for the problem: the more illegal corrupt behaviors citizens perceive, 
the more relevant corruption is (see equation 1). Next, legal corruption was evaluated as a 
main determinant of the phenomenon (see equation 2). After that, both illegal and legal 
perspectives of corruption were put together, in order to investigate in more detail the results 
and to comprehend how perceived ‘beyond the law’ corrupt actions affect citizens’ 
perceptions of the relevance of corruption itself (see equation 3). In addition, two control 
variables – political stability and years of schooling – were then used to boost the robustness 
of each proposed model. 
(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙)𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)𝑗,𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 (Equation 1) 
(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖 = 𝛿 + 𝜗(𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙)𝑖 + ∑ 𝜇𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)𝑗,𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 (Equation 2) 
(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖 = 𝜎 + 𝜔(𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙)𝑖 + 𝜑(𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙)𝑖 + ∑ 𝜌𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)𝑗,𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 (Equation 3) 
Hence, country i’s perception of the relevance of corruption (𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖 was always used 
as the response variable. Then, three generic functions were modeled to verify what really 
determines the relevance of corruption. In equation 1, illegal corruption (𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙)𝑖 was 
selected to define a traditional and rival approach to explain the phenomenon. In equation 
2, legal corruption (𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙)𝑖 was employed to derive relevant results. Equation 3 just 
combined both effects of (𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙)𝑖 and (𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙)𝑖 to find even more robust evidences of the 
necessity to observe corruption in a ‘beyond the law’ perspective. Finally, ‘k’ exogenous 
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control variables (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)𝑗,𝑖 assessed political stability and/or years of schooling. ‘𝑢𝑖’, ‘𝜖𝑖’, 
and ‘𝑒𝑖’ were observed error terms. ‘𝛼’, ‘𝛽’, ‘𝛾𝑗 ’, ‘𝛿’, ‘𝜗’, ‘𝜇𝑗 ’, ‘𝜎’, ‘𝜔’, ‘𝜑’, and ‘𝜌𝑗 ’ were 
estimated coefficients and Again, ‘j’ was just the lower bound of the proposed summations. 
Such generic equations turned into 15 distinct linear models, which served as the foundation 
of chapter 4. 
Besides that, a two-step approach for transforming continuous variables to normal was 
adopted (see Templeton, 2011) to enhance the explanatory power of two abovementioned 
variables: (𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙)𝑖 and years of schooling. This strategy aimed to increase data reliability 
without biasing the real interpretation of the parameters. Indeed, a two-step transformation 
can improve validity of causal inferences (see Cook, Campbell, & Peracchio, 1990), especially 
in social research. As pointed by Templeton (2011, p. 53), “[a two-step] transformation […] 
has the most implications for improving the statistical conclusion validity of causal inferences 
[…] [, b]ecause the order of values do not change when the transformation is made [and] 
inferences using parameters (e.g., p-values) remain valid”. 
In this sense, these variables were calculated considering first a “transform[ation] [of] the 
original variable toward statistical uniformity […] by [using] the percentile (or fractional) rank 
[method]” (Templeton, 2011, p. 44) (see equation 4). Second, they were normalized by using 
an inverse normal distribution40 (see equation 5). 
(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘) = 1 – [𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑋𝑚) / 𝑛] (Equation 4) 
(𝑇𝑆) = ?̅? + √2 𝑆 𝑒𝑟𝑓−1[−1 + 2(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘)] (Equation 5) 
In equation 4, 𝑋𝑚, refers to the value of each respective observation of the transformed 
variables, 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑋𝑚) is the rank that 𝑋𝑚 assumes in the entire distribution, ‘m’ describes each 
country analyzed, and ‘n’ refers to the sample size. In equation 5, (𝑇𝑆) represents the final 
two-step score used for subsequent analysis, ?̅? and ‘S’ symbolizes the mean and the standard 
deviation of (𝑇𝑆), respectively, 𝑒𝑟𝑓−1 is the inverse error function, and (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘) 
is the result of equation 4. 
                                                          
40 This procedure described in equations 4 and 5 was developed by Templeton (2011). Such strategy was 
recommended as a way to improve the normality of residuals in linear regression and to increase measures of 
sampling adequacy and communality in factor analysis (Templeton, 2011, p. 53). Consequently, “researchers 
should experience more significant findings, greater effect sizes, less threats to causal inferences, and more 
reliable results” (Templeton, 2011, p. 56). 
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3.3.2. Modelling legal corruption 
Following this approach, legal corruption was also modelled in a linear perspective. OLS 
regressions were used to investigate what is relevant, and what is not, to explain citizens’ 
perceptions of legality in corruption. Equation 6 presents the proposed list of determinants 
for legal corruption. 
(𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙)𝑖 = 𝜏 + ∑ 𝑂𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
(𝑇&𝐴)𝑗,𝑖 + ∑ 𝑋𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
(𝐸&𝐸)𝑗,𝑖 + ∑ 𝑌𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
(𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜)𝑗,𝑖+𝑧𝑖 (Equation 6) 
Where (𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙)𝑖 represents country i’s perceptions of legal corruption (the dependent 
variable). The ‘k’ exogenous independent variables (𝑇&𝐴)𝑗,𝑖, (𝐸&𝐸)𝑗,𝑖, and (𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜)𝑗,𝑖 refer 
to ‘Transparency and Accountability’, ‘Efficiency and Efficacy’, and ‘Macroeconomic 
conditions’, respectively. 𝜏, 𝑂𝑗, 𝑋𝑗, and 𝑌𝑗 are the respective coefficients of the equation. 
Finally 𝑧𝑖 is the observed error term. Again, ‘j’ is just the lower bound of the proposed 
summations. 
Such generic equations turned into 48 distinct linear models, which tried to explain what 
really determines legal corruption. Chapter 5’s findings and conclusions were based on all 
these models. A two-step approach – as described in the previous subsection – was also used 
to enhance the explanatory power of one T&A variable (‘Internet Usage’), one E&E variable 
(‘Freedom of the Press’), and three macroeconomic variables (‘Unemployment’, 
‘Government Debt’, and ‘GDP per capita’). 
3.4. A schematic methodological overview 
In this final section, the proposed methodology is presented in a schematic manner. Table 2 
provides basic information about the universe of analysis (such discussions refer to section 
3.1). Table 3 summarizes the main steps of the research, presents all hypotheses and the 
criteria used to validate them (this table organizes what was previously discussed in section 
3.2). Table 4 focuses on showing how to operationalize each proposed variable (it refers 
specifically to subsections 3.2.1.3 and 3.2.2.4). Finally, Table 5 describes all econometric 
linear models used (see section 3.3 for a detailed evaluation of variables, coefficients, and 
linear transformations) in order to facilitate subsequent analyses carried out over chapters 4 
and 5. 
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Table 2: Basic information about the universe of analysis 
Essential Conditions Relevant information 
Using perceptions 
Information on public opinion provided by TI in its GCB for the year 
2013 was used to create statistical models in which ‘beyond the law’ 
aspects of corruption were evaluated. Citizens’ perceptions were crucial 
to identify legal corrupt implications 
Making comparisons 
39 capital-oriented economies (28 advanced democracies and other 11 
emerging industrialized countries) that appeared in the 2013’GCB were 
used to explore legality in corruption. Considering these countries, a 
universe of 40,605 people was surveyed by TI between September 2012 
and March 2013 
Countries analyzed: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, 
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States of America 
Finding  
tendencies and patterns  
OLS methods served to format linear regressions that explored 
significant relations between legality in corruption and the relevance of 
corruption, and between legal corruption and transparency, 
accountability, efficiency, efficacy, and macroeconomic conditions 
Table 3: Main steps of the research and hypotheses 
Hypotheses Expected interactions 
Step 1: Does legality in corruption explain the relevance of corruption?  
Dependent Variable: Relevance of Corruption 
Main-H1: The higher the 
occurrence of legal corruption 
in a country, the higher the 
relevance of corruption as a 
public problem in this country 
 Present robust positive correlation with the ‘Relevance of Corruption’ 
 Show statistical significance in multivariate linear models used to 
determine the ‘Relevance of Corruption’ 
 Such independent variable should demonstrate capacity to enhance the 
explanatory power used to determine the ‘Relevance of Corruption’ 
Rival-H1a: The higher the 
occurrence of illegal 
corruption in a country, the 
higher the relevance of 
corruption as a public problem 
in this country 
 Present robust positive correlation with the ‘Relevance of Corruption’ 
 Show statistical significance in multivariate linear models used to 
determine the ‘Relevance of Corruption’ 
 Such independent variable should demonstrate capacity to enhance the 
explanatory power used to determine the ‘Relevance of Corruption’ 
PolStab-H1b: The higher the 
political stability in a country, 
the lower the relevance of 
corruption as a public problem 
in this country 
 Present robust negative correlation with the ‘Relevance of Corruption’ 
 Show statistical significance in multivariate linear models used to 
determine the ‘Relevance of Corruption’ 
 Such independent variable should demonstrate capacity to enhance the 
explanatory power used to determine the ‘Relevance of Corruption’ 
Educ-H1c: The more years of 
schooling, the lower the 
relevance of corruption as a 
public problem in a country 
 Present robust negative correlation with the ‘Relevance of Corruption’ 
 Show statistical significance in multivariate linear models used to 
determine the ‘Relevance of Corruption’ 
 Such independent variable should demonstrate capacity to enhance the 
explanatory power used to determine the ‘Relevance of Corruption’ 
58 
Table 3:   Main steps of the research and hypotheses (Cont.) 
Hypotheses Expected interactions 
Step 2: Legal corruption dissected 
Dependent variable: Legal Corruption 
Transparency and Accountability (T&A) 
Transp-H2a: The higher the 
level of transparency of 
government policymaking, the 
lower the perception of legal 
corruption in a country. 
 Present robust negative correlation with ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Show statistical significance in multivariate linear models used to 
determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Such independent variable should demonstrate capacity to enhance the 
explanatory power used to determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
Audit-H2b: The higher the 
strength of auditing, the lower 
the perception of legal 
corruption in a country. 
 Present robust negative correlation with ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Show statistical significance in multivariate linear models used to 
determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Such independent variable should demonstrate capacity to enhance the 
explanatory power used to determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
Press-H2c: The freer the press, 
the lower the perception of 
legal corruption in a country. 
 Present robust negative correlation with ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Show statistical significance in multivariate linear models used to 
determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Such independent variable should demonstrate capacity to enhance the 
explanatory power used to determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
Internet-H2d: The greater the 
internet usage, the lower the 
perception of legal corruption 
in a country. 
 Present robust negative correlation with ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Show statistical significance in multivariate linear models used to 
determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Such independent variable should demonstrate capacity to enhance the 
explanatory power used to determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
Efficiency and Efficacy (E&E) 
RegQuality-H2e: The better the 
regulatory quality, the lower 
the perception of legal 
corruption in a country. 
 Present robust negative correlation with ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Show statistical significance in multivariate linear models used to 
determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Such independent variable should demonstrate capacity to enhance the 
explanatory power used to determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
LegFrame-H2f: The higher the 
efficiency of the legal 
framework in challenging 
regulations, the lower the 
perception of legal corruption 
in a country. 
 Present robust negative correlation with ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Show statistical significance in multivariate linear models used to 
determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Such independent variable should demonstrate capacity to enhance the 
explanatory power used to determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
Waste-H2g: The higher the 
wastefulness of government 
spending, the higher the 
perception of legal corruption 
in a country. 
 Present robust positive correlation with ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Show statistical significance in multivariate linear models used to 
determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Such independent variable should demonstrate capacity to enhance the 
explanatory power used to determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
Burden-H2h: The higher the 
burden of government 
regulation, the higher the 
perception of legal corruption 
in a country. 
 Present robust positive correlation with ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Show statistical significance in multivariate linear models used to 
determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Such independent variable should demonstrate capacity to enhance the 
explanatory power used to determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
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Table 3:   Main steps of the research and hypotheses (cont.) 
Hypotheses Expected interactions 
Step 2: Legal corruption dissected (cont.) 
Dependent variable: Legal Corruption 
Macroeconomic conditions 
Tax-H2i: The higher the 
taxation, the higher the 
perception of legal corruption 
in a country. 
 Present robust positive correlation with ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Show statistical significance in multivariate linear models used to 
determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Such independent variable should demonstrate capacity to enhance the 
explanatory power used to determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
Debt-H2j: The bigger the 
government debt, the higher 
the perception of legal 
corruption in a country. 
 Present robust positive correlation with ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Show statistical significance in multivariate linear models used to 
determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Such independent variable should demonstrate capacity to enhance the 
explanatory power used to determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
GDP-H2k: The higher the 
GDP per capita, the lower the 
perception of legal corruption 
in a country. 
 Present robust negative correlation with ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Show statistical significance in multivariate linear models used to 
determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Such independent variable should demonstrate capacity to enhance the 
explanatory power used to determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
Unemployment-H2l: The higher 
the unemployment, the higher 
the perception of legal 
corruption in a country. 
 Present robust positive correlation with ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Show statistical significance in multivariate linear models used to 
determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
 Such independent variable should demonstrate capacity to enhance the 
explanatory power used to determine ‘Legal Corruption’ 
Table 4: Operationalizing variables 
Variables Operationalization 
Relevance of corruption 
Citizens’ responses to the question 2 (“To what extent do you think that corruption 
is a problem in the public sector in this country?”) of the 2013’GCBa. Values range 
from 1 to 5 (more relevance of corruption) 
Legal corruption 
A factorial combination of three questions of the 2013’GCBa: question 3, (“In your 
dealings with the public sector, how important are personal contacts to get things 
done?”), question 4 (“To what extent is this country's government run by a few big 
entities acting in their own best interests?”), and question 6 (“To what extent do you 
see the following categories in this country affected by corruption?: Political Parties, 
Parliament/Legislature, Judiciary, and Public officials/Civil servants”). 
Illegal Corruption 
Citizens’ responses to the question 12 (“Have you ever been asked to pay a bribe?”) 
of the 2013’GCBa. Values range from 1 to 5 (more illegal corruption) 
Political Stability 
Results of the “Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism” dimension 
of the WGI for the year 2013b. Values range from -2.5 to 2.5 (more political stability) 
Education 
The average number of years of education received by people (≥25 years old) 
calculated in 2012 by the UNDP and presented in its Human Development Report 
2014c 
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Table 4:   Operationalizing variables (cont.) 
Variables Operationalization 
Transparency of 
government 
policymaking 
Item 1.12 (Transparency of government policymaking) of the 2013-2014’GCRd. 
Values range from 1 to 7 (more transparency) 
Strength of auditing 
Item 1.18 (Strength of auditing and reporting standards) of the 2013-2014’GCRd. 
Values range from 1 to 7 (stronger auditing) 
Freedom of the Press 
Freedom of the Press Indexe of the FH for the year 2013. Values range from 0 to 
100 (less freedom) 
Internet Usage 
Percentage of individuals using the Internet in 2012 developed by the ITU and 
presented in the World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators 2013f (June 2013 
edition) 
Regulatory Quality 
Regulatory Quality in 2012. Results produced by Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay 
and financed by the WB. A part of the WGIb. Values range from -2.5 to 2.5 (better 
regulatory quality) 
Efficiency of legal 
framework in 
challenging regulations 
Item 1.11 (Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations) of the 2013-
2014’GCRd. Values range from 1 to 7 (more efficiency) 
Wastefulness of 
government spending 
Item 1.08 (Wastefulness of government spending) of the 2013-2014’GCRd. Values 
range from 1 to 7 (less wastefulness) 
Burden of 
government regulation 
Item 1.09 (Burden of government regulation) of the 2013-2014’GCRd. Values range 
from 1 to 7 (less burdensome) 
Taxation 
Total tax rate, % profits, in 2012, used by the WEF in its 2013-2014’GCR and 
produced by  the WB/International Finance Corporation, Doing Business, 2013g: 
Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises 
Government Debt 
Gross general government debt as a percentage of GDP in 2012, published by the 
IMF in its World Economic Outlook Databaseh (April 2013 edition) 
GDP per capita 
Gross domestic product per capita for the 2012 in current US dollars, published by 
the IMF in its World Economic Outlook Databaseh (April 2013 edition) 
Unemployment Unemployment as % of total labor force in 2012, produced by the WBi 
Sources: a Transparency International (2013b); b Kaufmann & Kraay (2015); c United Nations Development 
Programme (2014); d World Economic Forum (2013); e Freedom House (2013); f International 
Telecommunication Union (2013); g World Bank (2013a); h International Monetary Fund (2013); i World Bank 
(2013b). 
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Table 5: The proposed econometric models 
 
Reason to use the 
model 
Models a 
Linear Models 
(OLS) for Step 1 
Testing the Rival 
Hypothesis: does 
illegal corruption 
explain the relevance 
of corruption? 
(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙)𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)𝑗,𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 
Testing the Main 
Hypothesis: does legal 
corruption explain the 
relevance of 
corruption?  
(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖 = 𝛿 + 𝜗(𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙)𝑖 + ∑ 𝜇𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)𝑗,𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 
Combining both 
illegal and legal 
approaches to find 
robust explanations 
for the relevance of 
corruption 
(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖 = 𝜎 + 𝜔(𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙)𝑖 + 𝜑(𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙)𝑖 + ∑ 𝜌𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)𝑗,𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 
Linear Model 
(OLS) for Step 2  
Finding good 
determinants for 
legal corruption 
(𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙)𝑖 = 𝜏 + ∑ 𝑂𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
(𝑇&𝐴)𝑗,𝑖 + ∑ 𝑋𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
(𝐸&𝐸)𝑗,𝑖 + ∑ 𝑌𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
(𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜)𝑗,𝑖+𝑧𝑖 
a For Step 1: (Relevance) refers to the ‘Relevance of Corruption’; (Illegal) refers to ‘Illegal Corruption’; 
(Legal) refers to ‘Legal Corruption’; (Controls) refers to both ‘Political Stability’ and ‘Education’. For Step 
2: (Legal) refers again to ‘Legal Corruption’; (T&A) refers to ‘Transparency and Accountability’ and 
considers ‘Transparency’, ‘Accountability’, ‘Freedom of the Press’, and ‘Internet Usage’ as plausible 
dimensions; (E&E) refers to ‘Efficiency and Efficacy’ and considers ‘Regulatory Quality’, ‘Efficiency’, 
‘Wastefulness of government spending’, and ‘Burden of government regulation’ as plausible dimensions; 
(Macroeconomic) refers to ‘Macroeconomic Conditions’ and considers ‘Taxation’, ‘Government Debt’, 
‘GDP per capita’, and ‘Unemployment’ as plausible dimensions. For detailed information about the 
proposed models (characteristics and operationalization), see section 3.3. 
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Chapter 4  
A ‘beyond the law’ explanation for the relevance of corruption 
Generic statements usually refer to corruption as “one of the most detrimental factors to 
economies and social development” (Tan, Liu, Huang, Zhao, & Zheng, 2016, p. 90) or as 
“an issue [that] has been gaining increasing importance in today’s world” (Aguilera & Vadera, 
2008, p. 431). Albeit undeniably true, these assertions lack precision. Immediately, some 
questions emerge when accepting an endemic, persistent, and necessary corrupt behavior: 
what does make corruption so relevant? Is its importance explained by which kind of 
influences? This chapter wants to offer such precision by arguing that what goes ‘beyond the 
law’ should count as necessary to understand the reason why citizens perceive corruption as 
a major public problem. 
Of course, there is a long way to go before evaluating how legality in fact affects corruption. 
First, the relevance of corruption as a public problem must be identified, explored, and 
discussed (section 4.1). Next, a non-orthodox interpretation of corruption must be also 
observed (section 4.2), i.e., legal corruption should be evidenced and clarified. In fact, results 
show that some corrupt behaviors (the ones approved by law and supported by citizens) 
determine a widespread perception of corruption as a major public problem. Such distortion 
makes politics resembles an obligatory corrupt process in which societies naturally accept 
corruption, albeit symbolically condemned, as part of the sociopolitical functioning. Then, a 
set of 15 complementary statistical models (section 4.3) will be finally tested and discussed 
in order to prove that ‘beyond the law’ aspects of corruption really matter to explain the 
relevance of corruption. Additionally, a concise summary of the findings will be also 
displayed. 
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4.1. Is corruption in fact a relevant public problem? 
Researches have been emphasizing that the real incidence of corruption bothers societies 
(see Tanzi, 1998, pp. 559–564). However, what really matters to citizens, especially in 
advanced democracies and/or emerging industrialized countries, is how it is perceived as a 
problem and not how real it might be. Certain levels of corruption may be acceptable in 
some countries, while in others no. Scholars agree that high levels of systemic occurrence of 
illegalities lead to an equivalent high level of perceived corruption in countries plagued with 
widespread corruption (see for e.g., Persson et al., 2013), but little is known when advanced 
democracies or at least highly industrialized societies are took exclusively into consideration. 
For this reason, it is necessary to observe how citizens in this specific set of nations 
understand the incidence of corrupt acts. Corruption has been historically associated with 
the commitment of illegal behaviors, but this well-established assumption might be 
explaining just a criminal perspective of the phenomenon. Corruption is in fact more than 
what resembles illicit. Surveys and barometers have always tried to link the commitment of 
illicitness with the occurrence of corruption. It was a good strategy, but corruption still 
matters and causes disturbance even in places broadly recognized by low levels of evidenced 
illegality. From Russia to Canada or from Mexico to Estonia, people do consider corruption 
something relevant and a major public problem. Thus, if it is a problem, it deserves attention. 
Figure 2 presents how citizens perceive the relevance of corruption as a public problem in 
their respective countries. It is possible to observe that values are impressively high. Almost 
all countries scored above 3.00 – a mid-term result in a Likert scale with 5 items. These results 
are impressive, because even considering a tendency towards agreement (see for e.g., 
Weijters, Cabooter, & Schillewaert, 2010, p. 237), i.e., a tendency towards centrality (see also 
Garland, 1991; Hartley, 2014) – neutral results near the center of the scale –, scores 
significantly diverge from neutrality. Only two countries scored extremely near 3.00 
(considering 0.10 range): Norway and Finland. In the other 37 cases, results tended to assume 
extreme values (35 countries scored above 3.10 and other 2 below 2.90).  
Another important evidence is that 23 observations presented extremely high scores (above 
4.00), what constitutes a valid argument to affirm that citizens do consider corruption 
extremely relevant in advanced democracies and emerging industrialized countries. 13 
observations ranged from 3.00 to 4.00 and only 3 below 3.00.  
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Figure 2: Levels of perceived relevance of corruption in advanced democracies 
and emerging industrialized countries 
In this context, some descriptive statistics become revealing (see Table 6). The mean value 
of the observations is high (a 3.995 score) and far from a neutral Likert mid-point of 3.00. 
The observed median (a 4.210 result), another central tendency measurement, confirms a 
process towards significant relevance of corruption. Else, a standard deviation of 0.584, what 
determines a coefficient of variation of 14.6%, represents a robust evidence of low 
dispersion, i.e., results are quite similar and based on a widely social acceptance of corruption 
as an endemic problem. 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for the relevance of corruption 
Measures Results 
Mean 3.995 
Standard Deviation 0.584 
Median 4.210 
Coefficient of Variation 0.146 
Minimum 2.220 
Maximum 4.700 
N 39 
It is not surprising that corruption appeared as a widespread phenomenon. What is surprising 
is the fact that even localities with historical low levels of corruption still think it is relevant. 
Only Switzerland (with a 2.69 score) and Denmark (with a 2.22 score) in fact disregarded 
corruption as a perceived major public problem. New Zealand (with a 3.32 score), Australia 
(with a 3.58 score), Canada (with a 3.67 score), and especially Chile (with a 4.25 score) and 
Japan (with a 4.21 score), proved that citizens’ perceptions of the relevance of corruption 
4
,7
0
4
,6
9
4
,6
8
4
,6
0
4
,5
6
4
,5
5
4
,5
3
4
,4
8
4
,4
8
4
,4
3
4
,4
1
4
,4
0
4
,3
6
4
,2
9
4
,2
6
4
,2
5
4
,2
3
4
,2
1
4
,2
1
4
,2
1
4
,1
2
4
,1
2
4
,0
2
3
,9
7
3
,9
1
3
,8
7
3
,7
8
3
,7
7
3
,7
4
3
,7
3
3
,6
7
3
,6
1
3
,5
8
3
,3
2
3
,2
0
3
,0
8
2
,9
0
2
,6
9
2
,2
2
0,00
0,50
1,00
1,50
2,00
2,50
3,00
3,50
4,00
4,50
5,00
R
u
ss
ia
M
ex
ic
o
In
d
o
n
es
ia
P
o
rt
u
ga
l
G
re
ec
e
S
p
ai
n
B
ra
zi
l
It
al
y
L
it
h
u
an
ia
S
o
u
th
 A
fr
ic
a
C
o
lo
m
b
ia
P
h
ili
p
p
in
es
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
li
c
Is
ra
el
L
at
v
ia
C
h
il
e
In
d
ia
Ja
p
an
S
lo
v
ak
ia
S
lo
v
en
ia
F
ra
n
ce
T
h
ai
la
n
d
T
u
rk
ey
U
n
it
ed
 S
ta
te
s
B
el
gi
u
m
G
er
m
an
y
H
u
n
ga
ry
M
al
ay
si
a
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
gd
o
m
E
st
o
n
ia
C
an
ad
a
S
o
u
th
 K
o
re
a
A
u
st
ra
lia
N
ew
 Z
ea
la
n
d
L
u
xe
m
b
o
u
rg
N
o
rw
ay
F
in
la
n
d
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
D
en
m
ar
k
R
el
ev
an
ce
 o
f 
C
o
rr
u
p
ti
o
n
Source: Transparency International (2013b)
66 
differ dramatically from what specialists define as a latent public sector corruption. In 
2013’CPI – a good example of a specialist-based survey –, these countries scored remarkably 
high41 and were perceived as very ‘clean’ societies. However, their citizens still evidenced 
moderate (for e.g., New Zealand, Australia, and Canada) or even high levels of perceived 
corruption (for e.g., Chile and Japan) when assessing 2013’GCB results. Citizens’ perceptions 
of corruption are said to be tiny especially in Nordic countries, but corruption is still 
potentially devastating nevertheless. In sum, real corruptions cause direct social losses, 
whereas perceived corruptions make citizens discontent with the political democratic 
process. 
This thesis is about to explain what really disappoints people in this respect, but it is first 
necessary to identify how divergent, albeit mainly problematic, corruption might be in three 
complementary clusters: countries with extremely high levels of perceived corruption 
(subsection 4.1.1), countries that deal with moderate levels of perceived corruption 
(subsection 4.1.2), and countries where societies have understood that corruption is not 
necessary for politics to run properly (subsection 4.1.3). Of course, this proposed 
classification is not inviolable and excluding. Certain countries may present commutative 
characteristics, i.e., conditions that goes beyond a specific cluster, what makes such process 
a complex task. The idea is to create just a simple clarification of patterns of perceived 
relevance of corruption among advanced democracies and newly industrialized nations. It is 
not intended to stablish perfect groups of analysis, but a contextual organization in which 
some countries’ experiences may help us to identify how a ‘beyond the law’ incidence of 
corruption affects public opinion in general. Only after comprehending these specificities, it 
will be possible to evaluate what kind of corruption is indeed making citizens believe that 
corruption itself remains relevant. 
4.1.1. Corruption, a very serious perceived public problem 
Corruption has been directly related to undemocratic regimes (see for e.g., Chang & Golden, 
2010). 2013’GCB results evidence that it is not an exclusive problem of autocracies and 
dictatorships. Scientific research recently revealed that even unstable democracies present 
lower levels of perceived corruption than stable despotic regimes (see Nur-tegin & Czap, 
2012). However, such study does not affirm that democracies are immune to corrupt 
                                                          
41 2013’CPI final scores and relative positions for Denmark (91, 1st), New Zealand (91, 1st), Switzerland (85, 
7th), Australia (81, 9th), Canada (81, 9th), Japan (74, 18th), and Chile (71, 22nd). Values ranged from 0 (highly 
corrupt) to 100 (very clean). For more information, see Transparency International (2013a). 
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governments or that democracies produce absolute low levels of perceived corruption. 
Indeed, democracy does not imply absence of corruption. Contrariwise, as proposed by 
Kaufmann & Vicente (2011, pp. 196, 215), it just produces a different corrupt output: legal 
corruption. 
Peoples’ opinions have been impacted by an evidenced perception of democratic failure or 
at least a political detachment from democratic values in order to distort norms and produce 
benefits to specific social groups in an apparently licit ambiance. In general terms, advanced 
democracies or even industrial ‘pseudodemocracies’42 are not only dealing with corruption, 
but with its perception. 
Figure 2 also presents an interesting fact: citizens in some geographic regions are more likely 
to perceive corruption as a relevant problem. Considering the 39 countries that took part 
into this research, it was possible to group 23 of them in a single cluster of analysis. These 
countries displayed something in common, they all scored above 4.00, which means that 
people observe a latent corruption throughout governments in these societies. This proposed 
cluster can be divided in 4 other secondary groups43: (i) a post-socialist, (ii) a Latin-American, 
(iii) a Mediterranean, and (iv) a indo-pacific group. 
Russia, Lithuania, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia presented extremely 
high levels of perceived corruption (always above 4.21). Although post-Communist societies 
appear to display multiple forms of corruption (Karklins 2002), “corruption is widespread 
throughout the former Communist states” (Obydenkova & Libman, 2014, p. 304). In this 
group of countries, corruption is believed to be an unescapable consequence of the historical 
socialism previously implemented. Citizens use a ‘the system made me do it’ excuse to blame 
an historical and exogenous condition for the necessity of practicing corruption (see 
Karklins, 2005). “The currency of the corrupt act, be it a bribe, profiteering, nepotism, or 
something else, is less important than how it distorts the workings of the political system” 
                                                          
42 ‘Pseudodemocracies’ or electoral authoritarian regimes are “the grey zone between autocracy and democracy 
[and] consist of democratic institutions but violate democratic standards in the practice of power, thus 
preserving authoritarian rule behind a democratic facade” (Zavadskaya & Welzel, 2015, p. 1107). See also 
Diamond (2002) for more information about hybrid regimes. Other relevant aspect is that not all of the studied 
countries were considered purely democratic when the GCB survey happened (from mid-2012 to mid-2013), 
but they experienced at least electoral authoritarianism during this period. This thesis is not oriented to evaluate 
if democracies deal better with corruption than ‘pseudodemocracies’. Beyond that, it wants to evidence that the 
existence of high levels of industrial or commercial interests (which implies high levels of monetary-capitalist 
interests in both advanced democracies or hybrid regimes) is undermining the political operation and making 
citizens believe in corruption as necessary. This necessary corruption, i.e., a corruption in which norms are 
distorted and ethical standards are relaxed, is here explored. 
43 South Africa presented high levels of perceived corruption. Albeit not directly inserted in any proposed 
subgroup, such country has aspects in common with the other nations of this cluster: a colonial past, with 
historical and recent implications, and high levels of industrial/commercial interests. 
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(Karklins, 2002, p. 23), i.e., people do not consider corruption relevant in these localities 
because they know it still occurs, but because they perceive that they are systematically 
exposed to situations in which unilateral decisions (monopolistic decisions) oblige them to 
act in a corrupt manner to have their citizenship properly recognized as part of the system. 
As previously observed for Lithuania by Dobryninas, 
“According to popular opinion, the lack of responsibility, transparency and 
accountability in […] public sector could be explained by the fact that corrupt 
practice is deeply ingrained in the so-called Soviet-type mentality that could not 
be automatically replaced during the last […] years of political independence. Old 
Soviet values, beliefs and habits still have an impact on the current social and 
economic situation […]” (Dobryninas, 2005, p. 77). 
Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and Chile represent the Latin American tradition towards social 
importance of corruption. Scoring systematically above 4.25, these countries still deal with 
complex processes of democratization with high levels of latent influences of previous 
authoritarian regimes (see Gephart, 2016 for the Chilean case), judicial inefficiency (see 
Alencar & Gico Jr., 2011 for the Brazilian case) or violence (see Langbein & Sanabria, 2013; 
and Poveda, 2013 for the Colombian case ; see Sabet, 2013 for the Mexican case). It is 
possible to classify their ‘high perceived’ corruption as a radicalism against injusticias. The seek 
for stability and social justice reinforces citizens’ dissatisfactions and makes clear all spurious 
relations between politics, entrepreneurs, and society. Citizens see corruption in these 
countries, but they certainly feel that this is an indissoluble part of politics. They call for 
justice, but , as Brazilians say, ‘Eu sou contra a corrupção, mas preciso dar o meu jeitinho’, which 
implies that citizens are against corruption, although they recognize they need to use it in 
ordinary interactions to be socially valued (see for e.g., Fernandes da Silva, 1999, p. 27). 
An Indo-pacific evidenced corruption must be also described here. Different from the 
previous groups, common reasons to recognize citizens’ dissatisfaction caused by corruption 
among these countries are less evident. However, they all together still characterize a region 
in which corruption is evoked as problématique (they all scored above 4.12). Thais’ opinions 
reflect a pessimism that mainly associate the revival of “notions of moral ethics, nationalism, 
and royalism” (Sinpeng, 2014, p. 535) to a crusade against corruption.  In India, “[p]eople 
often blame […] corruption on the system of business licensing that prevailed from the 1950s 
through the 1980s” (Riley & Roy, 2016, p. 73), albeit recognize that moral or civic decay 
played an important role when observing corruption (Riley & Roy, 2016, p. 93). Indonesia 
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and the Philippines follow this moralistic pathway, though the Philippine case links social 
contestation also with a strong deception with entrenched oligarchies that rule the country 
and their implicit political violence (Johnston, 2008, pp. 214–215; Moran, 1999, p. 576). In 
Indonesia, “[…] the country’s loss through corruption has exceeded tolerance limits which 
can be seen from moral, ethics, morality and law perspectives” (Lukito, 2015, p. 476) and has 
been related to a “dysfunctional party and campaign financing system” (Mietzner, 2015, p. 
587). In Japan, “influence markets connect private interests to decision makers within a 
strong, well-institutionalized state” (Johnston, 2008, p. 211)”. In sum, “Japan is, in many 
important senses, a network society and the power of personal networks added to the 
traditional role of ‘go-betweens’ facilitates corruption” (Reed, 2008, p. 398) and its broadly 
institutionalized perception. 
Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy, France, Israel, and Turkey form a heterogeneous cultural 
group, albeit corruptly homogeneous (they all scored above 4.02). Corruption is a delicate 
issue for Mediterranean societies. Portuguese citizens assume a critical attitude towards 
public corruption. They see the administration as dishonest, ineffective and abusive, what 
gives them an excuse to engage in informal corrupt processes (de Sousa, 2008, p. 21). 
Dissatisfaction with democratic functioning represents thus a way to accept high levels of 
governmental inefficiency. Greece follows the same tendency. Danopoulos (2014, p. 128) 
argues that “the problem of corruption in the country is primarily cultural and social rather 
than economic [, because] [p]eople become corrupted when conditions are amenable to such 
practices”. In a Spanish perspective, corruption is said to be intrinsically correlated with the 
deterioration of public governance (de Lancer Julnes & Villoria, 2014, p. 39). In Italy, the 
former Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema (La Repubblica, 27 February 1998) once observed 
that “the judicial investigations in Milan (referring to the Mani Pulite) only unraveled what 
everybody already knew, including the journalists and the judges”. Again, he confirmed what 
has been argued: Italians also believe that there is a necessary corruption to make politics 
runs properly. Della Porta & Vannucci argue that 
“[i]n the absence of effective political solutions, and when the voice of anti-
corruption is weakening or finding fewer listeners, corruption remains an 
advantageous pursuit for many and therefore likely to become more widespread” 
(Della Porta & Vannucci, 2007, pp. 834–835). 
In accordance with a perspective française, citizens condemn corruption, but forgive a ‘petty 
favouritism’ (Lascoumes & Tomescu-Hatto, 2008, p. 24). They tolerate high levels of political 
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misconducts, because they believe that politics follows a particular moral code in which the 
means justify the goals (Lascoumes & Tomescu-Hatto, 2008, p. 37). In Israel, research on 
corruption found that country’s status as a civil society has declined in recent years, what 
reaffirmed Israelis’ increasing preoccupation not only with corruption, but also with crime 
and terror (Zelekha & Bar-Efrat, 2011). In Turkey, Adaman (2011, p. 318) sees that 
“corruption […] [is] deeper than a mere ‘technical problem’, which can successfully be 
addressed by increasing public auditing and by designing incentive-compatible mechanisms”. 
In this context, perceiving corruption helps people to distrust public institutions and 
democratic instruments. 
Apart from this classification, it is worth mentioning that South Africa also appeared as a 
country with high levels of perceived corruption (a 4.43 score) In fact, all BRICS44 were part 
of this corruption-evidenced cluster. South Africans’ opinions are not that different from 
what has been discussed here and their declared preoccupation with corruption resembles a 
Latin American justification focused on injustices. Indeed, South African research discuss a 
lot about such injustice and its connections with both the segregating apartheid regime (see 
Van Vuuren, 2006) and the resilience of corruption in a post-apartheid era (see Habtemichael 
& Cloete, 2010). 
Although citizens disagree with respect to what determines a persistent perception of a 
widespread corruption in advanced democracies and emerging industrialized countries, they 
agree in one thing: “corruption is a symptom that something has gone wrong with the 
management of the state” (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p. 9). Such deterioration, apparently 
associated with illicit behaviors, must be reevaluated in ‘beyond the law’ terms. Table 7 
presents the main characteristics to determine high levels of citizens’ perceptions about the 
relevance of corruption in this specific set of nations. 
Table 7: Reasons for the relevance of corruption in societies where corruption is 
perceived as endemic and resilient 
Subgroups Main characteristics to determine a perceived relevance of corruption 
Post-socialist countries Persistence of a Soviet-type mentality 
Latin-American countries a 
Lack of justice related to previous authoritarian regimes, judicial inefficiency, 
or violence 
Mediterranean countries 
Dissatisfaction with the democratic functioning as a whole or with evidenced 
crime and terror 
Indo-pacific countries Absence of morality in politics and/or in oligarchic power 
a Albeit with particularities, the South African perspective resembles an injustice-based case of analysis. 
                                                          
44 China did not appear in 2013’GCB global results. 
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4.1.2. A pathway to transition 
The United States, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and Estonia 
form a cluster in which corruption is moderately perceived as a relevant problem. They all 
presented scores that ranged from 3.73 to 3.97. These results ratify that corruption is still 
significant for them. In countries with high levels of perceived corruption, citizens apparently 
know that corruption is an essential problem to be dealt with, albeit they do not know what 
should count as corrupt. Contrariwise, in this intermediate cluster, citizens are apparently 
able to identify major patterns of a practiced corrupt behavior, albeit they do not seem to 
know how damaging it could be for the political process. They do sanction the commitment 
of illegal corrupt acts, but they overlook what constitutes a licit and institutionalized 
corruption. Citizens’ interests have been then promoted and used as a way to justify 
particularistic interests. The so-called ‘national interests’ do not purely reflect citizens’ 
desires. They will only reflect citizens’ desires if in accordance with major commercial or 
industrial interests. 
In the United States, “[m]uch corruption […] flies beneath the radar” (Johnston, 2012, p. 
329). Both commercial and industrial interests interpenetrate American politics and define 
what constitutes an ‘Influence Market’ style of corruption, i.e., “routine political processes 
such as advocacy and persuasion that get pushed beyond certain boundaries of fairness” 
(Johnston, 2012, pp. 334–335). In fact, judicial institutions seem to work properly to combat 
corrupt illegalities (and citizens recognize it), while the government deals with a licit non-
transactional interference of the market in the political affairs; what is potentially dangerous 
for the system. 
When assessing corruption and anti-bribery strategies in the United Kingdom and Germany, 
Lord (2013, pp. 128–129) argues that “[t]he approach shifts focus away from a preoccupation 
with offenders towards a focus on the ‘markets’ within which they operate and within which 
criminal activities occur”. In the Belgian case, Verwee & Walle (2008, p. 73) concludes that 
the “responsibility for corrupt practices […] belongs […] especially to Western businesses 
that abuse new methods of public governance to influence public decision making”. In 
Estonia, scientific research found that “both public officials and citizens are more likely to 
engage in corruption when they do not define corruption as wrong, and when they perceive 
that corrupt behavior is widespread among their peers” (Tavits, 2010, p. 1257). In Hungary, 
the more people regard political corruption as an elemental part of the political system, the 
more they strongly protest against it (see Gulyás, 2004). In sum, the more they perceive its 
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‘beyond the law’ implications, the more they demand governments to implement anti-
corruption measures to deal with its illegal aspects. Certainly a paradox that reaffirms how 
citizens act: they feel they know what corruption is about (only about illegalities), but they 
are confused about how pervasive it could be when socially approved (legal corruption). 
Again, such ubiquitous relation between corruption and society is determinant to understand 
the Malayan situation. Malayans seem to have difficulties to evaluate how noxious socially 
accepted corrupt behaviors may become when developing strategies to curb corruption. Such 
inconsistence seems to have undermined the efficacy of anti-corruption measures recently 
(see Siddiquee, 2010). 
These countries are in the pathway to transition, because they mostly recognize what 
corruption is in an illegal perspective, but still fail to evidence how it can be politically 
destructive. In this context, moderate levels of perceived corruption do not imply its control. 
In brief, legality becomes once more a plausible justification to understand why the corrupt 
business bothers especially citizens in advanced democracies or commercial/industrial-
oriented nations. Table 8 shows what counts as determinant for perceiving moderate (but 
still high) levels of corruption in these countries. 
Table 8: Reasons for the relevance of corruption in societies where corruption is 
perceived as moderately endemic and resilient 
Subgroup 
Main characteristics to determine a moderately high perceived 
relevance of corruption 
Transition countries 
The difficulty in determining how politically destructive socially accepted 
corrupt behaviors can be 
4.1.3. Socially controlled, but not inexistent 
It is usual to define a cluster in which corruption is inexistent. Kaufmann & Vicente (2011, 
p. 196) did it with legal corruption. However, it is necessary to overcome such simplistic 
perspective, because corruption does exist in countries like Canada, South Korea, Australia, 
New Zealand, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Norway, Finland, or Denmark. The only difference 
is how citizens deal with its occurrence. This ‘socially controlled corruption’ set of countries 
presents a combination of two vital conditions capable of curbing perceptions of corruption: 
(i) a disseminated sense of ethics in politics (ii) and the recognition of corruption as an issue 
that goes beyond the limits imposed by norms, laws and statutes. 
In Canada, for e.g., citizens “believe that their politicians are not meeting expectations as 
defined in ethical terms” (Atkinson, 2011, p. 446). However, they know that corruption is a 
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comprehensive phenomenon, which encompasses especially tacit behaviors. As pointed by 
Atkinson, 
“there is growing evidence that for citizens of democracies like Canada, 
corruption is not fundamentally about either of these things [(breaking 
increasingly elaborate contracts between office-holders and the state or the 
prevalence of rent-seeking officials who hold processes and players for ransom)]. 
Or, put another way, it is only incidentally about these things. For democratic 
citizens, corruption is the breakdown of trust between rulers and the ruled” 
(Atkinson, 2011, p. 447). 
Such breakdown of trust in politics is largely perceived as a problem in this set of countries. 
Albeit not in a large scale, “[e]ven in […] [nations] that sit at the apex of the corruption 
indices, like Finland, Denmark, [and Norway], not everyone is prepared to give political 
institutions the benefit of the doubt” (Atkinson, 2011, pp. 448–449). 
Indeed, Nordic people do recognize an implicit – albeit marginal – occurrence of political 
corrupt acts (see Linde & Erlingsson, 2013). Curbing corruption becomes then very easy, 
because ethical standards are widespread and any moral transgression should be sanctioned 
(not by laws, but by ethics). Again, Atkinson offers a good explanation for this situation: 
“Departures from standard practice—whether in obtaining licenses, hiring 
officials, or tendering contracts—light up against a background of adherence to 
rules and high standards of probity” (Atkinson, 2011, p. 446). 
Denmark is surely a good example of best practices in this field (see Johnston, 2013), because 
its citizens’ behaviors are not based on reasons to explore normative loopholes. In the 
opposite direction, Danes created a virtuous cycle of absence of corruption. In Manion’s 
words, “low-corruption countries have arrived at a ‘clean government’ equilibrium, and there 
is little reason to expect them to depart from it” (Manion, 2003, pp. 11–12). 
Other localities, such as New Zealand (see Gregory & Zirker, 2013), Australia, South Korea, 
Luxembourg, and Switzerland just follow a similar tendency: for them, corruption is not 
perceived as a massive problem, but it exists and must be controlled by society. In summary, 
the absence of corruption does not represent a given external benefit. Contrariwise, it is an 
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internal continuous pact of ethics and morality among citizens. Table 9 describes what should 
count as determinant to evidence low levels of perceived corruption in these countries. 
Table 9: Reasons for a perceived moderate/low relevance of corruption in 
advanced democracies 
Subgroup 
Main characteristics to determine moderate or low levels of perceived 
relevance of corruption 
‘Socially controlled corruption’ 
countries 
The comprehension of corruption as an all-embracing concept based on 
moral codes and not determined exclusively by lawful constraints 
4.2. Enfin, legal corruption 
As observed, corruption is a public drawback evidenced in advanced democracies and newly 
industrialized countries. It seems that corrupt behaviors have been affecting politics in many 
distinct contexts. In places where it is considered extremely relevant, citizens recognize that 
the political process is distorted by any sort of corrupt practices, albeit they do not know 
what corruption really means and tend to accept as not corrupt what laws do not forbid (even 
if actions are anti-ethical). In localities where corruption is moderately perceived as a 
problem, citizens are able to clearly identify and sanction illegal corrupt behaviors, but remain 
incapable of understanding how destructive a licit corruption can be. In countries where 
corruption is not seen as significant, people are apparently able to recognize that corruption 
is more comprehensive and related to moral misconducts. 
For different reasons, they all agree there is something that goes beyond the norms and still 
makes societies worry about corruption. Is legality in fact determining citizens’ perception of 
the relevance of corruption? In order to answer this question, it is now time to identify how 
legal corruption occurs and how it correlates with the relevance of corruption (subsection 
4.2.1) and in what circumstances it deserves special attention (subsection 4.2.2). 
4.2.1. Legal corruption and its connections with a perceived relevance of 
corruption 
A composite perceptional index45 was used to identify patterns of corrupt legality among 
advanced democracies and quasi-democracies. In this sense, three groups could be defined: 
                                                          
45 These results refer to a composite variable determined by a factorial analysis of three other variables: influence 
peddling, institutional corruption, and state capture. Such composite variable was built in order create an index 
for legal corruption. Measurements here observed were intentionally structured (a standard normal distribution 
was modelled) to facilitate comparisons among countries. 
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(i) one in which legal corruption is said to be perceived as common, other (ii) in which it is 
moderately observed, but still relevant; and another (iii) in which citizens tend to consider it 
unusual. 
Figure 3 shows that ‘beyond the law’ actions are considered recurrent. Based on a standard 
normal distribution, only seven countries departed significantly from positive results which 
symbolize high levels of perceived usage of socially accepted corrupt behaviors46: Norway 
(with a -3.03. score), Denmark (with a -2.39 score), Finland (with a -1.94 score), Switzerland 
(with a -1.86 score), South Korea (with a -0.87 score), Malaysia (with a -0.84 score), and 
Estonia (with a -0.59 score). Citizens from places in which corruption is perceived as 
something extremely (or at least moderately) relevant tended to observe high levels of legal 
corruption. In the opposite direction, countries with low levels of perceived corruption 
displayed discrete results when considering a ‘beyond the law’ perspective of corruption. 
 
Figure 3: Levels of perceived legal corruption in advanced democracies and 
emerging industrialized countries 
There is a latent relation between the perception of corruption as a public problem and the 
belief that licit corrupt behaviors should be used to make politics functions (see Figure 447). 
Results are similar in both directions (for the relevance of corruption and for its ‘beyond the 
law’ misappropriation), what suggests a robust interaction48. 
                                                          
46 Considering a simple composite index based on an average score of the three dimensions of legal corruption 
(influence peddling, institutional corruption, and state capture), Estonia, which is the first ‘non-legally 
corrupted’ society in Figure 3, presented a 3.36 result in a Likert scale of 5 items. This suggests that all countries 
with scores above Estonia presented high (or at least moderate) levels of perceived usage of socially approved 
corrupt behaviors. 
47 Data intended to make all variables compatible and comparable. For this reason, a standard normal 
distribution was then used to determine the relevance of corruption.   
48 Subsection 4.3.3 expands this central issue and gives support to reaffirm such assertion in a more 
comprehensive way. 
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Figure 4: Comparing levels of perceived relevance of corruption and levels of 
perceived legal corruption in advanced democracies and emerging 
industrialized countries 
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There is a compatibility between levels of perceived corruption and the usage of socially 
accepted corrupt acts. As observed in Figure 4, countries that scored high in one dimension 
(the relevance of corruption) also presented high levels of legal corruption in their societies. 
It is possible to affirm that these two variables interact in a very strong way. A Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient (r) of 0.821 determines a positive interaction and ratifies what has 
been discussed lately: these two variables are intrinsically connected and, for this reason, 
Main-H1 apparently appears to be true. 
They correlate, but more investigation is necessary to understand the causal relation between 
them and if a ‘beyond the law’ explanation for corruption is really able to determine its latent 
perceived social relevance in different societies. Table 10 ratifies such correlation and offers 
new conditions to explore legality in corruption. 
Table 10: Correlation between the relevance of corruption and legal corruption 
 Results 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (r) between ‘the relevance of 
corruption’ and ‘legal corruption’ 
0.821*** 
N 39 
Statistically significant ***(1% level). 
The relevance of corruption is thus correlated with legal corruption, but general inferences 
must be done with caution, especially causal ones. Some potential exceptions observed in 
Figure 4 need to be further investigated. In most countries, as here discussed, high levels of 
perceived relevance of corruption as a public problem are associated with high levels of legal 
corruption, but it does not happen in Brazil, Portugal, the Czech Republic, and Indonesia. 
Considering what has been argued in section 4.1, it is then possible to conclude that socially 
accepted corrupt behaviors work as a powerful tool to understand the reason why citizens 
consider corruption something relevant. ‘Socially controlled corruption’ countries presented 
low levels of legal corruption, what ratifies their latent perception of a broader corruption 
that represents “the breakdown of trust between rulers and the ruled” (Atkinson, 2011, p. 
447). In transition countries, legal corruption was mainly evidenced as usual, albeit not 
necessarily related to high levels of perceived relevance of corruption. This fact reinforces 
the idea of difficulty in observing the pervasiveness of corrupt actions in ‘beyond the law’ 
terms, i.e., citizens understand that socially accepted corrupt behaviors exist, but they are not 
sure about how destructive it could be for politics. Finally, in places where corruption is seen 
as an extremely relevant public problem, people tend to assume licit corrupt actions as part 
of the process and have difficulty in understanding what corruption really is. 
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4.2.2. Potential exceptions? The ‘I see nothing, but I guarantee it happens’ 
effect 
Dissonant voices come from countries like Brazil, Portugal, the Czech Republic, and 
Indonesia. In these localities, corruption is largely perceived as a public plague, although 
almost unnoticed by citizens as an unacceptable licit political tool. A contradiction is then 
evidenced: corruption has been reported as problematic, while locals have been neglecting 
its licit capability to deteriorate political institutions. Initially, such situation might configure 
a potential refutation of what has been previously discussed in this thesis. However, a more 
detailed observation reveals that this apparent exception in fact configures a prominent 
confirmation of how pervasive licit corrupt behaviors can be, especially in advanced 
democracies and emerging industrialized countries. These societies present what is defined 
here as the ‘I see nothing, but I guarantee it happens’ effect. Put in other words, citizens 
refute to accept corruption as fundamental, even though they know it determines how 
politics operate. In such context, freedom of speech is guaranteed and people are able to 
express their opinion. The problem does not refer to the limitation of fundamental rights, 
but to a systematic rejection of participation in the corrupt equilibrium by citizens. A reversal 
populism is then employed to preserve society as pure and uncorrupted: politics (‘they’) are 
corrupt and distort the political functioning in order to benefit from the system, whereas 
citizens (‘we’) are desperately fighting against any harm corrupt behaviors promote. What 
happens if citizens are considered a part of the political game? ‘We’ become also corruptible 
and determinant to reinforce the prevalence of self-promoted interests in the public arena. 
This set of countries presented high levels of perceived relevance of corruption combined 
with moderate or even low levels of legal corruption. Causing certain disturbance in the 
results, such observations had something in common: they all are ‘‘I see nothing, but I 
guarantee it happens’ cases, which means that they do not displayed results apparently 
contradictory because of a limitation of essential individual rights, but because of a non-
acceptance of participation in the corrupt equilibrium that permeates politics by citizens as a 
whole. 
Brazil presented the higher disparity between the relevance of corruption and its perceived 
‘beyond the law’ commitment (a difference of 1.386, considering comparable standard 
normal distributions). Following this tendency, Portugal presented great disparity (a 
difference of 1.256). The Czech Republic also scored remarkably divergent when these 
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parameters were taken into consideration (a difference of 1.085). Again, Indonesia reinforced 
the pattern: it presented a difference of 1.083 between these two selected variables. 
Explanations for this phenomenon are similar and encompass a perception of “political 
connections as one of the main strategies for life success [in these countries] […]” (M. L. 
Smith, 2010, p. 449). Albeit condemnable, corruption is seen as a fundamental tool to make 
individual interests represented in societies where industrial or commercial gains command. 
If entrepreneurs need the state to reach their goals, citizens will do exactly the same to achieve 
their objectives. In this scenario, “[c]itizens not only mistrust public officials, they also believe 
the state apparatus is obstructive of their initiatives and above all of the exercise of their 
rights” (de Sousa, 2008, p. 21). It becomes then necessary to distort the natural functioning 
of the state to have political voice and to make interests secured. Thus, corruption configures 
not only an avoidable occurrence, but a channel to democratize rights when governments 
simply fail to guarantee democratic conditions of political access, representation and/or 
independence. 
4.3. Finding good measures to explain the relevance of corruption 
As it was possible to observe, the relevance of corruption as a major public problem is 
apparently connected with a ‘beyond the law’ explanation for corruption. However, further 
investigation is needed in order to verify if a causal relation between them does exist. First, 
a rival illegal explanation will be presented (subsection 4.3.1), because it would be impossible 
to describe potential implications of legal corrupt behaviors on the way citizens perceive the 
importance of corruption without recognizing the existence of possible implications of illegal 
corruption (a rival interpretation) with regards to this issue. 
After assessing such rival interpretation, the specific causal implications of the proposed 
control variables on how citizens perceive legality in corruption will be discussed (subsection 
4.3.2). Finally, a ‘beyond the law’ explanation for the relevance of corruption will be proposed 
and properly validated (subsection 4.3.3). 
4.3.1. A rival illegal explanation? 
Citizens’ perceptions of illegalities in corruption has been used by surveys as a plausible 
determinant to measure corruption or at least some dimensions of the corrupt behavior. 
However, it is here observed that it is necessary to take care when considering such illegal 
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approach sufficient to explain corruption and especially its relevance. In this subsection, it 
will be shown that illegal corruption represents only an apparent determinant which has a 
limited explanatory power. 
Figure 5 suggests a certain positive relation between the evidenced commitment of illegalities 
and the relevance of corruption. Table 11 presents a Pearson’s correlation coefficient of 
0.399, what constitutes a moderate interdependence in social sciences. Albeit important, it is 
necessary to investigate if an illegal approach really matters to determine citizens’ perceptions 
of the relevance of corruption as a public problem. Recurrently, studies use illegalities to 
interpret corruption indexes, but such strategy appears to be limitative. The perception of 
illegal corruption exerts influence on how people see corruption in ordinary interactions with 
public institutions, but it is not certain if illegalities are determinant to understand citizens’ 
perceptions about the relevance of corruption, i.e., illegalities may present a marginal 
explanatory power. Indeed, this is exactly what happens: illegal corruption does not appear 
to determine the relevance of corruption, offers a limited explanation for the phenomenon, 
and becomes secondary when other variables are added to the model. 
 
Figure 5: ‘Illegal Corruption’ vs. the ‘Relevance of Corruption’ 
Table 11: Correlation between the relevance of corruption and illegal corruption 
 Results 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (r) between ‘the relevance of 
corruption’ and ‘illegal corruption’ 
0.399** 
N 39 
Statistically significant **(5% level). 
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It would be possible to admit the acceptance of Rival-H1a in places where corruption is 
widespread and democratic values are not even fostered. Both advanced democracies and 
quasi-democracies are not included in this context, because there is at least an apparent 
ambiance of respect of the individual rights. 
Table 12 confirms the expectations. Albeit moderately correlated with the relevance of 
corruption, illegal corruption does not appear as a main determinant. Linear regressions were 
used to show that illegalities act just as a supporting element, and not as a core reason to 
mold citizens’ perceptions of the relevance of corruption as a whole. When observed alone 
(Model A.1), illegal corruption appears as significant, but with a reduced explanatory power 
– a coefficient of determination (R²) of 0.159. When combined with years of schooling 
(Model A.2), it remains significant, but not expressive. However, when political stability is 
added (Model A.3), illegal corruption loses its significance. Model A.4 just reinforces the 
secondary role played by illegalities in this context. 
In sum, these 4 models offer a limited explanatory power for the perceived relevance of 
corruption in advanced democracies and emerging industrialized countries. Model A.2 
presents a R² of 0.268, Model A.3, a R² 0.339, and Model A.4, a R² of 0.348, respectively. All 
coefficients of determination are below 0.4. Such occurrence reduces the importance of this 
specific set of variables and promotes a quest for better determinants. In summary, all these 
variables appear to be secondary to explain citizens’ perceptions of the relevance of 
corruption. 
Table 12: Illegal determinants of the relevance of corruption 
Dependent variable: Relevance of corruption 
Independent Variables Model A.1 Model A.2 Model A.3 Model A.4 
Constant 3.975*** (0.087) 3.991*** (0.083) 4.091*** (0.087) 4.078*** (0.090) 
Illegal 0.214** (0.081) 0.175** (0.078) 0.098 (0.081) 0.103 (0.082) 
Political Stability - - -0.323*** (0.103) -0.270** (0.130) 
Education (years of schooling) - -0.197** (0.085) - -0.069 (0.102) 
R² 0.159 0.268 0.339 0.348 
N 39 39 39 39 
Statistically significant *(10% level); **(5% level); ***(1% level). Standard Errors in brackets. 
Table 12 serves to conclude that an illegal explanation is not sufficient to determine the 
relevance of corruption in general terms. In models A.3 and A.4, it becomes even statistically 
insignificant. In other words, Rival-H1a should be refuted. Moderate levels of correlation, 
low levels of explanatory power in models where illegalities take part, and reduced statistical 
significance make illegal corruption secondary to the understanding of a perceived social 
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relevance of corruption. Although historically correlated with high levels of corruption (both 
perceived or real), it was proved here that illegalities are not as crucial as it was expected 
lately. Thus, an overvalued illegal perspective of corruption has been used to justify why 
citizens are concerned with corruption itself. However, such strategy appears to be strongly 
based on common sense. People, at least in advanced democracies and emerging 
industrialized countries, are preoccupied with corruption not because of its illicit projection, 
but because of its socially accepted interference in the political process. What was here 
proved is that the perception of illegalities may produce marginal influence on the perception 
of corruption as a public problem, but it cannot be considered determinant to interpret such 
issue. 
4.3.2. Controlling sociocultural interactions 
As any other phenomenon, corruption is influenced by certain cultural or social exogenous 
circumstances. Due to its complexity, corrupt behaviors were directly linked to two specific 
control variables: political stability and education (years of schooling). The first one 
represents a possibility to expunge temporary democratic ruptures that may distort citizens’ 
opinions about the relevance of corruption. The second one appears to determine a 
progressive condition that may influence the comprehension about what really constitutes 
corruption and how pervasive, resilient, and adaptable, it might be. It was expected to 
observe low levels of perceived relevance of corruption combined with both high levels of 
political stability and literacy. Is it true? Let us find out. 
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate such expected negative correlation.  In essence, both political 
stability and years of schooling present apparently moderate negative levels of correlation 
with the relevance of corruption. Tables 13 and 14 show Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficients between each control variable and the relevance of corruption. The 
correlation with political stability is represented by a -0.559 coefficient, while the correlation 
with education is lower and determined by -0.409 coefficient. 
It is possible to assume that a preliminary bivariate interaction identified moderate 
relationships between the relevance of corruption and both political stability and education. 
However, a perceived relevance of corruption does not seem to be strongly associated (in 
linear terms) with lower levels of social stability and literacy, at least in a scenario where legal 
corruption remains constant. 
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Figure 6: ‘Political Stability’ vs. the ‘Relevance of Corruption’ 
 
Figure 7: ‘Education’ vs. the ‘Relevance of Corruption’ 
Table 13: Correlation between the relevance of corruption and political stability 
 Results 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (r) between ‘the relevance of 
corruption’ and ‘political stability’ 
-0.559*** 
N 39 
Statistically significant ***(1% level). 
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Table 14: Correlation between the relevance of corruption and education 
 Results 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (r) between ‘the relevance of 
corruption’ and ‘education (years of schooling)’ 
-0.409*** 
N 39 
Statistically significant ***(1% level). 
The result displayed in Table 13 ratifies what was evidenced by Fjelde & Hegre (2014), Nur-
tegin & Czap (2012), and Schumacher (2013), because political stability correlated moderately 
with the relevance of corruption. However, such relation must be further investigated. Albeit 
evidenced, the occurrence of social convulsions may be not necessary to determine how 
citizens perceive the commitment of corrupt behaviors in their respective societies. It is 
necessary something else, something that is not captured by political instability, illegal 
corruption, or even literacy. The result shown in Table 14 just expands what has been 
discussed, because education also correlates moderately with the relevance of corruption. 
Table 15 presents how each proposed control variable (political stability and education) 
interacts with the relevance of corruption in a linear approach. Models A.5, A.6, and A.7 
clarify the limited explanatory power of such control variables. Model A.5 considered only 
political stability as a necessary condition and produced a R² of 0.313. Model A.6 considered 
education as a necessary independent variable and displayed less significant results with a R² 
of 0.167. Model A.7 confirmed that adding parameters to control levels of education does 
not improve the model – R² remained near 0.3 and education became statistically 
insignificant. 
Table 15: Control determinants of the relevance of corruption 
Dependent variable: Relevance of corruption 
Independent Variables Model A.5 Model A.6 Model A.7 
Constant 4.119*** (0.084) 4.011*** (0.087) 4.109*** (0.087) 
Political Stability -0.380*** (0.092) - -0.338*** (0.119) 
Education (Years of Schooling) - -0.239*** (0.088) -0.057 (0.103) 
R² 0.313 0.167 0.319 
N 39 39 39 
Statistically significant *(10% level); **(5% level); ***(1% level). Standard Errors in brackets. 
Else, Tables 12 and 15 can be analyzed together. Illegal corruption, political stability, and 
education offered only moderate levels of correlation with the relevance of corruption. A 
model in which all these parameters were considered still presented a R² of 0.348 (Model 
A.4). Illegalities, even when political stability and education took part in the model, remained 
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weak to explain why citizens consider corruption so relevant in advanced democracies and 
emerging industrialized countries. In addition to what has been concluded in subsection 
4.3.1, political stability and education cannot be considered determinant to define levels of 
perceived relevance of corruption, even though they showed the expected negative 
relationships with the relevance of corruption. PolStab-H1b and Educ-H1c should be then 
refuted. Causal inferences are not confirmed by moderate levels of interdependence. The 
relation between these two control variables and the relevance of corruption exists, but 
‘beyond the law’ factors may be encompassing such influences. 
4.3.3. Perceiving relevance, perceiving legality in corruption 
There is corruption beyond the limits of what is prescribed by law. Legal corruption is much 
more about perceptions than about real occurrences. It is necessary to understand that 
citizens are not disappointed with the way politics operates in their countries because of the 
incidence of illegal corruption and not even because of what is perceived as corruptly illicit 
(as proved in subsection 4.3.1). In fact, there is much more acceptance in what should count 
as politically destructive than one should imagine. However, the adoption of distorted laws, 
regulations, and statutes create the illusion of a society without corruption. In other words, 
using political institutions to reconfigure social norms and make them adapted to consider 
what is morally wrong as lawful does not eliminate corruption. On the contrary, it just 
reaffirms the necessity of combating a different expression of the phenomenon: a socially 
accepted corruption, i.e., legal corruption. 
As previously observed, the way in which citizens perceive the commitment of illegalities is 
not sufficient to explain the perception of the relevance of corruption in advanced 
democracies or emerging industrialized countries. Something else is challenging the modus 
operandis of corruption: the distrust in public institutions. A latent discredit in governments, 
parliaments, and courts is not related to the inability to punish what is prescribed as wrong 
and against the laws. Such discredit is a direct consequence of the distortion of the political 
process in order to promote particularistic interests. Legal corruption offers a reasonable 
interpretation for this issue. 
The perceptions of both the relevance of corruption and legal corruption are intrinsically 
interconnected (see Table 10). Consequently, it is impossible to dissociate mutual 
implications and consequences. This thesis argues that levels of ‘beyond the law’ corruption 
determine levels of relevance. Figure 8 shows a clear association between these two variables. 
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Figure 8: ‘Legal Corruption’ vs. the ‘Relevance of Corruption’ 
Table 16 expresses the crucial role played by legal corruption. Model A.8 describes how 
powerful a ‘beyond the law’ perception of corruption is to determine the relevance of 
corruption in a given advanced democracy or quasi-democracy (a R² of 0.675 confirms it). 
Legal corruption is per se sufficient to explain the relevance of corruption, because it fitted 
well in every proposed model in which it was used. Models A.9 (with a R² of 0.714), A.10 
(with a R² of 0.738), and A.11 (with a R² of 0.741) improved what was found in Model A.8 
and described that even considering control variables, legal corruption still matters to explain 
the phenomenon. 
Table 16: ‘Beyond the law’ determinants of the relevance of corruption 
Dependent variable: Relevance of corruption 
Independent Variables Model A.8 Model A.9 Model A.10 Model A.11 
Constant 3.996*** (0.054) 4.045*** (0.056) 4.005*** (0.049) 4.022*** (0.055) 
Legal 0.480*** (0.055) 0.418*** (0.059) 0.450*** (0.051) 0.433*** (0.057) 
Political Stability - -0.153** (0.068) - -0.055 (0.084) 
Education - - -0.150*** (0.051) -0.123* (0.065) 
R² 0.675 0.714 0.738 0.741 
N 39 39 39 39 
Statistically significant *(10% level); **(5% level); ***(1% level). Standard Errors in brackets. 
Besides that, Table 17 insert illegal corruption in the discussions. Model A.12 appears to 
prove that illegalities and legalities are not simplistically complimentary. Comparing Models 
A.1, A.8, and A.12, makes possible to affirm that any illegal disturbance that influences a 
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perceived relevance of corruption is in fact subsumed into a macro-perception of what 
should count as legal corruption. In other words, Model A.1 presented illegal corruption as 
potentially determinant, but with a R² of only 0.159. Model A.8 showed legal corruption as 
a powerful determinant with a strong a R² of 0.675. Model A.12 (with a R² of 0.678 almost 
equivalent to that obtained in Model A.8) evidenced that combining these two dimensions 
of corruption in the same model does not help to explain the relevance of corruption. 
Contrary to expectations, such a combination makes even more clear that illegalities are 
secondary to the explanation. When considering both illegal and legal corruptions in Model 
A.12, illegal corruption became statistically insignificant and not necessary. Models A.13 to 
A.15 just confirms this tendency: legal corruption remained relevant and determinant, while 
illegal corruption stayed not significant and the other two control variables added little when 
evaluating the increasing complexity of the models in combination with their explanatory 
power. Model A.8 offered a simple solution to the problem with a robust evidence. No other 
model proved to be more effective than this specific model. 
Table 17: Illegal and legal interactional determinants of the relevance of corruption 
Dependent variable: Relevance of corruption 
Independent Variables Model A.12 Model A.13 Model A.14 Model A.15 
Constant 3.992*** (0.055) 4.046*** (0.058) 4.004*** (0.050) 4.021*** (0.058) 
Illegal 0.034 (0.056) -0.004 (0.056) 0.012 (0.052) 0.003 (0.055) 
Legal 0.464*** (0.061) 0.419*** (0.062) 0.445*** (0.056) 0.432*** (0.060) 
Political Stability - -0.154** (0.073) - -0.054 (0.089) 
Education - - -0.148*** (0.052) -0.124* (0.066) 
R² 0.678 0.714 0.738 0.741 
N 39 39 39 39 
Statistically significant *(10% level); **(5% level); ***(1% level). Standard Errors in brackets. 
The results presented in Tables 10, 16, and 17 are sufficient to affirm that the higher the 
occurrence of legal corruption in a country, the higher the relevance of corruption as a public 
problem in this country. The way in which citizens perceive the occurrence of socially 
accepted corrupt behaviors is in fact what counts as crucial to understand why corruption is 
seen as a major public problem in advanced democracies and newly industrialized countries. 
Adding a rival explanation based on illegalities and socio-cultural control variables reinforced 
such finding, because it clarifies what should cause disturbance and make the results even 
more robust and clear. Removing possible noises such as political instability or levels of 
education, enhances the explanatory power of the most adjusted (and simple) model: Model 
A.8. 
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4.4. Conclusive remarks and findings 
After observing how both the relevance of corruption and legal corruption are perceived by 
citizens in advanced democracies and emerging industrialized countries and after 
understanding how each selected variable affects the perception of the relevance of 
corruption as a public issue, it is now possible to present some important findings and 
establish some conclusions. 
Table 18 displays all the proposed hypotheses for this first step of the research and makes 
clear what has been refuted and what has been confirmed. Main-H1 was confirmed, whereas 
Rival-H1a, PolStab-H1b, and Educ-H1c were all rejected. It does not mean that illegal 
corruption, political stability, and education are not important to comprehend how the 
corrupt thing operates. It just means that they are secondary to the process of understanding 
how citizens perceive the relevance of corruption. One thing is to find explanations for a real 
occurrence of corruption worldwide, and another thing is to explain why people identify 
corruption as a major public problem in advanced democracies and emerging industrialized 
countries. 
Table 18: Summing up: hypotheses tested (Step 1) 
Hypotheses (Step 1) Results 
 
Is there a latent 
correlation with the 
relevance of corruption? 
Is such relation able to 
work as a necessary 
determinant for the 
relevance of corruption 
in a multivariate linear 
analysis? 
Final 
Result 
Main-H1: The higher the occurrence 
of legal corruption in a country, the 
higher the relevance of corruption as 
a public problem in this country 
Yes 
Very strong positive 
correlation 
Yes 
Hypothesis 
confirmed 
Rival-H1a: The higher the occurrence 
of illegal corruption in a country, the 
higher the relevance of corruption as 
a public problem in this country 
Yes 
Moderate to low positive 
correlation 
No  
Hypothesis 
rejected 
PolStab-H1b: The higher the political 
stability in a country, the lower the 
relevance of corruption as a public 
problem in this country 
Yes 
Moderate negative 
correlation 
No 
Hypothesis 
rejected 
Educ-H1c: The more years of 
schooling, the lower the relevance of 
corruption as a public problem in a 
country 
Yes 
Moderate negative 
correlation 
No 
Hypothesis 
rejected 
As a central finding, it is possible to affirm that the higher the occurrence of legal corruption 
in a country, the higher the relevance of corruption as a public problem in this country. Such 
statement is contrary to previous scientific expectations in the field. Of course, it was 
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expected to find a strong relation between the relevance of corruption and legal corruption. 
The unexpected was to discover that the way citizens perceive the commitment of illegal 
corrupt acts has nothing to do with the way they define corruption as a relevant public issue. 
It is important to mention that the discussions held were not concerned with real levels of 
occurrence of corrupt illegalities. On the contrary, the objective here was to identify how 
variations in the perception of illegal corruption affect the perception of the relevance of 
corruption itself. Levels of declared illegal corruptions (such as bribery, extortion or 
embezzlement) are always lower than what reality exposes. However, the interest was not to 
understand such ‘real-versus-perceived’ disparity in corruption. Patterns of perceived 
relevance of corruption in this specific set of nations were identified and explained in order 
to propose a reconfiguration of elementary characteristics of anti-corruption policies usually 
implemented. It is here found that a real incidence of corruption can only be controlled after 
reorienting citizens’ perceptions of corruption as something necessary for politics. Changing 
perceptions means changing behaviors and consequently reducing future commitments of 
corrupt behaviors. 
Finding a simple solution to a complex issue: legal corruption does it. Figure 9 summarizes 
the discussions held and identify what should be concluded in this chapter. In sum, legal 
corruption is necessary and sufficient to explain how citizens classify the relevance of 
corruption as public problem in their democracies or quasi-democracies. 
 
Figure 9: A causal relation between legal corruption and the relevance of corruption 
It was identified that legal corruption is more important to define the relevance of corruption 
than its illicit counterpart. Even considering control variables (political stability and 
education) it remained valid. If a ‘beyond the law’ corruption affects the way in which citizens 
see corruption itself as relevant, so it becomes necessary to unveil what determines the 
perception of a corrupt legality. 
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Chapter 5  
What determines legal corruption? 
Illegal corruption has been broadly studied. Its causes have been largely contested and 
explained (see Lambsdorff, 2006; Seldadyo & Haan, 2006; Tanzi, 1998; Treisman, 2000). On 
the contrary, legal corruption is a phenomenon under construction, which means that its 
causes have not been fully assessed yet. Previous works only tried to observe if such ‘beyond 
the law’ corruption was related to a comprehensive definition of corruption (Castro, 2008, 
pp. 88–89) or if economic determinants were able to describe differences between legal and 
illegal corruptions (Kaufmann & Vicente, 2005, 2011). Chapter 4 proved that illegalities and 
legalities should not be considered complimentary dimensions of the relevance of corruption. 
Illegal corrupt implications were in fact subsumed by their legal counterpart and, for this 
reason, it is not reasonable to consider ‘beyond the law’ occurrences of corruption residual 
or marginal as usually attempted. 
All these recent studies have one thing in common: they neglected plausible explanations 
that go beyond the boundaries of economic determinism. Conditions of direct transparency 
and public efficiency or efficacy should be properly explored. It does not mean that economic 
factors are irrelevant, but they are not sufficient to explain what really drives legal corruption. 
It is necessary to understand that macroeconomic instability may describe apparent higher 
levels of evidenced legal corruption in advanced democracies or pseudodemocracies, but 
there is more to be studied. This chapter will serve to do so. 
First, extrinsic determinants of legal corruption will be presented, analyzed, and inserted in 
multivariate linear models to test and discover what really affects the way in which citizens 
observe the commitment of socially accepted corrupt behaviors (section 5.1). Then, it will 
be shown how the most prominent socioeconomic factors observed in section 5.1 interact 
and help to derive the most appropriate statistical model (section 5.2) to establish causal and 
theoretical conclusions about ‘beyond the law’ aspects of corruption (section 5.3). 
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5.1. Extrinsic determinants of legal corruption 
Three questions must be answered in order to understand what counts to determine a 
perceived ‘beyond the law’ corruption in advanced democracies or quasi-democracies: (i) ‘Do 
higher levels of transparency and accountability decrease the perception of ‘beyond the law’ 
corrupt behaviors?’ (subsection 5.1.1); (ii) ‘Is it possible to control legal corruption by simply 
making governments more effective and efficient?’ (subsection 5.1.2); and (iii) ‘Do 
macroeconomic conditions affect the way in which citizens perceive legal corruption?’ 
(subsection 5.1.3). 
Investigating if legal corruption is determined by this set of questions makes even easier to 
understand which kind of causalities must be seen as necessary (or not) to create an ambiance 
of social acceptance of certain corrupt behaviors. It is then necessary to avoid a simplistic 
comprehension of the phenomenon, because legal corruption is more than a simple concern 
about levels of perceived freedom of the press and/or accountability49. Indeed, it is 
represented by a complex interaction of socioeconomic conditions and not by a single 
element. Only multivariate analyses in which variables are freely added or removed are able 
to prove what really determines legal corruption. 
Else, each proposed subsection appeared as a manner to create rival explanations for legal 
corruption. Different scenarios and different variables enhanced the proposed findings and 
made solutions even more powerful and robust. 
5.1.1. Transparency and accountability: are they really important? 
Accountability and transparency usually appear together. Albeit intrinsically related, they are 
not the same. In this subsection, different forms of transparency and accountability will be 
used to identify patterns of a socially accepted and licit corruption. In other words, 4 
independent variables (‘Transparency of Government Policymaking’, ‘Strength of Auditing’, 
‘Freedom of the Press’, and ‘Internet Usage’) will try to explain legal corruption. 
                                                          
49 Dincer & Johnston (Dincer & Johnston, 2015) created a justification based on reporters’ opinions about 
public corruption in American states, while Kaufmann & Vicente (2011) developed a statistically significant 
model in which accountability and freedom of the press were crucial. Dincer found statistical significance when 
adding moralism, urbanization, education, median income, voter participation, and media coverage. Their 
model produced a R² of 0.52 (Dincer & Johnston, 2015), but remained inconclusive because of their difficulty 
to find rival explanations for legal corruption. Accountability, equality, and initial income were also used by 
Kaufmann & Vicente (see 2011, pp. 212–214) to describe legal corruption, but these three variables did not 
enhanced the explanatory power of their models (in fact all their models, albeit statistically significant, produced 
low R²’s). 
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Table 19 confirmed previous expectations: transparency and accountability are correlated 
with legal corruption. Both moderate and high levels of linear relationship were evidenced. 
The coefficients of correlation between each independent variable and legal corruption were 
-0.456 (regarding ‘Transparency of Government Policymaking’), -0.484 (regarding ‘Strength 
of Auditing’), 0.573 (regarding ‘Freedom of the Press’50), and -0.681 (regarding ‘Internet 
Usage’), respectively. All results were statistically significant at 1% level. 
Table 19: Correlations between T&A factors and legal corruption 
Variables analyzed Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (r) 
‘Transparency of Gov. Policymaking’ and ‘Legal Corruption’ a                      -0.456*** 
‘Strength of Auditing’ and ‘Legal Corruption’ a -0.484*** 
‘Freedom of the Press’ and ‘Legal Corruption’ a 0.573*** 
‘Internet Usage’ and ‘Legal Corruption’ a -0.681*** 
a N=39 / Statistically significant *(10% level); **(5% level); ***(1% level). 
Table 19 made possible to affirm that all these variable are apparently correlated with legal 
corruption, but it is still necessary to explore if these parameters are adequate to explain 
certain levels of evidenced corrupt legality. For this reason, Table 20 describes how these 
variables interact with legal corruption and with one another. Linear regressions are 
conclusive and serve to affirm that only ‘Internet Usage’ was statistically significant and 
necessary. ‘Transparency of Government Policymaking’, ‘Strength of Auditing’, and 
‘Freedom of the Press’ – albeit correlated with legal corruption – proved to be irrelevant 
when running multivariate regressions. 
Table 20 gathers all results of the linear regressions that considered transparency and 
accountability as possible determinants of legal corruption. It is worth noting that all these 
variables were apparently seen as necessary conditions. Models B.1to B.4 showed preliminary 
fitted results. Models B.1 to B.3 presented low levels of determination: model B.1 offered a 
R² of 0.208; Model B.2, a R² of 0.235; and Model B.3, a R² of 0.328. On the contrary, Model 
B.4 produced a promising explanatory power (a R² of 0.463). Subsequent models confronted 
these previous impressions and made clear that only ‘Internet Usage’ exerted direct influence 
on legal corruption. In fact, ‘Internet Usage’ encompassed all the implications caused by 
‘Transparency of Government Policymaking’, ‘Strength of Auditing’, and ‘Freedom of the 
Press’. More complex models stated it. Models B.5 to B.15 just confirmed the importance of 
‘Internet Usage’ in the process. Hypothesis Internet-H2d will be further investigated in section 
5.2, but it should be confirmed in a preliminary evaluation. 
                                                          
50 ‘Freedom of the Press’ presented a positive coefficient, but it is necessary to emphasize that its expected 
negative correlation with legal corruption (see subsection 3.2.2.1) was confirmed. The numerical scale for this 
variable was built in an inverse way (see Table 4), i.e., higher values represented less freedom of the press. 
 Table 20: T&A determinants of legal corruption 
Dependent variable: Legal Corruption 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 
B.1 
Model 
B.2 
Model 
B.3  
Model 
B.4  
Model 
B.5 
Model 
B.6 
Model 
B.7 
Model 
B.8 
Model 
B.9 
Model 
B.10 
Model 
B.11 
Model 
B.12 
Model 
B.13 
Model 
B.14 
Model 
B.15 
Constant 
2.871*** 
(0.934) 
3.871*** 
(1.158) 
-0.050 
(0.134) 
0.059 
(0.119) 
3.948*** 
(1.161) 
1.407 
(0.975) 
1.017 
(0.877) 
2.004 
(1.247) 
1.667 
(1.083) 
0.036 
(0.123) 
2.115 
(1.274) 
1.700 
(1.115) 
0.879 
(0.909) 
1.504 
(1.147) 
1.536 
(1.182) 
Transparency of 
Government 
Policymaking 
-0.645*** 
(0.207) 
- - - 
-0.302 
(0.305) 
-0.325 
(0.261) 
-0.217 
(0.197) 
- - - 
-0.162 
(0.287) 
-0.045 
(0.262) 
-0.190 
(0.203) 
- 
-0.040 
(0.265) 
Strength of 
Auditing 
- 
-0.745*** 
(0.221) 
- - 
-0.501 
(0.331) 
- - 
-0.393 
(0.237) 
-0.311 
(0.208) 
- 
-0.276 
(0.317) 
-0.279 
(0.282) 
- 
-0.282 
(0.219) 
-0.254 
(0.290) 
Freedom of the 
Press 
- - 
0.524*** 
(0.123) 
- - 
0.421*** 
(0.139) 
- 
0.403*** 
(0.141) 
- 
0.141 
(0.164) 
0.388** 
(0.145) 
- 
0.108 
(0.168) 
0.081 
(0.169) 
0.080 
(0.172) 
Internet Usage - - - 
-0.622*** 
(0.110) 
- - 
-0.552*** 
(0.127) 
- 
-0.553*** 
(0.124) 
-0.518*** 
(0.164) 
- 
-0.527*** 
(0.129) 
-0.481*** 
(0.169) 
-0.481*** 
(0.165) 
-0.477*** 
(0.169) 
R² 0.208 0.235 0.328 0.463 0.255 0.368 0.481 0.376 0.495 0.474 0.381 0.495 0.487 0.498 0.498 
N 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Statistically significant *(10% level); **(5% level); ***(1% level). Standard Errors in brackets. 
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Hypotheses Transp-H2a, Audit-H2b, and Press-H2c must be rejected. Although they all 
described moderate and significant correlations with legal corruption, their impacts proved 
to be marginal and unnecessary to define how citizens perceive the occurrence of ‘beyond 
the law’ corrupt behaviors in advanced and/or industrial democracies (or quasi-
democracies). 
In part, these results confirmed what Kaufmann & Vicente (2011) and Dincer & Johnston 
(2015) found, because legality in corruption and accountability measures were described here 
as interdependent phenomena. However, these two scientific studies focused on describing 
transparency and accountability as an indirect action and did not verified if these elements 
fulfilled the publicity condition, i.e., the capacity of actually making transparency accessible 
by the public (Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010, p. 302). In this sense, a greater media coverage or 
even a freer press only determine lower levels of legal corruption if accompanied by direct 
strategies of transparency and accountability. In essence, “simply making information 
available [or public] – […] do little to prevent corruption” (Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010, p. 302) 
if not followed by conditions of data access. ‘Internet Usage’ represents this direct capacity 
of revealing what governments do – and how they do – and rendering information accessible. 
Today, access to technologies represents a weapon against the validation of some corrupt 
behaviors as socially accepted. Believing in the probity of governments makes citizens less 
receptive to tolerate corruption as something necessary for politics to happen. 
5.1.2. Are efficiency and efficacy crucial? 
The perception of legal corruption is not only influenced by transparency and/or 
accountability (especially ‘Internet Usage’). Government efficiency and efficacy also plays a 
relevant role in this process. More than providing access to information, governments should 
be aware of the dangers of public malfunctioning. ‘Regulatory Quality’, ‘Efficiency of Legal 
Framework’, ‘Wastefulness of Government Spending’, and ‘Burden of Government 
Regulation’ will be tested in this subsection. 
Table 21 displays all Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r) regarding efficiency and efficacy. 
‘Regulatory Quality’ produced a r of -0.469; ‘Efficiency of Legal Framework in Challenging 
Regulations’, a r of -0.503; ‘Wastefulness of Government Spending’, a r of -0.596; and 
‘Burden of Government Regulation’, a r of -0.462. All results were statistically significant at 
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1% level. Again, moderate correlations appeared and all expected relations were confirmed51. 
But, a question persists: can these variables explain levels of perceived legal corruption? 
Table 21: Correlations between E&E factors and legal corruption 
Variables analyzed Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (r) 
‘Regulatory Quality’ and ‘Legal Corruption’ a -0.469*** 
‘Efficiency of Legal Framework in Challenging 
Regulations’ and ‘Legal Corruption’ a 
-0.503*** 
‘Wastefulness of Government Spending’ and 
‘Legal Corruption’ a 
-0.596*** 
‘Burden of Government Regulation’ and ‘Legal 
Corruption’ a 
-0.462*** 
a N=39 / Statistically significant *(10% level); **(5% level); ***(1% level). 
Table 22 shows that in multivariate linear regressions, only ‘Wastefulness of Government 
Spending’ proved to be undeniably necessary to explain legal corruption in an 
‘efficiency/efficacy’ perspective. It displayed high levels of statistical significance (at least at 
5% level) and R² ranged from 0.355 (Model B.18) to 0.394 (Model B.30) in models where 
such variable was considered. For this reason, hypothesis Waste-H2g should be preliminarily 
validated. 
Contrary to expectations, all the other variables – albeit moderately correlated with legal 
corruption – remained not statistically significant in multivariate linear regressions. Again, 
when ‘Regulatory Quality’, ‘Efficiency of Legal Framework in Challenging Regulations’, and 
‘Burden of Government Regulation’ were considered alone (in simple linear regressions), 
they appeared to be potential valid determinants of legal corruption (Model B.16 presented 
statistical significance and a R² of 0.220, Model B.17 presented statistical significance and a 
R² of 0.253, and Model B.19 also presented statistical significance and a R² of 0.213). 
However, subsequent multivariate OLS linear regressions proved that these three variables 
gave almost no contribution to the explanatory power when combined with ‘Wastefulness 
of Government Spending’ (Models B.21, B.23, B.25, B.26, B.28, B.29, and B.30 presented 
coefficients of determination that ranged from 0.355 to 0.394 and poor p-values results for 
all variables, except for the variable ‘Wastefulness of Government Spending’). Hypotheses 
RegQuality-H2e, LegFrame-H2f, and Burden-H2h must be then rejected, because they described 
real interactions with no causal relevance or statistical significance for the process of 
describing legal corruption. 
                                                          
51 ‘Wastefulness of Government Spending’ and ‘Burden of Government Regulation’ presented negative 
coefficients, but it is necessary to emphasize that their expected positive correlations with legal corruption (see 
subsection 3.2.2.2) were confirmed. The numerical scales for these two variables were built in an inverse way 
(see Table 4), i.e., higher values represented both less public waste and less burdensome governments. 
 Table 22: E&E determinants of legal corruption 
Dependent variable: Legal Corruption 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 
B.16 
Model 
B.17 
Model 
B.18  
Model 
B.19  
Model 
B.20 
Model 
B.21 
Model 
B.22 
Model 
B.23 
Model 
B.24 
Model 
B.25 
Model 
B.26 
Model 
B.27 
Model 
B.28 
Model 
B.29 
Model 
B.30 
Constant 
0.685** 
(0.256) 
2.059*** 
(0.593) 
2.351*** 
(0.537) 
2.151*** 
(0.694) 
1.841*** 
(0.599) 
2.209*** 
(0.543) 
2.019*** 
(0.662) 
2.357*** 
(0.577) 
2.350*** 
(0.689) 
2.029*** 
(0.630) 
2.159*** 
(0.591) 
2.149*** 
(0.683) 
1.982*** 
(0.629) 
2.048*** 
(0.660) 
1.958*** 
(0.663) 
Regulatory 
Quality 
-0.725*** 
(0.225) 
- - - 
-0.425* 
(0.257) 
-0.315 
(0.242) 
-0.524** 
(0.233) 
- - - 
-0.326 
(0.250) 
-0.435* 
(0.258) 
-0.277 
(0.249) 
- 
-0.285 
(0.259) 
Efficiency of 
Legal 
Framework in 
Challenging 
Regulations 
- 
-0.530*** 
(0.150) 
- - 
-0.370** 
(0.175) 
- - 
-0.008 
(0.260) 
-0.380 
(0.231) 
- 
0.061 
(0.263) 
-0.205 
(0.248) 
- 
-0.029 
(0.261) 
0.037 
(0.267) 
Wastefulness of 
Government 
Spending 
- - 
-0.700*** 
(0.155) 
- - 
-0.569*** 
(0.184) 
- 
-0.692** 
(0.290) 
- 
-0.978*** 
(0.324) 
-0.621** 
(0.293) 
- 
-0.795** 
(0.363) 
-0.953** 
(0.396) 
-0.821** 
(0.413) 
Burden of 
Government 
Regulation 
- - - 
-0.660*** 
(0.208) 
- - 
-0.468** 
(0.218) 
- 
-0.268 
(0.314) 
0.386 
(0.395) 
- 
-0.289 
(0.306) 
0.292 
(0.403) 
0.390 
(0.402) 
0.285 
(0.412) 
R² 0.220 0.253 0.355 0.213 0.306 0.384 0.310 0.355 0.268 0.372 0.385 0.323 0.393 0.372 0.394 
N 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Statistically significant *(10% level); **(5% level); ***(1% level). Standard Errors in brackets. 
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Perceiving waste in the public sector reinforces the idea of acceptability of corruption as 
necessary. In a system where inefficiency and inefficacy rule, it is then necessary to adopt 
corrupt behaviors, no matter if sanctioned or not by laws. In sum, higher levels of wastage 
promote equally higher levels of perceived legality corruption. Apparently, citizens’ 
perceptions of legal corruption are not influenced by the quality of regulation in general 
terms, but by the governments’ ability to make public institutions more objective, efficient 
and organized. 
5.1.3. Do macroeconomic conditions matter? 
Kaufmann & Vicente (2011, p. 216) once said that “the current literature is lagging on the 
comparison of the effects of legal and illegal types of corruption on economic performance”. 
Many studies about the influence of macroeconomic factors on illegal corruption have been 
performed since mid-twentieth century (Lambsdorff, 2006, pp. 24–27; Seldadyo & Haan, 
2006, pp. 14–19). On the contrary, little is known about the interactions between 
macroeconomics and legal corruption. It is time describe such relationship. 
Table 23 displays coefficients of correlations. When associated with ‘Legal Corruption’, 
‘Taxation’ produced a r of 0.289; ‘Government Debt’, a r of 0.115; ‘GDP per capita’, a r of -
0.441; and ‘Unemployment’, a r of 0.351. Statistical significance was evidenced only in 
relation to ‘GDP per capita’ (statistically significant at 1% level) and ‘Unemployment’ 
(statistically significant at 5% level). ‘Taxation’ and ‘Government Debt’ simply failed to 
explain ‘Legal Corruption’, because their results proved to be inexpressive in linear terms. 
Thus, hypotheses Tax-H2i: and Debt-H2j must be immediately refuted. Hypotheses GDP-
H2k and Unemployment-H2l needs further multivariate investigation. These two variables 
presented moderate levels of correlation with legal corruption. It is necessary to verify if they 
are in fact important to determine citizens’ perceptions of legality in corruption. Table 24 
provides these answers. 
Table 23: Correlations between Macroeconomic factors and legal corruption 
Variables analyzed Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (r) 
‘Taxation’ and ‘Legal Corruption’ a 0.289 
‘Government Debt’ and ‘Legal Corruption’ a 0.115 
‘GDP per capita’ and ‘Legal Corruption’ a -0.441*** 
‘Unemployment’ and ‘Legal Corruption’ a 0.351** 
a N=39 / Statistically significant *(10% level); **(5% level); ***(1% level). 
 
 Table 24: Macroeconomic determinants of legal corruption 
Dependent variable: Legal Corruption 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 
B.31 
Model 
B.32 
Model 
B.33  
Model 
B.34  
Model 
B.35 
Model 
B.36 
Model 
B.37 
Model 
B.38 
Model 
B.39 
Model 
B.40 
Model 
B.41 
Model 
B.42 
Model 
B.43 
Model 
B.44 
Model 
B.45 
Constant 
-0.942* 
(0.535) 
-0.010 
(0.162) 
0.038 
(0.146) 
-0.031 
(0.153) 
-0.915* 
(0.544) 
-0.516 
(0.528) 
-0.812 
(0.517) 
-0.025 
(0.146) 
-0.034 
(0.155) 
0.009 
(0.140) 
-0.437 
(0.536) 
-0.805 
(0.526) 
-0.416 
(0.509) 
0.002 
(0.141) 
-0.370 
(0.518) 
Taxation 
0.021* 
(0.012) 
- - - 
0.021* 
(0.012) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
0.018 
(0.011) 
- - - 
0.010 
(0.012) 
0.018 
(0.012) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
- 
0.008 
(0.011) 
Government 
Debt 
- 
0.105 
(0.149) 
- - 
0.070 
(0.147) 
- - 
0.155 
(0.135) 
0.048 
(0.145) 
- 
0.132 
(0.138) 
0.024 
(0.143) 
- 
0.103 
(0.133) 
0.087 
(0.135) 
GDP per capita - - 
-0.403*** 
(0.135) 
- - 
-0.356** 
(0.141) 
- 
-0.422*** 
(0.135) 
- 
-0.374*** 
(0.129) 
-0.379** 
(0.144) 
- 
-0.339** 
(0.136) 
-0.388*** 
(0.131) 
-0.355** 
(0.139) 
Unemployment - - - 
0.321** 
(0.141) 
- - 
0.287** 
(0.140) 
- 
0.312** 
(0.145) 
0.282** 
(0.129) 
- 
0.283* 
(0.144) 
0.267** 
(0.131) 
0.261* 
(0.133) 
0.252* 
(0.134) 
R² 0.084 0.013 0.195 0.123 0.090 0.221 0.180 0.223 0.126 0.289 0.241 0.181 0.304 0.301 0.312 
N 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Statistically significant *(10% level); **(5% level); ***(1% level). Standard Errors in brackets. 
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‘GDP per capita’ fitted well in almost all proposed models. Albeit presenting moderate 
explanatory power (R² ranged from 0.195 to 0.312 in models B.33, B.36, B.38, B.40, B.41, 
B.43, B.44, and B.45), this variable proved to be statistically relevant. ‘Unemployment’ fitted 
well too – albeit with lower statistical significance (in most cases at 5% level) –, what leads 
to the partial conclusion that it might also be relevant to the explanation of the phenomenon. 
Considering such information, it is prudent to further investigate hypotheses GDP-H2k and 
Unemployment-H2l in order to validate and confirm them in a conclusive way. They offered 
preliminary promising results, but it is necessary to ratify if they remain statistically significant 
and necessary to the process of determining levels of legality in corruption when combined 
with the other prominent variables detected in subsections 5.1.1 (‘Internet Usage’) and 5.1.2 
(‘Wastefulness of Government Spending’). 
5.2. A model to explain legal corruption 
After testing rival explanations (subsections 5.1.1, 5.1.2, and 5.1.3), it is possible to affirm 
that none of them was able to capture the essence of legal corruption on its own. This section 
demonstrates that these domains must interact in order to better describe the phenomenon. 
In essence, ‘Internet Usage’ represents the capacity of developing direct transparency and 
accountability; ‘Wastefulness of Government Spending’ means more public efficiency in 
direct terms; ‘GDP per capita’ and measures against ‘Unemployment’ symbolize both more 
social empowerment. Apparently, these elements alone were able to explain certain levels of 
perceived corrupt legality in advanced democracies and quasi-democracies, but it is necessary 
to verify if together they produce the same relevant outputs. 
Table 25 presents a model that combines these four promising variables and tries to capture 
a multivariate understanding of how perceptions of legal corruption are produced. Model 
B.46 shows that ‘Unemployment’ loses its statistical adjustment when combined with the 
other proposed T&A and E&E factors, namely ‘Internet Usage’ and ‘Wastefulness of 
Government Spending’. Model B.47 emphasizes that ‘GDP per capita’ may be working as a 
confounding variable52. In fact, ‘GDP per capita’ displays an evidenced reversal of its least-
                                                          
52 As once observed by both Arah (2008) and Knaeble & Dutter (2015), some variables may bias final results 
even if statistically supported. When evaluated together with other macroeconomic variables, ‘GDP per capita’ 
presented negative estimates. However, after adding some T&A and E&E variables, ‘GDP per capita’ reversed 
the direction of its impact on legal corruption, i.e., its estimate became positive. As a way to avoid considering 
contradictory effects of ‘GDP per capita’ and multicollinearity, this variable was then described as secondary 
to the process of determining levels of legality in corruption. Else, the evidenced positive results for ‘GDP per 
capita’ estimates in models B.46 and B.47 ratify what Lambsdorff (2006, p. 24) once wrote about considering 
‘GDP per capita’ in corruption research: “a simple regression would not provide a causal link between 
corruption and GDP, but would report some correlation of unknown origin”. 
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squares estimate (it assumes a positive value if compared to its estimates presented in Table 
24) that may be misinterpreted. Even with a R² of 0.596, Model B.47 lacks objectivity, clarity, 
and precision. Model B.48 offers such precision by avoiding dubious implications caused by 
‘GDP per capita’. Presenting robust results (a yet powerful R² of 0.549 and p-values with at 
least 5% level of statistical significance), such model (model B.48) describes in essence what 
really determines legality in corruption: ‘Internet Usage’ and ‘Wastefulness of Government 
Spending’. 
Table 25: Global Determinants of legal corruption 
Dependent variable: Legal Corruption 
Independent Variables Model B.46 Model B.47 Model B.48 
Constant 0.970* (0.542) 1.345*** (0.497) 1.383** (0.517) 
Internet Usage -0.792*** (0.184) -0.765*** (0.188) -0.466*** (0.118) 
Wastefulness of Government 
Spending 
-0.281*(0.158) -0.389** (0.146) -0.398** (0.152) 
GDP per capita 0.361** (0.173) 0.355* (0.177) - 
Unemployment 0.168 (0.107) - - 
R² 0.622 0.596 0.549 
N 39 39 39 
Statistically significant *(10% level); **(5% level); ***(1% level). Standard Errors in brackets. 
It is crucial to avoid simplistic inferences when observing Table 25, because the impacts of 
each proposed explanatory variable cannot be interpreted in separate. In other words, 
perceptions of the usage of necessary legal corrupt behaviors in advanced democracies and 
emerging industrialized countries may be influenced by any of the selected variables of this 
subsection, but only a combination of levels of ‘Internet Usage’ and ‘Wastefulness of 
Government Spending’ can purely and simplistically explain how citizens perceive legality in 
corruption. As a final act, hypotheses GDP-H2k and Unemployment-H2l must be rejected 
definitely, while hypotheses Internet-H2d and Waste-H2g remain statistically relevant. 
5.3. Chapter highlights 
This chapter served to establish parameters for the explanation of legal corruption. In this 
sense, some important findings must be quoted: (i) legal corruption represents a complex 
interaction of socioeconomic factors; in which (ii) ‘Internet Usage’ and ‘Wastefulness of 
Government Spending’ play a crucial role. They proved to be not only correlated with the 
perception of legality in corruption, but also statically determinant for the process of finding 
effective causal relations. 
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Table 26 presents all ‘Step 2’ hypotheses and their respective results. Moderate levels of linear 
correlation were evidenced when considering almost all variables (only ‘Taxation’ and 
‘Government Debt’ did not confirm the expected relations proposed in chapter 3, subsection 
3.2.2.1. 
Table 26: Summing up: hypotheses tested (Step 2) 
Hypotheses (Step 2) Results 
 
Is there a latent 
correlation with 
legal corruption? 
Is such relation able to 
work as a necessary 
determinant for legal 
corruption in a 
multivariate linear 
analysis? 
Final 
Result 
Transparency and Accountability (T&A) 
Transp-H2a: The higher the level of 
transparency of government policymaking, 
the lower the perception of legal corruption 
in a country. 
Yes 
Moderate negative 
correlation 
No 
Hypothesis 
rejected 
Audit-H2b: The higher the strength of 
auditing, the lower the perception of legal 
corruption in a country. 
Yes 
Moderate negative 
correlation 
No 
Hypothesis 
rejected 
Press-H2c: The freer the press, the lower the 
perception of legal corruption in a country. 
Yes 
Moderate negative 
correlation 
No 
Hypothesis 
rejected 
Internet-H2d: The greater the internet usage, 
the lower the perception of legal corruption 
in a country. 
Yes 
Moderate to high 
negative correlation 
Yes 
Hypothesis 
confirmed 
Efficiency and Efficacy (E&E) 
RegQuality-H2e: The better the regulatory 
quality, the lower the perception of legal 
corruption in a country. 
Yes 
Moderate negative 
correlation 
No 
Hypothesis 
rejected 
LegFrame-H2f: The higher the efficiency of 
the legal framework in challenging 
regulations, the lower the perception of legal 
corruption in a country. 
Yes 
Moderate negative 
correlation 
No 
Hypothesis 
rejected 
Waste-H2g: The higher the wastefulness of 
government spending, the higher the 
perception of legal corruption in a country. 
Yes 
Moderate to high 
positive correlation 
Yes 
Hypothesis 
confirmed 
Burden-H2h: The higher the burden of 
government regulation, the higher the 
perception of legal corruption in a country. 
Yes 
Moderate positive 
correlation 
No 
Hypothesis 
rejected 
Macroeconomic conditions 
Tax-H2i: The higher the taxation, the higher 
the perception of legal corruption in a 
country. 
No 
Low positive 
correlation 
(not statistically significant) 
No 
Hypothesis 
rejected 
Debt-H2j: The bigger the government debt, 
the higher the perception of legal corruption 
in a country. 
No 
Low positive 
correlation 
(not statistically significant) 
No 
Hypothesis 
rejected 
GDP-H2k: The higher the GDP per capita, 
the lower the perception of legal corruption 
in a country. 
Yes 
Moderate negative 
correlation 
No 
Hypothesis 
rejected 
Unemployment-H2l: The higher the 
unemployment, the higher the perception of 
legal corruption in a country. 
Yes 
Moderate to low 
positive correlation 
No 
Hypothesis 
rejected 
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In conclusive terms, developing strategies to enhance ‘Internet Usage’ and reduce the 
‘Wastefulness of Government Spending’ makes citizens see less legal corruption in societies. 
Figure 10 summarizes such causal dependence between these two socioeconomic 
determinants and the perceived legal corruption in advanced democracies and emerging 
industrialized countries. 
 
Figure 10: A causal relation between socioeconomic conditions and legal corruption 
After all, perceiving legal corruption is not a mere consequence of improving judicial control 
or the quality of norms, it is a direct consequence of citizens’ acceptance of the necessity of 
using corruption in public institutions. Higher levels of legal corruption determine higher 
levels of relevance of corruption in the public arena (see chapter 4) and higher levels of a 
perceived usage of licit corrupt behaviors are determined by less direct transparency and 
more public inefficiency. In Dincer & Johnston’s (2015, p. 18) words, “reform cannot simply 
be a matter of laws, enforcement and punishment, […] [it] requires an open, credible political 
process […]”, i.e., it is impossible to fight against corruption without directing energy in 
combating a widespread perception of legal corruption in capital-oriented societies. 
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Chapter 6  
Main findings and conclusions 
Can legal corruption explain the reason why corruption itself is perceived as an important 
public problem among countries? The answer is yes. It is possible to affirm that the way in 
which citizens detect the necessity of using corrupt practices is in fact determined by the 
perception of the commitment of ‘beyond the law’ corruptions. Contrary to expectations, 
illegal corruption proved to be secondary to this process. It does not mean that illegalities 
are irrelevant to the matter at hand, their effects are just contradicted by ethical and moral 
standards. Societies have been fighting against a normative-based corruption, while people 
have been detecting that certain socially accepted behaviors – albeit approved by normative 
frameworks – are undoubtedly harmful to politics and consequently corrupt. 
Such legal corruption was here detected to be not only pervasive – as expected -, but also 
resilient and adaptable. Even controlling social implications (political stability and 
educational levels), it remained crucial for understanding the relevance of corruption as a 
major public problem in advanced democracies and emerging industrialized countries. 
Political stability and education, as well as illegal corruption, proved to be secondary 
dimensions of this problematics. In essence, the relevance of corruption must be seen as a 
phenomenon in which both illegal standards and social implications are just a part of the 
entire explanation, but they are not the explanation itself. 
Furthermore, legal corruption was also observed in detail. It was found that all expected 
correlations (and their proposed directions) were evidenced (only taxation and sovereign 
debt produced statistically insignificant results). However, only few variables described real 
multivariate causal implications, what leads to the conclusion that most correlations are only 
casuistry. In other words, the majority of the variables presented in chapter 5 were not 
relevant to describe the perception of legality in corruption reported by citizens in capital-
oriented societies. Only ‘Internet Usage’ and ‘Wastefulness of Government Spending’ 
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remained valid after running exhaustive econometric tests (linear regressions) and proved to 
be sufficient conditions to the process of determining legal corruption. The perception of a 
‘beyond the law’ corruption is no more than a reflex of citizens’ capacity of accessing public 
information directly (here seen as the usage of technologies to enhance transparency and 
accountability), ratifying the efficiency and efficacy of their political representation (here seen 
as the process of reducing the wastefulness of government spending), and fighting for 
political independence (here seen as a combination of the implementation of measures that 
boost direct transparency and mitigate public waste, i.e., actions that develop citizens’ 
empowerment and make public policies less market-oriented and more focused on essential 
social wills). Table 27 summarizes all these findings in one scheme, while Figure 11 shows 
the proposed causal nexuses in a diagrammatic manner. 
Table 27: Main Findings 
Questions answered Main Findings 
What determines the relevance of corruption as a 
major public problem in advanced democracies and 
emerging industrialized countries? 
 Illegal Corruption does not determine the 
relevance of corruption in advanced democracies 
and emerging industrialized countries 
 Political Stability and Education are secondary to 
explain the relevance of corruption in advanced 
democracies and emerging industrialized 
countries 
 Legal corruption is crucial and necessary to 
explain the relevance of corruption in advanced 
democracies and emerging industrialized 
countries 
What determines the perception of legality in 
corruption in advanced democracies and emerging 
industrialized countries? 
 Internet Usage and Wastefulness of government 
spending are the only necessary conditions to 
determine legal corruption 
 
 
Figure 11: A complete ‘beyond the law’ causal relation 
It is possible to conclude that legality in corruption can be unveiled by simply asking citizens 
if they consider corruption a relevant public problem in the public sector of their respective 
countries, instead of asking directly about legal dimensions of corruption. Additionally, it is 
also possible to perceive if corruption is a relevant public problem without directly asking 
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citizens about corruption, but about general socially accepted misconducts with regards to 
legal corruption, such as the necessity of establishing personal contacts to get things done; 
the capacity of distorting rules, norms, and statutes in order to make private interests 
resemble licit and politically acceptable; and the governments’ ability to do what tradespeople 
want without hindering citizens’ wills. 
Else, developing public policies, in which technological accessibility and control of 
government wastes appear, makes governments able to reduce citizens’ dissatisfaction with 
the way politics happens and, consequently, the way they perceive the necessity of using 
socially accepted corrupt strategies to be accepted in democracies or pseudodemocracies. Of 
course, policies will not be defined in order to control levels of perceived legality in 
corruption or evidenced relevance of corruption. However, they may encompass these 
elements to produce better anti-corruption strategies. The commitment of corruption is in 
fact a process that needs time to be tackled and certainly its mitigation will only be possible 
when combined with changes in moral standards. Anyway, changing perceptions of 
corruption in a slow and constant pace means accepting less corruption in the future. More 
political access, better political representation, and more governmental independence signify 
then less necessity to be corrupt or to corrupt the system. 
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